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Abstract
Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), represent a class of networks where continuous end-to-end con­
nectivity may not be possible, and even when it does exists, then it is highly delayed or disrupted. 
DTN is a well recognized area in networking research and has attracted extensive attention from 
both network designers and apphcation developers. Applications of this emerging communica­
tion paradigm are wide and include sensor networks, satelhte and space communication and Rural 
Area DTN (RA-DTN) for providing connectivity in developing regions. The real challenge for 
DTN in general and RA-DTN in particular is to hide end user identities by providing a level of 
privacy through anonymity and pseudonymity.
Privacy is a value shared by most human societies, and thus it is no longer an inherent assump­
tion; rather it has becomes a property that must be explicitly designed. Privacy by Design (PbD) is 
a new paradigm to achieve privacy from the design level rather an add on functionality. This work 
engineered PbD and has accomphshed privacy through Privacy by Architecture (PbA), Privacy by 
Resolution (PbR) and Privacy by Revocation (PbRe) mechanisms.
This thesis proposes a privacy solution for DTN in three phases; where the first two phases 
incorporate PbA concept while the third phase is embedded with PbR and PbRe. The first phase. 
Pseudonym Credential Phase, allow users to generate a blinded Pseudonym Credential from a 
Verifying Certificate Authority (VCA), which verify user through digital certificate. Our approach 
is based on BHnd Signature which prevents Certificate Authority from learning linking information 
about the user and content of the Pseudonym Credential. The second phase. Pseudonym Certific­
ate Issuance Phase, faciUtates users to anonymously authenticate to Issuing Certificate Authority 
(ICA) and obtained multiple Pseudonym Identities and Pseudonym Certificates. Our approach is 
based on the idea of embedding half resolution information directly in the Pseudonym Identity and 
the rest has been distributed in VCA and ICA. The third phase. Pseudonym Resolution and Re­
vocation Phase, enforces several ICAs and VCA which further cooperates for pseudonym-identity 
resolution and revocation at legitimate situations without entrusting any one of them. The pro­
posed protocols have been verified and validated through formal modeling in CasperFDR, also the 
study has employed an information theoretic quantification for different size of the system.
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Nomenclature
Acronyms
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
PReq Pseudonym Request message
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DTN Delay Tolerant Network
N4C Networking for Communications Challenged Communities
MANETs Mobile Ad hoc Networks
IPNs Interplanetary Networks
WSNs Wireless Sensor Networks
DTNRG Delay Tolerant Networking Research Group
RA-DTN Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network
IH Internet Hub
ISP Internet Service Provider
BLS Bundle Layer Security
DoS Denial of Service
BSP Bundle Security Protocol
PIB Payload Integrity Block
BAB Bundle Authentication Block
PCB Payload Confidentiality Block
PETs Privacy Enhancing Technologies
OR Onion Routing
VPN Virtual Private Network
PC Pseudonym Certificate
CA Certificate Authority
PbD Privacy by Design
PbP Privacy by Policy
PbA Privacy by Architecture
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NOMENCLATURE IV
PID Pseudonym Identity
CPIDRP Collaborative Pseudonym Identity Resolution Protocol
PbR Privacy by Resolution
PbRe Privacy by Revocation
CPCRP Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Protocol
PF Pseudonym Framework
W-LAN Wireless Local Area Network
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
CL Convergence Layer
EID Endpoint ID
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
AES Advance Encryption Standard
CASPER Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocol
loi Item of Interest
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
DoA Desgree of Anonymity
CSP Communication Sequential Processes
FDR Failure Divergence and Refinement
NSPK Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol
VCA Verifying Certificate Authority
ICA Issuing Certificate Authority
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PDA Privacy Distribution Authority
PRes Pseudonym Response
PT Pseudonym Token
L Law enforcement agency
RHST Revoked Hash String Table
IRHT Identity Resolution Hash Table
Notations
PCr Pseudonym Credential
b blinding factor
b~^ unblinding factor
BT Blinded Token
sBT sign Bhnded Token
NOMENCLATURE
real identity of user
4 ith fresh random number generated by user
p Digital Signature
p Partial Decryption Challenge
If Full Decryption Challenge
one time session key between vca and ica
pj^n public key of entity in the PF
Secret Key of entity in PF
Hash function of x variable
pvca Time stamp assigned by vca
HS^ ca Hash string i generated by vca
sUBT signed UnBlinded Token
K(%) Knowledge of X entity
GID Group ID
j^ GSK Group Symmetric Key
IHi Intermediate hop
TPK Threshold Public Key
TSK Threshold Secrete Key
TPKff^vca Threshold public key between CA’s
Threshold secret key of CA
p p n i Pseudonym public key of user
Pseudonym Secret Key
R C Hop count
nIH Non forwarding nodes
Q Number of compromise nodes
H(M) maximum entropy
Anonymity Set Size
^ h c hop count of compromised IH
XÿS Calculated
next hop
Number of compromised IH
X Number of possible senders in the range of IH
% unknown hash value
CRL based on real identity
NOMENCLATURE vi
CRLr  ^ Regional CRL based on PC’s
CRLsr Subregion CRL based on PC’s
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Internet is snccessfhlly deployed predominantly due to its competency to interconnect commu­
nication devices globally using a homogeneous set of protocols, called the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite. Internet architecture is built on a set of assumptions 
such as continuous bi-directional hnk between a communicating source and destination, relatively 
short round trip time, symmetric data rates and relatively low error rates [I]. Challenged networks 
are characterized by disabihties or impairments such as intermittent connectivity, high error rates 
and many more. Thus these networks do not meet Internet design and assumptions and shows the 
need for the Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) concept.
1.1 Delay Tolerant Network (DTN)
This concept is defined by the Delay Tolerant Networking Research Group (DTNRG) [2], it deals 
with architecture and protocol design to provide practical communication in challenged networks. 
It form an overlay architecture on top of a number of diverse regional networks such as Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks (MANETs), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), Satellite Networks, Interplanetary 
Networks (IPNs) and the Internet [3]. The Bundle Layer (BL) is a new protocol layer implemented 
in DTN architecture which provides store and forward message services. It ties together the region 
specific lower layer thus allow apphcation program to communicate across multiple regions. A 
Bundle is an application data transmission unit similar to a packet in Internet [4], it consists of 
source application’s user data, control information and header. DTN as networking concept for 
challenge environments, gained plethora popularity over the last few years. Therefore, it is a 
research interest in many topics such as military and disaster networks, environmental and wildlife 
monitoring, satellite and space communication, urban and rural areas.
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1.2 Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network (RA-DTN)
Technology has shown significant potentials in urban areas, and as a result Internet access is almost 
everywhere in urban areas. While rural areas lack affordable network connectivity or even if there 
is connectivity then it is often characterized by frequent delays, unpredictable outages, limited 
bandwidth and high cost. Existing technologies such as Internet, satellite based communication 
and cellular networks do not perform well due to certain reasons such as lack of fixed and mobile 
line infrastructure, cost (both installation and maintenance), efficiency and reliabihty.
Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network (RA-DTN) [5], [6], [7] is proposed as a viable solution 
for rural areas as it dominates existing solutions by providing tolerance to intermittent connectiv­
ity and long delays. In RA-DTN every village has one or more kiosk to collect user data. It is 
a shared area for villagers, equipped with computers, routers, network management unit and per­
sistent storage. User connects to the kiosk through their public web service or upload data to a 
mobile terminal such as bus, ferry etc (not mobile phones) which further connects to kiosk. Both 
kiosk and mobile terminal implements DTN architecture and provide store and forward mechan­
ism. Internet Hub(IH) collects data from every kiosk/village and forwards it to an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) through satellite or Internet. In RA-DTN, end users do not required costly equip­
ments, mobile terminal requires only a wireless device and persistent storage, kiosk host general 
purposes servers/gateways and only IH require equipments for satelhte communication. However 
IH provides services to multiple villages and thus its cost is shared. It does not requir any phone 
fine and through bundle layer, data is rehably and efficiently exchange between end users. There 
are several applications of RA-DTN mostly non real time such as news reporting, weather forecast. 
Telemedicine etc.
1.3 Bundle Layer Security
Traditional security requirements such as confidentiahty, integrity, authentication, non repudiation 
and privacy similar to other networks also hold for DTN [8]. The DTN endures security challenges 
such as bundle modification, unauthorized access. Denial of Service (DoS) and hiding identities 
etc. Bundle Layer Security (BLS) implements Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) [9] to achieve 
the aforementioned requirements. It consists of three security blocks i.e. Bundle Authentication 
Block (BAB), Payload Integrity Block (PIB) and Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB). These 
blocks provide hop-by-hop integrity and authentication, end-to-end integrity and authentication 
and end-to-end confidentiahty, respectively. Privacy among others such as key management, mul­
ticast, traffic analysis and trust is an open issue in DTN. There is no security block or mechanism
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available to hide end user identities [6] [10].
1.4 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
Privacy is intimately entwined with identity and defined as voluntary and temporary condition of 
separation from the pubhc domain. In other words privacy refers to the ability of an individual to 
control the distribution of information about him/her self. It does not necessarily mean that the 
personal information never gets revealed to anyone, rather a privacy preserving system that re­
spects user privacy will allow it to select what information is revealed and to whom. This personal 
information may include user’s physical address. Identity, reading/shopping habits, nationahty and 
email/IP address, [11] [12].
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) is a system which protects information privacy by 
eliminating or minimizing personal data. It also prevents unnecessary or unwanted processing of 
personal data distribution, without the loss of the functionality of the information system [13]. 
In PETs information privacy is persevered through techniques such as anonymity, pseudonymity, 
network coding and single proxy.
Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, the 
anonymity set [14]. MIX [15] is anonymity based system which accepts encrypted message, de­
crypts it and removes all sender related information. Further messages are stored in the buffer 
until trigger condition is reached and then reordered before forwarding to an appropriate node or 
destination. Onion Routing (OR) [16] is another anonymity technique based on layer encryption. 
It performs layered encryption for all intermediate hops in the path, the outermost layer of encryp­
tion is the first hop public key in the path and innermost layer of encryption is the destination’s 
public key. Generally, anonymity on one hand totally removes identifying information of the user 
but on the other hand it motivates abuse, malicious and illegal activities by providing a safe heaven 
to them.
Single proxy [17] is a naive method for achieving weak anonymity; all traffic between sender 
and receiver is directed through an intermediate authority called proxy, similar to Virtual Private 
Network (VPN). Network Coding, divides a message into multiple components and sends over 
multiple disjoint paths which is then assembled by the receiver [18].
A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other than one of the subject’s real names [14]. 
Pseudonym can be simple selection of a random number or an outcome of complex procedure 
which may involve more than one authority and some cryptographic operations. Pseudonyms are 
used as identity of the end users and Certificate Authority (CA) can issue Pseudonym Certificate 
(PC) for it. It provides conditional privacy or accountable anonymity because every pseudonym is
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resolvable to its real identity.
1.5 Engineering Privacy by Design
The term Privacy by Design (PbD) has been proposed by data protection policy makers (Inform­
ation Commissioners Office Canada) [19]. In this approach, privacy requirements are integrated 
from the start i.e. prior to the development of PETs system and the control on privacy is main­
tained throughout the system’s life cycle. It ensures that privacy controls are stronger, simpler 
to implement, harder to by-pass and totally embedded in the systems core functionality. There 
are four sub approaches of PbD that is Privacy by Architecture (PbA), Privacy by Policy (PbP), 
Privacy by Resolution (PbR) and Privacy by Revocation (PbRe). The PbA model focuses on data 
minimization and restricting authorities to keep and manipulate personal data, PbP aims on enfor­
cing policies/regulations in data processing. PbR deals with preserving privacy after pseudonym- 
identity resolution, PbRe keep the real identity secret from non participating CA’s and known 
to single legitimate CA. Engineering the PbD requires integrating all the above PbD concepts 
and to embed privacy requirements into the typical systems engineering activities. This mainly 
requires developing the design which fulfils those requirements, analyzing privacy, measuring pri­
vacy, threat analysis and modehng privacy. The design of the system must provide engineered 
methods for the involved entities in the PETs system.
1.6 Research Motivation
The fundamental architecture of Internet is designed without considering users privacy or an­
onymous communication. Since DTN is an overlay on regional networks, therefore it also lacks 
of mechanism for BP which can preserve user’s privacy. The three security blocks BAB, PIB 
and PCB of BSP guarantee authentication, integrity and confidentiality respectively. But this is 
not enough since traffic data still encodes information about conununication partner’s identity and 
location, duration of communications and frequency of the communication .
The existing work of privacy in DTN mainly focuses on privacy preserving solutions and 
provides soft privacy guarantees: a mechanism based on trusting authorities to protect data. Trust 
assumptions is dangerous and may not be realistic because the system may:
• accidently leak the private information to adversary.
• be broken by compromised node or misuse for incentives by node inside in it i.e. insider 
attack.
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• can be single point of failure and malicious outsiders may exploit its vulnerabilities.
Existing privacy solutions are based on two well known PETs techniques i.e. onion routing 
[ 16] and mixing [20]. Onion routing and its various sub techniques are not suitable for DTN as they 
rely on source routing and assuming end to end conununication path both ways. It is not possible 
for the DTN node to know the exact path and their public keys for layer encryption. A MIX 
node accepts encrypted message, decrypt it and removes all sender related information. Further 
messages are stored in the buffer until trigger condition (number of active cormections/buffered 
messages) is reached; messages are reordered before forwarding or flushing to appropriate node. 
The delay factor of mix node makes it harder for the adversary to correlate incoming packets to 
outgoing packets. In DTN, forwarder node accepts the custody of the bundle in case of delay and 
disruptive communication link. Thus, MIX node magnifies the overall delay of conununication 
link and therefore, it is not suitable for DTN.
Little past experience in other networks exists in designing systems with privacy in mind 
such as PbD. There is also lack of engineered mechanism to drive PbD firom the design level. 
Applications such as anonymous news reporting and anonymous Telemedicine in RA-DTN are 
the motivations for this undertaken work.
1.7 Research Problem
Providing privacy to the end user through pseudonym identity and pseudonym certificates is ex­
plored in other networking technologies such as Internet [21] [22] and Vehicular Ad hoc Networks 
(VANETs) [23] [24]. However there are still some open problems:
• Credential The credential is not generated securely and therefore leaks information either 
in certificate issuance or in accountability stage. There is no engineered policy for the 
number of credentials and certificates a user can be granted and issued respectively.
• Trust The user either show complete or partial trust on CA that it will not reveal user’s 
information dehberately or unintentionally to others certificate authorities at the time of 
pseudonym identity certificate request.
• Anonymous channel While obtaining a pseudonym certificate from the certificate au­
thority anonymous channel is required for unlinkability.
• Perfect forward privacy The resolution/revocation mechanisms are not well established, 
therefore, after resolution/revocation of pseudonym identity, the real identity is revealed to
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one or more authorities. Perfect forward privacy will enforce that linking information is 
available to legitimate authorities and user real identity is not disclosed.
1.8 Research Contributions
While not much have been done with regards to privacy research in DTN, the existing privacy 
solutions are either tailored towards a complete trust in authorities or designed based on internet 
assumptions or both. We investigate the DTN architecture, its characteristics, environment of 
deployment, apphcations and what make privacy design in DTN different from conventional wired 
and wireless networks. The contributions of this thesis are twofold : first, it fills the research gap 
of privacy in DTN architecture in general and Telemedicine application of RA-DTN in particular. 
Second, it also solve the problems in pseudonym based solutions and redesign engineered PbD 
which is comphant with DTN. Following is the fist of undertaken contributions.
1. We proposed PbA based Pseudonym Credential mechanism, which allow user to get non 
traceable secure Pseudonym Credential (PCr) from the blinded token. It is not possible for 
CA to link this particular (PCr) to real identity if presented later.
2. We have proposed Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase, it provides secure and private 
group communication through which user is able to obtain anonymously Pseudonym Iden­
tity (PID) and Pseudonym Certificate (PC) by spending credential (PCr).
3. Privacy by Resolution (PbR) mechanism is proposed through Collaborative Pseudonym 
Identity Resolution Protocol (CPIDRP). The protocol preserved user’s privacy from ad­
versary and CAs.
4. Privacy by Revocation (PbRe) is proposed through Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate 
Revocation Protocol (CPCRP). In this protocol the regional CA revoked only self signed 
certificate without knowing the real identity of the user, however the regional certificate 
authority will be able to revoke all issued pseudonym certificates.
1.9 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized into 8 chapters and 2 appendices, the remaining chapters are as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses first challenged networks and applications that motivates the apphcability 
of DTN architecture. DTN architecture and related concepts such as Bundle layer. Bundle Pro­
tocol, regions etc are listed. The second half describes security requirements and threats to DTN, 
Bundle Security Protocol and its various blocks. Finally, some open security issues are discussed.
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Chapter 3 discusses PETs and its related concepts including its techniques, systems and at­
tacks. This is followed by a discussion on techniques such as anonymity, pseudonymity, OR, MIX, 
network coding etc. Different methods for analysis and verification of PETs will be discussed in 
details.
First half of Chapter 4 focuses on the role of DTN for providing network connectivity services 
to rural areas through RA-DTN, followed by privacy requirements and motivation in Telemedicine 
application of it. The second half discusses the proposed Pseudonym Framework (PF) for DTN in 
general and for the said application in particular followed by brief introduction of phases.
Chapter 5 describes Pseudonym Credential Phase, the first phase of PF. It begins with hsting 
requirements, assumptions and pohcy for signing tokens. The phase is elaborated with messages 
exchanged between user and authorities for the grant of signing policy and credentials. Further 
analysis of privacy attacks and formal model is presented.
Chapter 6 describe Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase, the second phase of PF, it uses the 
services of first phase. Group communication and its deployment in RA-DTN application for 
hiding the link between user and message. Requirements, assumptions and protocol messages 
are further discuss. Formal modeling and information theoretic analysis of the second phase is 
presented.
Chapter 7 describes the third and the last phase i.e. Pseudonym Revocation and Resolution 
Phase. This phase lists two protocols that is CPIDRP and CPCRP with engineered mechanism of 
messages exchange. The proposed Pseudonym Framework is compared with ADTN and V token 
solutions for few common parameters.
Chapter 8 draws the conclusions of thesis and outlines directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Delay Tolerant Networks and Bundle 
Layer Security
DTN concept is defined by the DTNRG[2], aims to develop an architecture and protocol design 
which can fulfil the communication problem arising in challenge and extreme environments where 
end-to-end connectivity can not be assumed. This chapter briefly discussed challenged networks 
and its possible apphcations. The search for an efficient means of sustaining communication in 
these networks outcomes the concept of DTN. It is unique type of wireless networks where a 
complete path from source to destination is not in existence most of the time, and even when it 
does exist, it is highly unstable and unpredicted. This chapter discusses; DTN architecture its 
related concepts and characteristics.
DTN bundle layer security provides security architecture through hop by hop/end to end in­
tegrity, end to end confidentiahty and hop by hop authentication. Three types of bundle security 
blocks such as PIB, PCB and BAB achieve the security requirements i.e. integrity, confidentiahty, 
authentication and non repudiation in DTN. At the end of this chapter some open issues related to 
DTN security are identified.
2.1 Challenged Networks
Wireless networks which includes both Wireless Local Area Network (W-LAN) and cellular net­
works have become essential part of our hfe. We are surrounded by wireless devices in both private 
and pubhc places making ubiquitous access a reality. These widespread wireless devices can be 
connected over wireless hnks in order to provide services. The most serious challenge arises in 
the case when the network connectivity can not be guaranteed and it leads to delay and disruption 
in the communication. The causes of these disruption can be no line of sight, node mobility, short
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range of communication etc.
Therefore current networking technologies such as Internet do not provide connectivity be­
cause they are based on a set of assumptions [1],[25] which are not always true. These assumptions 
are end to end connectivity, symmetric data rate, low error rate, short round trip time, disconnec­
tion and interpretability. To fill the gap and provide network connectivity to challenged networks 
environment the concept of DTN is evolved and currently receiving great attention from both aca­
demia and industry. The popular examples from these challenging environments are the newly 
evolved IPN[26], Satellite networks, WSNs and many more. As an example National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) was communicating with their Mars rover, in that communic­
ation they suffer from two problems; high latency and frequent broken/intermittent link. These 
kinds of environments are not very viable for existing Internet protocols.
2.2 DTN Motivating Application Scenarios
DTN emerged in 2002 and currently different applications and networks start taking advantage of 
its unique architecture. This section will divide these applications into broad categories and sub 
categories. [27],[6],[28],[29],[10].
2.2.1 Military
These networks operate in very harsh and hostile environments where disconnection is a constant 
feature due to mobility, intentional januning or environmental factors. These type of networks 
are characterized by high intermittent connectivity, destruction, noise attack, interference, low 
transmission reliabihty etc. Currently, First Mile Solutions[30] and KioskNet[31] are two popular 
projects.
Airborne networks [32] and Naval networks [33] are the two types of network that fits well 
with DTN because both have dynamic nature of topology with multiple heterogenous links. There­
fore bundle layer of DTN can act as independent layer on the top of network specific Conver­
gence Layer (CL) and network technologies. CONDOR system [34] is military application of 
DTN which implemented a DTN enabled web proxy, also support Space Communication Pro­
tocol Standard Transport Protocol(SCPS-TP).
2.2.2 Disconnected Areas
The Saami Network Connectivity (SNC) [35] project (part of Networking for Communications 
Challenged Communities(N4C) project) explored the DTN concept for providing Internet service
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to Padjelanta national park in Laponia, Sweden; a UNESCO world heritage site, which lacks infra­
structure. Mines are another extreme and disconnected environment where DTN can be deployed, 
for example it can be used to deliver message down to the hole carrying the mobile devices rather 
building infrastmcture network. Finland [36] demonstrated initial deployment of DTN using mo­
bile phones for mines.
2.2.3 Environmental and Wildlife Monitoring
Environmental and Wildlife monitoring requires a network of data sensors with acoustic, seismic, 
video and some data processing capabilities. Mobile data mules such as buses, cars, boats can 
be made to travel among the sensors to collect data and transfer them to the data authorities. 
Lakes pollution is increasing problem currently facing by large part of the world and thus can 
be monitored using sensors deployment. Ireland [37] and MANA [38] project exploited DTN 
architecture to provide communication through deployment of data mule as boat which collect 
data from sensors and transfer it to data authorities in scheduled manners. MANA metallurgical 
data transfer can use DTN concept which may collect data from DTN regions to transfer to the 
headquarter through Internet.
Environmental Monitoring in Metropolitan Areas(EMMA) [39] project deals with air pollution 
in urban area, where data is collected through public transport buses/trams and exchanged through 
DTN technology. Light Under Shrub Thicket for Environmental Research (LUSTER) [40] used 
DTN as storage layer and bridges two wireless networks.
2.2.4 Urban Areas
DTN applicability is demonstrated in urban settings despite of Internet and other technologies 
because of cost effectiveness (financial or power). DieselNet [41] network composed of 40 buses 
covers 150 sq.miles, allows researcher to collect valuable information on connectivity patterns and 
to improve DTN routing algorithms. BikeNet [42] project deal with collecting information from 
bicycles and motorbikes using DTN for normal transmission and 3G/4G for urgent/emergency 
transmission. Smart Caching [43] provides uninterrupted continuous services by deploying DTN 
for accommodating delay (no timeouts) and proactive in high speed connectivity. This way provide 
high speed video streaming over occasional connection in highways.
2.2.5 Terrestrial Mobile Networks
Mobile networks also sometimes lacks the availability of end to end connectivity between the 
communication parties. These networks are characterized by large End-to-end delay, mobility, in­
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termittent connectivity etc. Due to this reason the existing protocols are unable to provide reliable 
and stable communication infrastructure. However DTN’s architecture is suitable for these net­
works and some researchers are exploring its use to replace the current mobile communication in­
frastructure. There are several projects in the past and some ongoing such as DOME [44],SARAH 
[45],HAGGLE [46] considering DTN architecture for terrestrial networks.
2.2.6 Satellite and Space Communication
These networks are prone to high delays and predictable disruption, and may be disconnected due 
to environmental factors such as weather. Networks such as these provide predictably-available 
store-and-forward network service. DTN is already tested by NASA and many other universities in 
Europe and other part of the world as a viable solution for satellite networks, and hence improved 
the performance.
The launching part of Deep-Space missions have implemented DTN architecture due to long 
delays in orbit settings, packet loss, and long delays in reaching the communication signal to 
devices on earth from deep space. NASA has successfully developed the first deep space commu­
nication network modeled on Internet using DTN architecture.
2.2.7 Sensor Networks
Small sensors devices combined together and form sensor networks to provide communication in 
challenge environments. In these networks end nodes are limited in terms of power, memory and 
CPU capability. The intermittent path, power saving, sparse deployment properties includes them 
in challenged networks. NASA JPL[47]is ongoing project which consider these and its relevant 
type of networks. DTNLite [48], TinyOS , iMote2 [39], Contiki [49] are some of the example of 
DTN architecture deployment.
2.2.8 Developing Areas
Providing Internet and connectivity service in isolated and developing areas includes many chal­
lenges such as infrastructure unavailability, cost of installing and maintaining equipments and 
many more. These networks are characterized by intermittent connectivity, mobility, sparse de­
ployment, high propagation delay etc. DakNet [50] project deployed DTN concept to provide 
network service in rural areas of India and Cambodia. This project implemented data mules (bus, 
motorbike) an offline means to move data between disconnected points. Electronic health ser­
vices in developing area plays an important role for the delivery of health care. DTN is beneficial 
in these application because it requires guaranteed transmission of non real time information.
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Teleconsultation in Ghana already deployed DTN architecture and provides health services to the 
citizens [51], [52], [53].
2.3 Characteristics of Challenged Networks
These networks are characterized by the following:[54],[3].
•  Long/variable delays: Long propagation delays (in the order of few seconds to few days) 
between participating nodes and various other delays such as queuing, transmission etc 
contribute to magnify end to end path delays, which defeat Internet protocol and TCP/IP.
•  Interm ittent connectivity: If there is no permanent or stable end to end link path between 
sender and receiver of the packet called network partitioning or intermittent connectivity. 
All existing networks perform poorly in this situation.
•  Asymmetric data rate: Those Networks in which there is substantial difference between 
bi directional data rates are also fall in challenged networks and conventional network tech­
nologies do not provide support in these conditions.
•  High E rror rate: Both sporadic loss of connection and fluctuating link cause high error 
rates in transmission and thus data is dropped or not completely transferred.
2.4 DTN Overview
In late 1990s IPN [26] initiated the feasibility of applying Internet architecture for space and 
satellite communication. However due to transmission time out, weather conditions space links 
suffered from high error rates, harsh space conditions and spacecraft movement make the continu­
ous communication link very fragile and short (last for few minutes). Therefore Internet architec­
ture fails to operate in these extreme conditions in which end to end path between two nodes may 
not available.
IPN project engenders DTN, a new communication model based on store and forward mech­
anism which means bundles (messages) from distinct/common sender may opportunistically be 
buffered at some common intermediate nodes and make DTN distinguished from other networks. 
It can be viewed as an overlay on the top of the regional networks including Internet [1], sometimes 
called "DTN is network of regional networks”. The DTN overlay architecture operates above the 
existing protocol stacks found in other network architectures [55]. For example in the Internet 
the overlay may operate over transport layer of TCP/IP [1]. For example, bundle communication
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may utilize a TCP or UDF convergence layer to ride on top of an Internet Protocol network. In 
the Interplanetary Internet it might operate over File Delivery Protocol (CFDP/CCSDS) [56]. In 
VANETs it may operates between datalink and network layer [57], [58]. In IP over DTN archi­
tecture [59] it may operate over datalink layer and requires UDP as upper layer to cope with long 
delays. In sensor/actuator networks it may operate over sensor transport protocol [60].
DTN handles the characteristics aforementioned of the challenged network in a robust way 
[25]. It can provides communication in the case when link are not available for long time i.e. 
hours to days through store and forward mechanism. The DTN protocol implementation is mainly 
characterized by well known research; ’’Delay Tolerant Networking Architecture”[4] and ’’Bundle 
protocol implementation[27]”.
2.5 DTN Architecture
DTN is a message-based store-and-forward overlay network architecture, unlike IP networks that 
are based on fixed-length packets. In Fig.2.1 source is the originator of the bundle, destination is 
the recipient of the bundle. Network-1, 2, 3 may be any networks discussed earlier with distinct 
characteristics. Both source and destination network have separate gateways. Every node in DTN 
network has persistent storage in which it buffers messages if a communication link to other node 
is not available. DTN router provides services between two or more regions. Bundle layer is a 
new layer introduced by DTN architecture and will be discussed more in details later in the next 
section.
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Bundle Bundle Bundle Bundle
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Figure 2.1: Delay Tolerant Networks Architecture
The DTN architecture is designed to facilitate interoperability using a naming syntax that sup­
ports a wide range of naming and addressing conventions. The three classes of service provided by
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the architecture during bundle delivery are; Bulk (least prioritized class which supports shipping 
of bundles on a ’least effort’ basis); Normal (second prioritized class with its bundles given prefer­
ence over those of bulk and after those of expedited class) and Expedited (the most prioritized class 
with its bundle given preference over other classes). The concept of contact was also addressed 
because of DTN nodes not being online continuously. Contact as defined is ’’the time interval 
during which the time varying capacity of a link is positive to move messages from their origin 
toward their destination.” The five types of contacts (also known as communication opportunities) 
are: Persistent (always available), On-demand (requires action for instantiation), Opportunistic 
(cause to happen by unexpected opportunity). Schedule (based on prior agreement) and Predicted 
(based on history of previous availability) [61]. When the bundle protocol wants to send a bundle 
to the next DTN node, it generally checks the status of the link towards this destination by asking 
the lower layer e.g. TCP for socket availability. If the answer is positive, the link is considered 
open and active and the bundle is passed to the lower layer for transmission [62].
2.6 DTN concepts
2.6.1 Bundle Layer
DTN is store-and-forward message switching architecture [55] by overlaying a new protocol layer 
called bundle layer as shown in Figure 2.1. Bundle layer is implemented between transport and 
application layer of traditional Internet model. The bundle layer can store entire bundle or frag­
mented bundle in its buffer in case of intermittent connectivity. It was designed as a common plat­
form implemented by every node to provide interoperability across heterogeneous entities while 
offering persistent storage to accommodate network interruption.
2.6.2 Bundle Protocol (BP)
The unit of transmission in Internet is know as message or packet, but in DTN the unit of transmis­
sion is called bundle. BP [27] consists of application data and control information by source for 
destination. Bundle can be transmitted as a whole or broken into fragments. When Alice wants to 
send data to Bob then Alice generates the bundle and sends to intermediate nodes that may store 
it for significant period of time if the link to destination is broken. Whenever the link is available 
it immediately sends it to destination. The delay could be hours to days/month.
Key capabilities of BP are; ability to cope with intermittent connectivity, handle long propaga­
tion delays, custody based retransmission and traverse low layer networks. It supports imple­
mentation of a layer called CL as a mean to send and receive bundles from underlying ’’native
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protocols”. The manner, in which CL sends and receives bundles, is totally implementation matter 
and can have different requirements according to underlying protocol.
2.6.3 DTN Node
A DTN node is an entity which implements the ’’bundle layer ”. Each node has unique Endpoint 
ID (EID) consisting of region naming part and administrative naming part. In this thesis we will 
consider EID as the ID of a node which uniquely identified that node in that specific region.
Host
A host can be sender or receiver of the bundle having storing/buffering capability to store bundle in 
case of long delays or intermittent connectivity. Hosts can optionally support custody of a bundle, 
but it all depends on the routing mechanism/algorithms.
Router
In DTN, router forwards bundle which are destined for the same region and provide persistent stor­
age for bundles until availability of outbound communication link. Routers can support custody 
transfer but it all depends on the implemented routing algorithm and technique.
Gateway
DTN gateway are mainly used for inter communication, it can forward bundle between two or 
more regions. Ideally gateway should support custody of bundles, sometimes provide conver­
sions facility between the underlaying protocols. Gateways are entry points of region and enforce 
policy/control for the region. These are different from traditional IP network gateways in a sense 
they are focused on reliable message routing instead of best effort packet switching.
Forwarder
A DTN forwarder is primarily responsible for forwarding of bundles between nodes through un­
derlying region specific transport protocol. Forwarding may involve storage and scheduling of 
bundles, aggregation of bundles, generation of status reports and enforcement of security policy.
2.6.4 DTN Region and Custody Transfer
DTN is network of regional networks and every region has its unique identity called region iden­
tity, known to all other regions and nodes belonging to that region. In DTN, region can be tradi­
tional Internet, sensor network, military tactical network and many more. Generally if two nodes
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in a network communicate with each other without consulting a gateway, are supposed to belong 
to same region. EID is composed of entity lD(name of entity) and region specific lD(name of 
region).
DTN supports retransmission of corrupted or lost bundles at bundle layer. The BP implements 
node to node retransmission by means of custody transfer. If a node do not receive custody ac­
knowledgement within a specific time frame after sending bundle then it retransmits the bundle 
assuming loss or corruption in the bundle transmission. However accepting custody of bundle is 
optional for nodes and routers but mandatory for gateways.
2.7 Bundle Layer Security
The following concepts are necessary prior to discussion on bundle layer security.
Source: The node which originates the bundle.
Security Source: The node which applies all security functions.
Destination: The node to which the bundle is finally destined.
Security Destination: The node which process all security functions applied by security source. 
In other networks, security methods attempt to mutually authenticate user identities and the in­
tegrity of messages, but do not attempt to authenticate routers that forward information. In DTN, 
forwarding nodes (routers and gateways) are also authenticated, and sender information is authen­
ticated by forwarding nodes [63]. The security challenges, threats, requirements, security blocks 
and opens issues are discussed in this section [64], [8], [9].
2.7.1 Threats
According to [8],[65],[66] the possible security threats can be summarized as follows:
Overlay security threats
An overlay network inherits all of the good and all of the bad of the underlying networks upon 
which it resides. For example, if an overlay network passes over three different concatenated 
underlying networks, then the overlay network is vulnerable to all of the insecurities of any of 
the underlying networks. This makes overlay networks much more difficult to secure as one has 
to secure each underlying network in addition to applying proper security to the network overlay 
itself. On the other hand, if an overlay network resides on a very secure underlying network, 
one may be able to simply secure the overlay network by securing the underlying network. For 
example, if one already has a closed, secure Internet Protocol (IP) network and is running an
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overlay network such as DTN on top, one may be willing to simply allow IP security to handle the 
overlay networks security needs [64].
Bundle Modification
DTN is overlay on top of regional networks, so it may traverse underlying heterogeneous networks 
and thus bundle can be forged or misused for malicious activities. Malicious nodes can also inject 
fake bundles to consume precious resource, they can also delete bundle to avoid legitimate users 
from specific operation.
Unauthorized Access
Due to resource scarcity characteristics of DTN, unauthorized access and use of DTN resources 
leaves legitimate DTN users in serious trouble and these could be catastrophic for the network. 
Unauthorized users could control the network and setup inefficient routes.
Denial-of-Service
The aim of DoS attack is to prevent authorized users from accessing a service they are allowed 
to access in normal circumstances. The reasons for launching DoS attacks can be many and 
varied: to exhaust the power of energy constrained nodes such as sensors, prevent legitimate 
nodes from receiving authentic messages, or increasing the time at which DTN nodes respond to 
messages [67].
Privacy/Anonymity
DTN same as traditional Internet lack privacy mechanism which can hide the identities of end 
user while communicating with each other. Applications like political reporting and medical data 
transfer require such mechanism to hide end user identities. The bundle security protocol lack 
such solution and therefore this thesis will focus on the design and analysis of it.
DTN can also be vulnerable to some other threats[68] like, dropping packets, flooding the 
network with unnecessary packets, spoofing a node, corrupting routing states, counterfeiting ac­
knowledgements, amendment in bundle control fields and blocks and many more.
Compromised/Big Brother Certificate Authorities
In a PKl, the user is issued with a digital certificate by an authorized entity such as a Certification 
Authority (CA) and Registration Authority (RA). However, these authorities are assumed honest 
and resistant to attacks but in 2011, several public certification authorities were attacked, and
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at least two attacks resulted in the successful issuance of fraudulent certificates by the attackers. 
Theses authorities from the privacy aspect may be perceived, as a ’’Big Brother”, when pseudonym 
identity and certificate both are generated by single authority. This is because such entities can 
always map a pseudonym in a certificate they issued to the name of the real user to whom it was 
issued. DTN’s gateways act as CA for users, thus can be compromised or becomes big brother. 
This threat is not studied in DTN and the work in this thesis will provide solution for this problem.
2.7.2 Requirements 
Confidentiality
In DTN, confidentiality is to ensure that sensitive information in the bundle is not revealed to 
unauthorized party during propagation.
Integrity
Integrity is to assure that the transmitted message can not be altered during the propagation from 
source to destination, thus lacking of it can cause the system to be attacked i.e. replay attacks, 
message modification etc.
Authentication
Generally, authentication is used to verify the identity of nodes in communication system and 
distinguish legitimate user from malicious users. However in DTN authentication is essential for 
every intermediate node, in other words, every node in system must have the capability to verify 
the data, that it is from authorized node and legitimate class of service for which they are allowed. 
In DTN authentication can be hop by hop or end to end basis depending on security design goals.
Privacy/Anonymity
Privacy in literature is defined contextually however, Pfitzmann[14] defined it as the boundaries 
around the subject attributes and restricting the rights to use, manipulate and share those attributes. 
Anonymity is one of the technique for preserving privacy. It is the state of being not identifiable 
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set. DTN network should not reveal the location and 
identities of the participating entities.
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2.7.3 Bundle Security Blocks
The BSP defines four types of security blocks. The Fig.2.2 shows operation of different bundle 
security blocks.
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Figure 2.2: Bundle Security Blocks 
Bundle Authentication Block (BAB)
BAB is used to assure the authenticity and integrity of the bundle along a single hop from for­
warder to intermediate receiver. Thus BAB is computed at every node and checked at every re­
ceiving node on every hop along the way from source to destination. The current bundle security 
protocol specification defines only one mandatory ciphersuite which is based on shared secret 
using long term pre shared symmetric key.
Payload Integrity Block (PIB)
PIB is used to assure authenticity and integrity of the bundle. PIB operates in both mode i.e. hop 
by hop and end to end unlike BAB which operates in former only. PIB is supposed to use the 
same ciphers suits as BAB. When both are present at a time in security design then BAB should 
be calculated first and this way it forms and outer layer.
Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB)
The PCB provides confidentiality by encrypting the bundle payload totally or partly in an ’’end- 
to-end” manner. The PCB indicates that some parts of the bundle have been encrypted at the 
PCB security source in order to protect the bundle content while in transit to the PCB security- 
destination. The only mandatory ciphersuit for PCB is using Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) for 
key management and Advance Encryption Standard (AES) for bulk encryption.
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2.7.4 Challenges/open issues
BSP specification defined a workable general security architecture for DTN, but still there are 
some open issues [6],[66],[63] some of which are explored and some still need attention from the 
research community.
Trade-off Between Security and Performance
There is always an overhead when security is implemented in a particular network. Digital sig­
nature supports authentication and integrity, while encryption provides confidentiality, but these 
may incur significant performance overhead, which may prevent or efrect its real world deploy­
ment. The causes of this performance degradation can be several i.e. the size of digital signature 
and digital certificates is from tens to hundreds of bytes, which put extra transmission and storage 
overhead on the system. The cause can also be signature verification, which includes extensive 
computational operations, and thus verifying these signatures hop by hop slow down the propaga­
tion of bundle. Enciyption is also one of the cause, as the receiving parties need to decrypt the 
message, which involves some cryptographic computational operations, which can slow down the 
system. Therefore trade-off between security and performance is a critical research challenge for 
DTN.
Key Management
Key management is one of the important problem that still focus of many researchers in every 
architecture such as Internet, MANETs, WSN etc. However in DTN, key management is more 
challenging task because of delay and intermittent connectivity to CA . The X.509 is well known 
certificate mechanism defined in literature, but there is still need a clear specification on its pro­
cessing in DTN. The only generally applicable schemes currently DTN implemented is equivalent 
to shared secrets. Therefore key management still deserve more investigation in DTN community.
Trust
The existing DTN routing scheme depends on the hypothesis that each node on the way is ready 
to forward packets, and therefore every node is trusted. However, selfish nodes can easily violate 
this trust assumption and intentionally waste wireless resources by acting as relay for bundles. So 
there is need to thwart these selfish nodes and differentiate between trusted and non-trusted node. 
Therefore a need of complete trust architecture is needed which can clearly defines the criteria of 
trust on nodes.
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Multicast Security
In DTN there is no mechanism defined for restricting the nodes to join a multicast address. The 
security architecture does not address which nodes may register to a multicast EID. Malicious node 
can join the multicast EID and can receive bundle destined for that EID. In DTN, nodes are mobile 
and topology changes rapidly, so membership of node to a multicast address is hard to define. 
Malicious node can subscribe for membership and remain part of multicast address despite of 
identified malicious inaccurate member. Therefore a secure multicast solution is required, which 
can figure out malicious and legitimate nodes at time of subscription to multicast address and 
maintain it.
Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce informa­
tion from communication patterns. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted[69] [70]. 
In DTN, traffic analysis issue and its solution is debated twofold; first, whether there is requirement 
of traffic analysis mechanism at bundle layer, or can be handled by the underlying technologies 
accordingly. Secondly, if DTN is deployed at bundle layer then such mechanism may be designed 
which should consume less resources.
Access Control
Authentication and Authorization are two processes that can be used to provide access con­
trol. This can be part of the key management procedures or performed separately. It protects 
the network from unauthenticated entities and usage of network resources from unauthorized 
entities. Centralized and decentralized architectures are known architectures for access control 
implementation[71 ]. However due to disconnected nature of DTN, centralized architecture would 
fail to deliver, and distributed architecture is hard to implement, therefore a hierarchical architec­
ture is required to implement.
Privacy
The fundamental architecture of Internet is built on the top of TCP/IP protocol suit, which is 
designed regardless of user’s privacy or anonymous communication. The core IP protocol make 
it easy on the network layer to route messages, but ensuring users to communicate anonymously 
is extremely difficult as source and destination addresses are provided explicitly in the IP header. 
DTN is a technology used when TCP/IP breaks, thus there is no such mechanism built in the 
BP which preserve the user location and identity privacy. In DTN where connectivity is itself a
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big issue considering privacy is challenging task, because of loose network boundaries, malicious 
nodes are more active compare to Internet [72].
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we briefly discussed Internet assumptions and its infeasibility for challenge net­
works. DTN, a store and forward message based architecture and its applicability for challenged 
networks such as satellite/space networks, sensor/actuator networks, networks in developing re­
gions were discussed. DTN concepts are summarized in table.2.1.
Bundle Application-defined payload and metadata.
DTN node Entity that communicates using the Bundle Protocol (BP).
Endpoint Collection of one or more DTN nodes.
Endpoint ID 
(EID)
Unique name of an endpoint, encoded as a URI.
Convergence
layer
Module to map the Bundle Protocol to an underlying network 
technology or protocol.
Custody trans­
fer
Hop by hop reliability framework used in the Bundle Protocol.
DTN region A region composing a DTN, in which communication character­
istics are homogeneous and has a unique region ID.
Table 2.1: Delay Tolerant Network Concepts
The second part of this chapter discussed DTN bundler layer security and reviewed; security 
threats such as bundle modification, unauthorized access, DoS attacks and user privacy. Further, 
DTN security requirements which are same as traditional Internet were also discussed. Different 
bundle security blocks were briefly discussed in order to meet the security requirements. The 
chapter is concluded with current open issues and challenges focusing DTN security.
Chapter 3
Privacy Enhancing Technologies: A 
Review
Privacy on the Internet is becoming important due to increasing part of everyday life takes place 
over the Internet. But Internet users are loosing control over their personal information shared 
on Internet. PETs helps user to enforce control on accessing private information on the Internet. 
The first half of this chapter will discuss PETs and then related concepts such as pseudonyms and 
anonymity. Further the techniques used for developing PETs and attacks on these systems will be 
explored. Literature review of different PETs systems based on different techniques such as OR, 
mixing and pseudonymity will be discuss.
The second half of the chapter will focus on quantification and formal modeling of PETs 
system. Information entropy is used for measuring the uncertainty of the attacker before and 
after the attack. The anonymity metrics such as 1-p (probability), anonymity set size, degree 
of anonymity and combinational anonymity presented here can be applied to a wide range of 
anonymity systems.
Protocols aiming security or privacy is a set of cryptographic messages exchange between 
users to achieve certain goals. There are several well known approaches that proven successful 
for modeling and analysis of security protocol, however model checking is one of the fully and 
widely adopted automated analysis tool based on state machines. Compiler for the Analysis of 
Security Protocol (CASPER) [73] is a compiler developed by Oxford University that complies 
abstract security protocols into machine readable program.
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3.1 Privacy
Privacy defined by Patricia Newell; a voluntary and temporary condition of separation from the 
public domain [72]. In other words privacy refers to the ability of the individual to control distribu­
tion of information about him/her self. It does not necessarily mean that your personal information 
never gets revealed to anyone, rather a privacy preserving system that respects your privacy will 
allow you to select what information is revealed and to whom. This personal information may be 
any of a large number of things, including your reading habits, shopping habits, nationality, email, 
IP address, physical address and Identity [74] [II] [12].
Information privacy includes aspects related to personal information and communication. It is 
divided further into two categories such as communication privacy and data privacy. Communic­
ation privacy also sometimes called network privacy. It is related to the participants identities and 
location involved in the network communication. Data privacy deals with techniques of saving 
data in the databases and retrieving it in such manner which preserve user’s privacy. Privacy on 
the Internet is becoming important because an increasing part of eveiyday life takes place over 
the Internet. Currently most organization/companies are providing services on the Internet and of­
ten require people to give their personal identifying information which can be used for marketing 
purposes or selling to other companies, thus a serious threat to network privacy.
3.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and related concepts
PETs protects information privacy by eliminating or minimizing personal data. It also prevents 
unnecessary or unwanted processing of personal data, without loosing the functionality of inform­
ation system [13].
PETs is not necessarily a new invention or something that has not been done before, rather 
existing technologies can be placed in an information system and subsequently act as a PET. It has 
already achieved an important place in the practical and theoretical arena of privacy protection. 
Therefore It has been center of interest for many countries particularly USA and Canada. It is 
based but not limited on certain principles.
Personal Data Minimization: Any PET system must comply with Article 6, Paragraph 1 (c), of 
Directive 95/46/EC [75]. Personal data collected must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed.
Data Accessing: Each user in the organization must have limited function access. This means if 
a user has granted access to sub part of a system than it must not access data from other sub part. 
For example the physician is entitled to have access to a particular patient medical record instead
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of patient’s address, ethnicity etc.
Privacy Techniques A technique is required for a PET system to provide privacy to data or com­
munication parties. These techniques can be combination of already developed cryptographic 
concepts such as digital signature, digital certificates and encryption/decryption or emerged tech­
niques i.e. blind signature, ring signature and threshold cryptography.
Audit and Accountability The most important feature of any PET system is audit and accountab­
ility. There must be mechanism defined for enforcement agencies or administrators through which 
they can audit the user who acquired privacy.
3.2.1 Pseudonyms
The word ’’pseudonym” refers to the adoption of a false name [14]. Chaum [76], defined a digital 
pseudonym, a public key used to verify the signature made by anonymous holder of the corres­
ponding private key. In his work, the author hides the participants of the communication without a 
trusted authority and the receiver of the message responds with untraceable return address. Pseud­
onyms are identifiers of subject (sender/receiver) while pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as 
IDs. Pseudonym can be simple as selecting any random number or complex as a procedure which 
may involves more than one authority and some cryptographic operations.
3.2.2 Anonymity
Anonymity of a subject means the subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects [14], the 
anonymity set. The notion of anonymity was first proposed by Chaum [77], most systems and its 
variations [78] are based on the fundamentals of his work. Anonymity is a fundamental identity 
hiding property and totally removes identifying information of the user. Anonymity property in 
any network promotes freedom of expression and protecting user privacy. However abuse and 
illegal activities are the most obvious drawbacks of anonymity, it can be controled using revocable 
anonymity [79]or accountable anonymous communication [80].
Anonymity is broadly divided into two main categories: sender anonymity and receiver an­
onymity. A system is said to provide sender anonymity if the initiator’s identity is hidden from 
communication parties. Receiver anonymity in a system means when the receiver identity is not 
revealed to communication parties. Some of the applications of anonymity are detailed below [81] 
[82].
Public Discussion: If the topic under discussion is controversial than the participants might not 
want to disclose their identity by giving unpopular view point.
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Political Reporting: It is used for overcoming censorship of authors, it is a well know histor­
ically application of anonymity, these reporting can also be in a suppressed organization where 
individual’s right of expressing view point is not appreciated.
Voting: It is one of popular research topic of anonymity. Anonymous voting must ensure that the 
voter correctly recorded his/her vote but at the same time the vote can not be link back to him/her. 
Assessment: It is one of the educational application of anonymity, the assessment system/marking 
system must be unknown to the assessors to avoid favoritism and biasness.
Online Medical Examination: In this application patient might be a public figure, wants to get 
treatment without revealing his identity to a doctor.
3.2.3 Unlinkability
Unlinkability [14] of two or more Item of Interest (lol) from adversary’s perspective is that they 
are indistinguishable. lol can be a message, thus unlinkability means that the probability of lol 
from the attackers perspective stays the same before and after the attack.
3.3 PETs Techniques
The following sections defines PETs techniques.
3.3.1 Anonymity Techniques
These techniques attempting to hide timing information that could be used as side channel to 
facilitate traffic analysis. In these techniques traffic is delayed, reordered or manipulated in a 
way to hide the timing information in order to achieve the anonymity of end users. These systems 
lacks practical realization because it degrades communication on the network despite of delivering 
optimal anonymity[83] [84] [85] [86].
MIX
MIX [15] [87], proposed by Chaum, accepts encrypted message, decrypts it and remove all sender 
related information. Further messages are stored in the buffer until trigger condition is reached 
and than reorder before forwarding to appropriate node. It maintains asymmetric key pair such 
as PKmix,SKjnix and publish it through Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Nodes wishing to send 
message anonymously simply encrypt their message with PKmix^  The latency is inherent in these 
systems, thus poorly operates in real time applications. It can hide the communication between 
sender and receiver in the following fashion.
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The sender pads the random number ro with message m and than encrypt with the public key 
of receiver PKr. This encrypted message and receiver address are padded with another random 
number r\ and encrypt the whole message with PKmix and sends it to MIX node as shown in Eq.3.1. 
It decrypts the message and forwards to appropriate destination, however prior to forwarding it 
stores message for a while and than reorders all message received by it and than send in batch to 
intended destination. This batching and storing message for a while prevent attackers to correlate 
source, MIX and destination.
S -4- MIX : [r\, {ro,m}pKD,IDD]pKMIX
M I X ^ D  : {rQ,m]pKD (3.1)
If the sender wants to receive the reply from receiver but not revealing its identity to him, thus 
it uses the untraceable return address shown in Eq.3.2. Source node chooses a random number r\ 
and pads with its own identity.
(3.2)
The bidirectional anonymous communication is shown in Table.3.1 where a source of the 
message also construct a return untraceable path for the message.
S -^MIX : {r\,{rQ,m\)pKD,IDB)pKmix^{nJL>s)pK,„u,PKs 
MIX -^D  : (rQ,M\)pKj),(H,IL>s)pKmix^PKs 
D -)■ MIX : (n  ,IDs)pKmix^  {n,M'^)pKs 
MIX -4- S : {r2,M2)pKs
Table 3.1: Bidirectional Anonymity (MIX)
A MIX network consists of more than one MIXs, message is encrypted for all MIXs on the 
path in layered fashion and transmit message to first MIX. Further MIXs including first MIX 
decrypt its layer and forward message to next MIX until it reaches destination. In MIX network it 
is highly probable to select a compromised node and thus loosing part or full anonymity. Fig3.1 
shows the simple operation of MIX network, for illustration purposes three MIX’s are used, the 
number can be any. Here S2 want to send message to R l, so it first encrypt message with the 
public key of the receiver R l and by calculating free route it selects MIXl and MIX2 and encrypt 
message using their public keys and forward it to first MIX on the way. SI also follows the same
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way but here the selection of MIX’s are MIX3 and MIX2.
S ender
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R eceiver
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MIX3
R eceiver
MIX2 R2
Figure 3.1: MIXes Array
3.3.2 Single Hop Proxy
This is a naive method for achieving weak anonymity; all traffic between sender and receiver is 
directed through an intermediate authority called proxy, similar concept like VPN. In practice this 
approach is realized by anonymizer[17], BTGuard[88], IPredator[89]. It is simple to implement 
but single point of failure, proxy itself know the real identities of the participants and can easily 
be attacked by powerful adversary.
3.3.3 Onion Routing (OR)
OR is a method of hiding routing information in application that demands real time network con­
nection, initially proposed in[16]. OR operates in four stages; define the route, construct anonym­
ous connection, move data through the connection and destroy the anonymous connection. OR 
provides anonymity by providing layered encryption for all intermediates hops in the path, the 
outermost layer encryption is the first hop in the path and innermost layer encryption is the des­
tination. Encryption is performed by first node in the network while each node in the path peals 
off its layer of encryption and so on until destination is reached. To avoid traffic analysis nodes 
pads outing data to a constant size. OR functions like virtual circuit set up by initiator of the 
message. Each node stores previous node and next node along their encryption keys. Each node 
peal/decrypt the outer layer of the message and only knows about the next hop in the circuit. OR 
provides anonymous routing rather anonymity, the message can not be correlate to sender and
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receiver but both participants knows each other real identity. Also first hop and the last hop in 
the path know the sender and destination identities respectively. Fig.3.2shows operation of OR 
network, reference implantation of OR is TOR project[90] and heavily researeh in [91] [92] [93].
Source Destination
Onion layer encryption
message
Onion Routers cloud
Figure 3.2: Onion Routing
3.3.4 Pseudonym based techniques
Pseudonymity and Pseudonymised communication in traditional Internet is realized in [94] [95] 
[96]. In [23] the system is at the same time anonymous but also aecountable in case of ma­
licious activity by dishonest node. The pseudonyms is based on registration and authorization 
authority, colluding of both reveal the identities of communication parties. The author in[21] [22] 
defined a pseudonymous e-commerce architecture which is based on proxies and layer encryption. 
PseudoID [97] is pseudonymised federated login system based on popular federated login system 
OpenID [98]. It proteets users from disclosure of private login data held by identity providers. 
This protocol used bhnd signature for generation of pseudo token and certificate. Dijiang [99] 
argued that in anonymous communication one centralized authority is responsible for generating 
private key, this way entity is not anonymous to the sever. To solve this problem distritbuted server 
based approaeh had been proposed where pseudonyms are used as public key.
CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: A  REVIEW  30
3.4 PETs Systems
This section briefly explains different PETs systems based on the aforementioned techniques.
3.4.1 Crowds
Crowds provide a method for anonymous web, initially proposed in [100] . The system relies on 
the network of nodes called jondos, that forward web request for other participants. The crowds 
system build a persistent virtual circuit through jondos for each initiator by re routing request 
randomly, to obscure the location of original request. When a node wants to fetch a website 
than it initiate a circuit by selecting a random node. With certain probabilities this node can 
either further forward request to another node or fetch the website and send back to requested 
node. The path used by sender is kept for future request and updated at pre define interval to 
avoid statistical attacks. It provides reasonably good level of anonymity but fails to defend global 
passive adversary, which observes the flow of message, and figures out the initiator of the request.
3.4.2 Tarzan
Tarzan is an anonymity preserving network layer based on decentralized peer-to-peer overlay 
mode that is transparent to higher level applications, highly fault tolerant and scalable system 
[101]. Tarzan uses layered encryption same like MIX/OR and provide covert traffic to deceive 
global adversary for performing traffic analysis. Tarzan uses Network Address Translation (NAT) 
to bridge between Tarzan hosts and Internet hosts.
3.4.3 TOR
TOR[102] system is based on OR architecture. It provides low latency anonymity service for TCP 
with perfect forward secrecy and standard proxy interface. In TOR, TCP stream is multiplexed 
over circuits to support hidden location services [103].
3.4.4 Freedom
Freedom network[104] is an overlay based on link to link padding rather end to end. Freedom 
provides the opportunity to the end users to create pseudonyms for each distinct activity. To 
reduce the possibility of linkability, freedom clients select a network of proxies and implement 
cryptographic ciphersuits to secure routes.
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3.4.5 Freenet
Freenet[105] provides an anonymous publishing to both author and reader, replication and retrieval 
using a peer-to-peer storage model. It uses encrypted data storage, geographical distribution and 
anonymous communication between nodes.
3.4.6 Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
JAP is a working anonymous web surfing over the Internet, built on MIX network design[106]. In 
JAP a single address is shared by many users. User forward traffic to fixed set of MIX’s, where 
each MIX remove its layer of encryption and finally forward message to its intended destination.
3.4.7 Peer to Peer Personal Privacy Protocol
Peer to Peer Personal Privacy Protocol[107], nodes are placed in group and communication is 
broadcast. The broadcasting help to achieve receiver anonymity, however for sender anonymity 
node uniformly distributed constant noise to make it difficult to differentiates between original 
traffic and noise.
3.4.8 Cashmere
Cashmere [108] relays traffic through more robust relay group of MIX nodes to decrease chance 
of failure and increase end to end delivery. When member of the relay group receives message 
it anycast message to next hop and broadcast the decrypted contents to all members of the relay 
group. It provides sender anonymity but not receiver and can be extended for it.
3.4.9 Salsa
Majority of anonymous communication systems are based on priori routing information and cent­
ralized point of trust. Salsa[109] distributes trust and improves scalability by giving partial view 
of network to all nodes using distributed hash table routing mechanism.
3.4.10 Anonymous Remailers
High latency anonymous communication technique has been popular for asynchronous commu­
nication such as email. The following are the three versions of remailers.
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lype-O (anon.penet.fi)
This is original electronic remailer system, a single machine run by Johan Helsingius in Finland. 
This system is based on simple remailer policy, in which sender sends email with extra header 
specifying receiver to remailer. Further the remailer stripped the identifying information before 
forwarding to intended receiver. A simple reply service was also defined in which user can set a 
pseudonym on the remailer, all emails destined to pseudonyms will be received by original user. 
However due to single authority responsible for the operation make it vulnerable to many attacks 
and becomes cause of shut down.
lype-I (Cypherpunks)
This removes the flaw of single point of failure in Type-0, message is encrypted with public keys 
of several servers on it path. A reply block is a series of routing instructions that allow the message 
to be delivered to a pseudonym and make the sender unidentifiable. Type-1 is built on a centralized 
architecture where remailers know both sender and receiver identities[l 10].
lype-II (MIXmaster)
It is improvement over iype-1 remailer and uses SMTP by adding sender anonymity. It enforces 
fix length messages, shorter messages being padded with dummy and larger messages should be 
broken into parts. It defeat traffic analysis on message size[l 11]. However there is no reply block 
defined and messages are unicast only.
lype-III (MIXminion)
This is improved MIXmaster by offering anonymous reply blocks, forward security using TLS 
protected, integrated directory servers, dummy traffic and exit policies. It is implemented on 
Internet where it requires minimal node synchronization and defends replay attacks [112].
3.5 PETs for DTN
PETs systems are based on two popular techniques such as onion routing and mixing. The farmer 
technique is for low latency systems and provide good network performance but minimal security. 
The later is high latency systems provide stronger security but degrade network performance.
Onion routing and its various sub techniques are not suitable for DTN as they rely on source 
routing, assumed end to end communication path both ways. It is not possible for the DTN node 
to know the exact path and their public keys for layer encryption.
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The delaying factor of mix node make it hard for the adversary to correlates incoming packet 
to outgoing packets. In DTN forwarder node accept the custody of the bundle in case of delay and 
disruptive communication link. Thus MIX node magnifies the overall delay of communication 
link, therefore not suitable for DTN.
3.6 Attacks on PETs
The purpose of PETs is to hide the relationship between corresponding participants of the mes­
sage. There are variety of ways where an attacker attempt to compromise the anonymity of the 
system[69] [70] [ 113] [ 114].
3.6.1 Adversary Characteristics
The following are the characteristics of an adversary.
Internal/External
The adversary operated in the anonymity system is called Internal attacker. In this attack adversary 
can observe communication of the system internally. External attacker is the one who do not 
participate in anonymity protocol but may be able to observe the traffic from outside. In case of 
anonymity several internal attackers can collude and reveal user identity, external attacker can also 
eavesdrop messages between sender and receiver and probabilistically guess the communication 
parties.
Active/Passive
Active attackers in general manipulate an anonymous system in various ways. Active adversary 
can delay, drop, modify or inject traffic on the link. These attacks can be on network level as well 
node level. Passive attackers may attempt to compromise the anonymity of the system by making 
deduction from the flow of data.
Local/Global
The attacker restricted to part of the network is called local attacker while the one observing 
whole network is called global attacker. In anonymous communication system global attacker 
may monitor all the traffic and launch active attack to compromise identities of a system, while 
different local attacker can collude to reveal identities of the participant of communication.
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Static/Adoptive
Static attacker is fixed in their location and responding to message and unable to alter their beha­
vior during communication. Adoptive attack change their strategy according to network condition 
or from protocol starting to ending. It allows much greater range of attack to be launched.
3.6.2 Attacks 
Packet Counting
The objective of this attack is to link sender with receiver. This attack attempts to counts the 
packet leaving from sender, packets leaving from network (mix or intermediate nodes) and packets 
delivered to receiver.
Latency Attack
In this attack adversary calculate the latencies of every possible path of the anonymity network 
from sender to receiver. This finding leads to identify the co-operative nodes in the anonymity 
network which attacker can control to get identifying information of the sender and receiver of the 
message.
Clogging Attack
This attack is based on the latency information available to the attacker and next he want to identify 
the participant nodes that are part of the anonymous route from sender to receiver. The attacker 
flood particular traffic between two nodes and than observed the latency of overall route at receiver. 
If attacker find exponential changes in latency than he assures about the anonymous route, thus 
can figure out the nodes involved in.
Intersection Attack
Generally all users are not sending messages all the time in the network and by observing these 
patterns attacker can identify the identities of the participants or correlation between sender and 
receiver.
Repudiation Attack
The attack in which adversary evades non repudiation and the system or protocol has no complete 
control on the user actions. In this attack the adversary perform some action but later on it denied
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it. The severity of this attack can be imagine in many applications, for example in online banking 
a customer may transfer/retrieve some money to another account and later deny this action.
Impersonation Attack
In this attack the adversary impersonate some honest node in the network and communicate with 
other honest nodes and gain information which it can not do by its own. The receiving node is 
under the impression that it is communicated with the honest node. One of the example of this 
attack can be login in to check the account online, the attacker may impersonate the web server 
and construct a same login page as of the bank in which user is asked to enter its login details. 
This way attacker records the login information and later on use with the bank for withdrawing 
money and online transaction[l 15].
Collaborative Attack
A group of nodes working together in order to analyze and derive information from communica­
tion link. In this attack the different adversary control different part of the network and through 
collaboration they get control of the network. This attack hardly achieve its objectives in the in­
termittent network like DTN where connectivity between the nodes is not always available. For 
example if an adversary gather information from one part of the network and send to other ad­
versaries , so there is possibility that the adversaries receive invalidate irfformation because of 
delay and disruption[ 116].
Double Spending Attack
Double spending is a chronicle problem in digital cash; it arose from the possibility of using same 
tokens twice. In real world it is not possible to use one pound coin with two merchants for buying 
goods. However in digital world cash token is combination of bits, thus an attacker can take 
multiple copies and spend each copy with different merchants on Internet. This attack is tackled 
in two ways, one through central online trusted party, from which merchants prior to accepting 
token confirms the validity of the token. Second distributed trusted parties[117] in order to avoid 
the single point of failure in the former solution. However both of solutions are not feasible for 
DTN because of the intermittent and delayed connectivity to online trusted party.
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3.7 Measurement and Verification of PETs
This section discusses quantification of PETs systems for measurement of privacy, pseudonymity 
and unlinkability. Also formal modeling for verification and correctness of PETs systems.
3.7.1 Quantification of Anonymity
Typical analytical measure anonymity of the system through quantification and probabilistic mod­
eling. There are several ways to measure anonymity of PETs system, however this section will 
discuss only those used for communication privacy and anonymity based on information theoretic 
approach and probabilistic modeling.
Information Theoretic Approach
Information theory deals with the uncertainty of the random variable, entropy is building block of 
it.
Entropy: Entropy[118] provides a measure of the uncertainty about the random variable, meas­
ured in bits. Let X be the discrete random variable with probability mass function Pf(i) =  P{X =  
i), where ”f ’ represents set of different values take by X. Therefore entropy H(X)  with N subjects 
in the anonymity set is defined as in Eq.3.3
H{X) =  -'^P ilog{Pd  (3.3)
i
H(X) takes maximum value log(f) when ”i” distribution is uniform and minimum value 0 when 
”i” is constant.
Conditional Entropy: This entropy deals with two related random variables, calculated as the 
entropy of one variable given the entropy of the second variable. The conditional entropy H{X\Y)  
can be formulated as
H(X\Y)  =  -  £  Ptv) £  P(x\y) logP(jc|y) (3.4)
y e Y  x e X
The above Eq.3.4 measures the entropy of random variable X when Y is known, it gains its max­
imum value H(X) when Y reveals no information about X and minimum value ”0 ” when Y reveals 
complete information about X.
Anonymity Metrics
The following metrics measures the anonymity in PETs systems.
1-P Metric: Reiter and Rubin[100] measured the anonymity in CROWDS anonymity system.
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defined degree of anonymity as probability 1-p, where p is probability assigned by attacker to 
potential sender of the message. Considering two nodes in the system, than according 1-p formula 
50% anonymity is achieved. Now consider 50 nodes in the network, than node 1 is assigned 
probability of being sender of the message and other nodes assigned .010 being the sender of the 
message. Reiter believed both systems degree of anonymity should be the same (50%), however 
in second network node 1 looks more probable being the sender of the message compare to first 
network.
Anonymity Set Size (ASS) Consider sending and receiving of messages in the network as lol 
while nodes as subjects. Therefore the goal of any anonymous system is to hide the link between 
lol and subjects. The set of nodes which may be linked to lol is called anonymity set. This is the 
basic metric for privacy measurements, also used in several metrics as integrated part[119]. For 
particular lol adversary knows in the advance the possible subjects i.e.Sta , than launch attack and 
compromised Saa- Therefore ASS quantifies the Anonymity Level (AL) achieved after the attack 
by subject.
Corollary; - The anonymity of the subject is increasing with the increase of the anonymity set 
size and vice versa, the Eq.3.5 shows the relation,
AL =  Sba-Saa (3.5)
Fig.3.3 shows the anonymity spectrum in the presence of adversary probability p ;0  <  /? <  1. 
Degree ranges[100] from absolute privacy where attacker can not perceive the presence of com­
munication, to provable exposed where attacker reveal sender, receiver identity and their relation­
ship. The remaining points along the spectrum are defined as; Beyond suspicion means it is very 
improbable that the subject had a role in a communication. Probable innocence and Possible in­
nocence correspond to the situation where subject have equal chance of having or not having role 
in the communication and Exposed means high likelihood of having a role in communication.
Effective Anonymity Set Size (EASS): This metric measure anonymity of the system and 
proposed by Seijontov and Danezis[120]. Adversary launch attack on anonymity system and 
obtained distribution of probabilities that link subjects to particular lol. It is trivial that different 
subjects have low to high probability pi of having a link with lol. These probabilities difference 
is based on the amount of information obtained by adversary after the attack. Thus EASS can be 
defined as the entropy H(X) of the distribution X of probabilities that link the subject from the 
anonymity set size to lol. EASS depends on the potential number of subjects link to lol and the 
probabilities distribution of those subjects.
Corollary: - If the probability distribution is uniform than high will be the entropy and thus
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Figure 3.3: Privacy Spectrum
high will be the effective anonymity set size. EASS depends on the potential number of subjects 
link to lol and the probabilities distribution of those subjects.
Degree of Anonymity (DoA): This is one step further measurement metric proposed by Diaz 
[121] [122] [123], normalized EASS in way that system can be asses on the scale 0-1. If an an­
onymity system has n number of subjects all links to lol through uniform probability distribution. 
It means all subject are indistinguishable to lol when adversary monitored the system. The max­
imum entropy of such systems can be denoted as H(M) in Eq.3.6, subject to the condition that 
adversary has no priori information.
H(M) =  log(n) (3.6)
The entropy when the adversary launches the attack can be denoted as H(X), so adversary gained 
H(M) - H(X) information after the attack. Thus DoA can be defined as Eq.3.7. The formula shows 
that DoA is the function of EASS and maximum entropy for a particular subjects.
H{M) H{M)
(3.7)
3.7.2 Security Protocol Verification
PETs protocols achieves secure and private communication by using combination of cryptographic 
primitives such as hash function, digital signature/certificates, encryption/decryption algorithms 
and many more. Verification is common practice for checking that whether these protocols sat­
isfies security requirements. Correctness checks that the specification satisfies the requirements. 
Correctness and security are the two main properties which every protocol aiming to achieve 
before the real implementation. Correctness property should satisfy the specification that for reas-
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onable input the protocol gives expected output. Security property must assure that the protocol 
shows resistance to various attacks. Fig.3.4 shows the block diagram of the categorization and 
anatomy of security protocol verification, various blocks are explained in the next section [124] 
[125].
Security' Protocol Verification
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Figure 3.4: Hierarchy of Security Protocol Verification 
Computational Approach
Computational approach considers the cryptographic primitives as function on string of bits. For 
example a symmetric encryption key might be defined in terms of (K, E, D), where K is key 
generator, E is encryption function and D is decryption function. This approach defines security 
properties in terms of probabilities of successful attack. The results of this approach provide strong 
security guarantees but generally harder to evaluate and understand.
Formal Methods
This approach adopts perfect cryptographic assumption; a message encrypted by a key can only be 
decrypted on the appropriate decryption key. These methods provides a rigid and thorough means 
of checking the correctness and security of the protocol that even a subtle defect can be detect.
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In the formal methods approach, the protocol description, security properties, participants and in­
truder is modeled formally and analyzed using process algebra or logical analysis. The popular 
three approaches of formal methods are logics, theorem proving and state exploration. The work 
in this thesis used state exploration category, so the rest of two will be defined briefly.
BAN Logic: BAN Logic[126], allows the assumptions and goals of the protocol to be stated in 
beliefs logic. The sender transmit its beliefs with inference rules at the receiver end if all beliefs 
are evaluated and they meet the goal than the protocol is correct. The main disadvantage of BAN 
logic is the assumption that all participating nodes in the network are honest. GNY[127] and 
BGNY[128] are two popular variants of BAN logic . In this method some security protocols are 
either restricting to particular security properties or difficult to apply because of many inference 
rules.
Theorem Proving: Theorem proving takes protocol description, a set of logical statements/hypothesis 
and inference rules and produce a formal proof. The participating nodes can run infinite number 
of sessions with other participants and intruder. Isabelle[129], HOL[130] and ACL2[131] are the 
famous tools used by the research community in formal methods. Generally, these tools are time 
consuming because these lack automatic mechanism and error/flaw detection.
State Exploration: In State Exploration by giving a protocol description, the verification methods 
explores as many execution path of the protocol by checking each state for certain conditions. A 
model checker is an automatic tool which explores the state space of model for finding illegal 
state. The main advantage of verifying the correctness and security of the protocol through model 
checking is that it provides syntax error detection, implement a particular intruder model and some 
of the advantages are specific to the each tool. The popular model checker are AIVSPA[132], 
ProVerif[133] and CASPERFDR.
Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocol (CASPER)[73] is compiler developed by 
Oxford University that translate abstract security protocols into machine readable program shown 
Fig.3.5. Its history dated back to Gavin Lowe who found a flaw in Needham Schroeder Public Key 
Protocol (NSPK)[134] after 17 years by formally modeling the protocol in CASPER. It consists 
of the following components.
• Communication Sequential Processes (CSP): CSP [135] [136] is a mathematical frame­
work for the description and analysis of the system consisting of components interacting 
via exchange of messages. CSP is written in mathematical language notations, with special 
symbols representing the operators. Security protocols operate through interaction of pro­
cesses in parallel that send messages to each other. The sender, receiver and intruder are
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modeled using processes. The requirement of the protocol is modeled in the specification 
section of the model.
• Failure Divergence and Refinement: (FDR)[137] is a model checking tool for state ma­
chines. FDR check certain security requirements if implementation is refinement of spe­
cifications. FDR also check determination of the state of the machine primarily for checking 
security properties. FDR accept file in CSPm and check for certain security properties such 
as secrecy, authentication etc. In this thesis FDR is not explored in depth rather its services 
are used for analysis.
• Dolev Yao Model: The popular attacker model used for analysis of the security protocol in 
formal methods in general and particularly in model checking tools. It is inspired by[I38], 
a very powerful adversarial model that is widely accepted as the standard by which crypto­
graphic protocols should be evaluated. The adversary can:
-  Obtain any message passing through the network.
-  Read any message, decompose it into parts and re-assemble.
-  Act as a legitimate user of the network (i.e. can initiate a conversation with any other 
user)
-  Become the receiver to any sender
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-  Send messages to any entity by impersonating any other entity.
In Dolev Yao model any message sent via the network is considered to have been sent by
adversary, thus any message received might be manipulated by adversary. Adversary can 
control how things ar sent. However there are some restrictions on the adversary in this 
model, so adversary can not:
-  chose a random number i.e. nounce which is part of the security protocol.
-  Decrypt a cipher text without the appropriate decryption key.
-  Encrypt a text without the knowledge of encryption key. However in majority of se­
curity protocols adversary is treated as a normal node which has its pair of keys.
-  Solve the private key pairing if the public key.
The Dolev Yao adversary is shown in the Fig.3.6, the network is depicted as star, where
attacker in the middle of different communication participants (PDA, laptop, servers, PCs). 
Attacker is able to mediate every communication channel between two or more than two 
participants.
,TTA< KER
Figure 3.6: Dolev Yao Adversary Model
For the last few years security protocols have been modeled using CSPm and than check for 
authentication and secrecy properties using FDR. However creating the description of security pro­
tocols in CSPm is very error prone. In order to overcome this problem CASPFR was developed it 
accepts CSP code and generates CSPm code for FDR in order to check certain security properties. 
CASPFR accepts file consisting of two parts i.e. first part which describe general model of the
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protocol, and second part instantiating parameters used in the model. The output of the CASPER 
is in the form of attacks finding or not finding. If attack is found than it give the trace of the 
attack, otherwise no information is provided when attack is not found. CASPER is also called as 
CASPERFDR because it uses FDR for model checking.
There are several tools available for verification and validation of security protocols. However 
CASPERFDR is used for this work because:
It is possible to deploy different variations of adversary; from weaker to stronger.
It is publicly available and no licensing required for academic research.
It provides trace of the attacks on the protocol.
It checks for syntax error and indicates that wether the protocol is run successfully or not.
It provides friendly graphical user interface.
Many security protocols have been modeled using CASPFR such as NSPK, Diffie Helman 
key exchange etc.
3.8 Summary
The use of Internet is getting wider and include activities: reading the newspaper, shopping, stay­
ing in contact with family and friends, finding a partner, booking holidays, expressing their opin­
ion, keeping an online diary, online medical consultation etc. The confidentiality of the inform­
ation attaches to these activities are being protected through encryption, however the source and 
destination of the communication are easily traceable. Therefore Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs) is much needed to provide privacy to the Internet users. Anonymity and pseudonymity 
are the two important components of PETs. There are several PETs systems for both real time 
and non real time scenarios. For example MIX is responsible for mixing, shuffling and delaying 
of packet in order to avoid the correlation between sender and receiver of the packet and Onion 
Routing encrypts packet for the router on the path in layer fashion. Table.3.2 shows the taxonomy 
of PETs systems in terms of sender anonymity, sender anonymity and both.
Privacy is a relative term and is different for individuals and scenarios, for example for some 
one shopping on the Internet should completely anonymous, someone requires only the pharmacy 
shopping anonymous. Therefore measuring privacy and providing a percentage value to the end 
user is efficient way. Different metrics have been discussed which are based on probability and 
information entropy.
CHAPTERS. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGŒS: A  REVIEW 44
Anonymity System Sender Anonymity Receiver anonymity Latency(H/L)
Crowds y X L
Tarzan y y L
Tor y y L
Remailer Type-0 y y H
Remailer lype-l y y H
Remailer Type-2 y y H
Remailer Type-3 y y H
Freenet y y L
JAP y y L
p5 y y L
Cashmere y y L
Salsa y y L
Table 3.2: Anonymous Communication Systems
It has been experienced in the past several times that a security protocol is designed and than 
implemented and used by the community but later formal modeling of that protocol proves some 
serious security flaws. Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NSPK) is one of the examples 
of these protocols in which Lowe found attack after 17 years of its deployment. In this chapter 
we have demonstrated the importance of formal modeling as a verification tool for privacy and 
security protocol. CASPER model checking tool with all its components is briefly discussed.
Chapter 4
Pseudonym Framework (PF)
This chapter focuses on the role of Delay Tolerant Networks in providing delay tolerant services to 
rural areas. DTN has gained considerable importance as a connectivity solution to rural areas in the 
past few years and evolved as Rural Area DTN. It is a suitable solution for telemedicine application 
which plays an important role in health care provisioning to developing regions. Privacy is one of 
the basic requirement of the user in RA-DTN, particularly for a patient sending medical record to 
a Doctor.
PF is a novel PbD framework proposed in this thesis for sustaining privacy in DTN generally 
and RA-DTN particularly. This chapter aims to design a secure framework where user can obtain 
its pseudonym identity and pseudonym certificate. PF consist of four phase: such as Pseudonym 
Credential, Pseudonym Certificate, Pseudonym Communication and Pseudonym Resolution and 
Revocation.
• Pseudonym Credential Phase allows user to interact with Verifying Certificate Authority 
(VCA) for (PCr); a token used for authentication to other certificate authorities without 
revealing real identity.
• Issuing Certificate Authority (ICA) issues PID and PC in Pseudonym Certificate Issuance 
Phase, it takes input PCr from the user and issue PID, PC and signed pseudonym public key.
• The Pseudonym Communication phase is not focus of this thesis and therefore we assumed 
a secure and efficient algorithm for pseudonyms changeover.
• The accountability phase of PF is the last phase which consists of two protocols such as 
resolution and revocation. The resolution protocol works on certain threshold of certificate 
authorities to cooperate for resolving of PID to real identity. However real identity should 
be known to only VC A, the one who issued PCr. The revocation protocol revoked all PCs 
if one PC is involved in malicious activity or its certificates are decided to be revoked based
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on some revocation policy. The protocol still sustain user’s privacy and ICA’s are unable to 
know about real identity of the user holding revoked PC.
4.1 Rural Areas and Network Connectivity
4.1.1 Network Connectivity Problem
Internet access is almost everywhere in urban areas while rural areas have lack of affordable 
network connectivity, or if there is connectivity then network is often characterized by frequent 
delays, unpredictable outages, limited bandwidth and high cost. Therefore in rural areas informa­
tion such as news reporting, weather forecast, market prices, medical consultation are communic­
ated via word of mouth or through umeliable and inefficient means. For example to apply for a job 
vacancy sometimes the rural area citizen has to travel to urban area while for urban area citizen 
this task can be achieved in minutes through Internet.
4.1.2 Existing Solutions
To provide connectivity to the villages in rural areas Internet can be the first thought. But many 
rural areas are lacking of fixed line telephone infrastructure, therefore it is not possible to provide 
network connectivity via any medium such as dial up, broadband etc. Also Internet is based on 
TCP/IP protocol suit which assumed end to end communication path and up to few seconds of 
round trip time. Despite of all these wide area fiber optic is deployed in parts of Cambodia but 
still network is effected by intermittent connectivity and power problems, also deployment cost is 
high [139].
Cellular network is growing rapidly and play a vital role in communication network, this can be 
also a possible solution for rural area network. Grameen Telecom initiated a village phone program 
[140] aims to provide mobile connectivity to 950 villages and approximately 65000 villagers. The 
deployment rely on the system in which a franchise in one village will buy the phone and then it 
will resell the services to many villagers to share the cost of device. This project did not sustain 
well because Grameen did not afford deployment of base station everywhere in rural area instead 
in dense population which are near to rail station and community centers.
Satellite based solutions provide global connectivity and therefore work well for rural area in 
terms of connectivity but not in terms of cost. The village in rural area has to first subscribe to the 
bandwidth from the satellite operators, the bandwidth cost varies for dedicated to shared links and 
size. For example for 1 mega byte of upload and download the village subscriber has to pay up 
to 2000 GBP compare to price of 30 GBP for home broadband in urban areas . The village has
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to deploy the initial setup of devices such as amplifiers, satellite modems, Cisco routers/switches, 
cables, antennas etc. These devices need a qualified satellite engineer and IP engineer for main­
tenance as well.
4.1.3 Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network
Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network (RA-DTN) as shown in Fig.4.1 , is a store-carry-and-forward 
communication architecture based on the DTN. The following are the main components of RA- 
DTN [141] [142].
kiosk
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W ireless link
XSatellite data upload
Satellite data dow nload
Bus route Hub
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Figure 4.1; Rural Area Delay Tolerant Network
Mobile Terminal is any mobile carrier such as bus, motorbike, ferry, train and aeroplane. It 
must have wireless network capability and enough persistent storage to hold user data for a certain 
period of time.
Internet Hub is acting as gateway and proxy for one or more than one villages,it collects all re­
quests from different villages and then either through satellite link or Internet backbone forward 
to Internet Service Provider(ISP).
Kiosk is a shared area for villagers equipped with computers, routers, network management unit 
and persistent storage. Kiosk is connected to Internet hub via mobile terminals using wireless 
network.
A villager in the Village-1 can come in person to kiosk and use the web interface for desired 
service or request via mobile terminal using wireless communication. Mobile terminal may itself 
store the data and then later on handed to IH, or it may pass the data to another mobile terminal.
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The IH depending on the class of application and request type forward the request via satellite link 
or Internet backbone.
In this architecture, villages do not required to keep and maintain costly devices instead use 
the infrastructure of urban areas. The following are the properties which dominate DTN over other 
solutions for rural areas.
•  Tolerance to intermittent connectivity : Many applications in rural area does not require 
immediate feedback, for example news reporter, cell phone user can record a voice mail 
instead of direct call for other user.
•  Low cost: The population density in rural area is very low, therefore any networking tech­
nology which is cost effective is suitable for it. DTN only required a relative powerful 
computer which act as gateway and persistent storage at Kiosk.
•  Reliability: It is also a key requirement for a DTN in rural areas. A user should be confident 
that the network provides the services reliably, even though with large delays.
• Heterogeneity: Users in rural area can use variety of devices based on different technologies 
such as uploading of pictures from smartphone, satellite network for downloading. DTN 
support different networking technologies through the use of convergence layer.
4.2 Telemedicine in RA-DTN
Medical Telemedicine is among the other applications such as news reporting and weather forecast 
for which RA-DTN can provide network connectivity [7] [10] [6]. A patient in rural area wants to 
send his medical reports to doctor in urban area/rura area (same region, different region). Because 
of unavailability of communication infrastructure, thus RA-DTN is used as viable solution. This 
scenario shown in the Fig. 4.2 is an example of non real time applications in RA-DTN.
Patient waits for the scheduled visit of mobile terminal ( which in this case is public transport 
bus) to transmit the data. Also if mobile terminal timings do not match user’s requirements or it 
lacks of transmitting device then it can go in person to kiosk and may use its web interface for 
transmission of medical data. DTN gateway in RA-DTN is responsible for sending data on behalf 
of the users in the village. Gateway only accept data from kiosk or mobile terminal but not directly 
from user in the village. Kiosk can also act as custodian for mobile terminals in situation when it 
does not find communication link to gateway for uploading user data.
Gateway can store the data transmitted by kiosk or mobile terminal if there is no link available 
to ISP. Gateway has choice of transmitting data to ISP gateway either through satellite communic­
ation or Internet backbone. The data will travel in Internet clouds and will be finally delivered to
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Figure 4.2: Telemedicine Application in RA-DTN
the hospital network, gateways at hospital network transmit data to the the doctor via Local Area 
Network (LAN). Reply to this request comes in reverse fashion; doctor send the assessments to 
hospital regional gateway, which further route data to ISP and Internet, then edge router in Inter­
net forwards data to DTN regional gateway, from their data is transmitted to user though mobile 
terminal or kiosk.
4.2.1 Privacy Threats and Requirements
Assume the patient in the village is well known person such as village elder, suffered from some 
chronic disease. Therefore he/she do not want to reveal its identity to other villagers or any mem­
ber of kiosk, mobile terminal or gateways. To achieve privacy and security in such a hostile 
environment is very challenging task. The infrastructure is loosely coupled and both passive and 
active attackers may compromise the network.
The objective of patient is to keep its identity hidden from intruders, also making it hard for 
the doctor at other end to profile him/her. This means both sender and receiver privacy is required. 
Also patient wants unlinkability i.e. two or more messages should not be linkable to same user in
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the village.
4.2.2 Privacy Motivation
The fundamental architecture of Internet built on the top of TCP/IP protocol suit, which is designed 
regardless of user’s privacy or anonymous communication. The core IP protocol make it easy on 
the network layer to route messages, but ensuring users to communicate anonymously is extremely 
difficult as source and destination addresses are provided explicitly in the IP header. DTN is a 
technology used when TCP/IP breaks, however, there is no such mechanism built in the bundle 
protocol which preserve the user location and identity privacy. In DTN where connectivity is itself 
a big issue considering privacy is challenging task, because of loose network boundaries malicious 
nodes are more active compared to Internet [72].
4.3 Privacy Related Work in DTN
Privacy was first realized in DTN by Kate et al [7]. This solution used pseudonyms instead of 
real identity of participants, the mechanism allows DTN routers to know that the pseudonym 
is belonging to a valid user without learning the user’s identity. All cryptographic functions were 
performed through Identity Based Cryptography (IBC). The user chooses a random integer ru G ZÎ 
(Z* is an integer set) to generates pseudonym identity PU =  ru.Qu (Qu is the shared secret) by 
itself. New pseudonym public/private key is generated based on pseudonym identity. This work 
is early significant solution for privacy in DTN aiming sender and receiver anonymity. However 
pseudonyms were generated in very trivial way which is easy to break and adversary can also 
generate it for itself. The protocol required periodic updates from Public Key Generator (PKG) 
for key generation, which is not practical in DTN environment. There is no mechanism defined for 
refilling of pseudonyms or multiple pseudonyms. This protocol assumes the gateways as trusted 
entities which make it single point of failure.
Threshold Pivot Scheme[143] considered anonymity in military environment where DTN is 
used as possible mean for communication. This work considers both identity and location hiding 
in DTN. This is accomplished though OR like mechanism called threshold pivot scheme. The 
outbound packet sending by source to destination is not transmitted directly to destination but 
instead through a random node called pivot. Pivot is the only node to know about the identity 
of the receiving node. To provide two way anonymity it includes return pivot node and one time 
symmetric key in order to hide the identity of the sender. This scheme uses threshold cryptography 
to accommodate the common case of DTN unknown topology paths. Source routing and layered 
encryption is not feasible approach for DTN as the path from source to destination is not known.
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The concept of pivot node on the return path and one time symmetric key is very unlikely in DTN.
EnPassent[144] uses re-routing messages through groups of peer nodes to hide the relation 
between source and destination. This work uses the pawn group- a new idea instead of onion 
routing and mixes. Source sends message by encrypting it with the public keys of pawn group 
members, where each pawn group can only know the next address of the pawn, however the last 
pawn know the destination of the message. The identity of the sending node is disclosed to the first 
pawn and identity of receiving node is disclosed to last pawn in the routing path. This protocol 
uses source routing and the initiator must know about the nodes in the path in order to encrypt the 
message for them. Also for return message the sender should include the return pawn group path. 
In DTN it is not possible for any node to know the full path ahead of communication because the 
coimectivity is highly delayed and disruptive.
It is not possible for any system to be absolutely secure but all the above developed protocol 
addition to their stated shortcomings have few other common problems.
• The protocols were not modeled for functional correctness and security validation.
• The protocols were not analyzed in the presence of both passive and active adversary mod­
els.
• Majority of the protocols uses PETs techniques which are not suitable for DTN environment.
4.4 Preliminaries for Pseudonym Framework
In this section we will briefly discuss concepts related to the framework/solution proposed for 
privacy in RA-DTN considering Telemedicine application.
4.4.1 Group Communications
The notion of groups can be seen as a set of entities with one more common goal/interest. These 
entities collaborate together in order to accomplish their common goal. These groups can vary 
in size and complexity. In communication networks, groups are used to reduce the load on the 
network, efficient utilization of bandwidth, and some groups also improve the security of the 
network. The communication among the group members or with other group members is known 
as group communications. It is considerably more efficient to convey information to entire group 
rather to individual members. In the rest of this chapter terms: member, entity and node will be 
used interchangeably for group membership.
Group communications [145],[146] can be seen generally in commercial applications such 
as video conferencing, distance learning, distributed databases, multiplayer games, distributed
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simulations and many more. However group communications can also be seen in non commercial 
applications/networks, such as military communications, sensor networks, rural area networks etc. 
The dynamics of groups can be broken down mainly into two parts; group formation and group 
maintenance. In literature group formation can be mainly but not limited to on the concept of 
network clustering[147], opportunistic [148] or leaner formation [149]. Group maintenance can 
be achieved using methods such as centralized, decentralized, tree based or flooding based[150].
The intermittent and delayed nature of DTN makes the groups formation and maintenance very 
challenging task. However due to the limited coimectivity in DTN it is batter to send a particular 
message to a group of nodes rather than to individual nodes. In DTN group communication can 
be realized in many applications such as rural area network, military communication, disaster 
management networks, sensor networks. In DTN composition of groups may be based on many 
abstraction such as roles (police officer, fire fighters etc), geographical closeness (nodes who meet 
every day for a cause) and many more[151] . Thus groups can be formed on the basis of roles 
of nodes; it can be centralized or distributed way. Group formation in DTN is out of scope for 
this thesis rather we will assumed that group is already created and nodes will join it by meeting 
certain conditions.
4.4.2 Blind Signature
Blind signature[152] was first introduced by David Chaum. In the defined mechanism CA signs 
the message for the user without knowing its content. Suppose Alice wants Bob to sign a message 
m for her, but do not want him to know its content. For this reason, Alice generates a blinding 
factor b, and encrypts with the public key of Bob (signer). Bob upon receiving it signs the message 
without knowing the message contents and sends back to Alice. Alice applies the unblinding factor 
b~ ,^ and gets m signed by Bob, which is simple RSA digital signature. Alice should proof herself 
to Bob that he is eligible for blind signing; this can be done through some token or certificates. 
Let (e, n) and (d, n) are Bob’s public and private key respectively and m is the message from Alice 
to Bob. Alice generates a random value b such that gcd(b, n)=l and sends Ml=(b^) mod n to Bob. 
As Ml is ’’blinded” by the random value b; hence Bob can derive no useful information from it, 
and returns the signed message as M2=M\^ mod n to Alice. When Alice receives the M2 message 
it performs the following as shown in Eq.4.1.
M2 =  M fm odn{b^m Ym odn ^  .m ^ m o d n b .b  ^m^modnm^modn  (4.1) 
Blind signature is an adopted way of generating pseudonyms and associated certificates but
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it raises few security issues. First there is no way to insured non repudiation and certificate re­
vocation because pseudonym can not be authenticated, second pseudonyms can be used to launch 
sybil attack, in which the adversary uses identity of more than one user for sending the message. 
We modified blind signature in certain way that in case of malicious activity the pseudonyms can 
be linked to real identity. To eradicate authentication problem the thesis proposed a pseudonym 
certificate which will be used with pseudonym token and the other participant authority can verify 
the pseudonym certificate as well.
4.4.3 Threshold Cryptography
Threshold Cryptography-the multiparty computation, a branch of public key cryptography which 
has been studied for last two decades, first coined by Adi Shamir[153]. Shamir defines (t,s) 
threshold system where the secrete k is divided into s shares; 1 <  r <  ,^ knowledge of any t shares 
allows the secrete k to be reconstructed, however knowledge of t-1 share reveals no information. 
The proposed work will use RSA version of threshold cryptography as a black box for generation 
of pseudonym token.
4.4.4 Public Key Infrastructure
The main objectives of PKI is to issue and manage digital certificate and public key. The digital 
certificate binds public key and unique identity of the user, signed by well known trusted CA. The 
digital certificate X.509 defines the standard format for public key certificates. The certificate is 
public and can be verified by any entity before starting secure communication with another node.
Certificate Revocation and Validation is very important component of PKI. There are two Cer­
tificate revocation and validation mechanism, such as Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [154] and 
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). CRL is issued periodically and it consists of serial 
numbers of all revoked certificates. Every user in the communication check its CRL with up­
dated CRL for validation of particular user certificate. OCSP is request respond based mechanism 
approach to check the validity of the certificate. OCSP compare to CRL provides more updated in­
formation of revoked certificates. In DTN offline mechanism is more suitable compared to online 
because of delay and disruptive nature of communication link.
PKI plays a key role in asserting the ownership of public key for users. It provides a powerful 
means of authenticating individuals, organizations and authorities (Web, FTP). In PKI if a user 
wants to initiate a secure communication with another user then it requires a certificate. This 
certificate includes public key and related information including identity of the user signed by 
authority. In PKI the task of generating certificate is split between Registration Authority (RA)
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and CA. There is nominal separation between the roles of RA and CA but in practical these two 
are closely coordinated. The standard followed by the Internet for certificate is called X.509[155]. 
However PKI does not protect privacy of the user. Because X.509 certificate typically includes the 
real identity of the user to whom it was issued. In security protocols, the user is liable to present 
a certificate to other participant before actual start of communication. In order to hide end user 
identity there are two ways:
•  1. Requesting CA to generate another identity and bind public key and that identity via new 
anonymous certificate.
• 2. User generate pseudonym or fake identity itself and request CA to issue certificate for it.
Attempting the first solution make the user anonymous to other users however CA can acts 
as a ’’Big Brother” and able to link communication to the real identity holder intentionally and 
unintentionally if required so. The second solution make the user anonymous to both other users 
and CA but in case of malicious activity it is very hard to know real identity of the pseudonym 
holder. Also it is easy for the attacker to generate fake certificates.
4.5 Pseudonym Framework
The Pseudonym Framework (PF) proposed in this thesis is a novel framework for sustaining pri­
vacy in DTN generally and RA-DTN particularly. It achieved Privacy by Design (PbD) rather an 
add on component to DTN architecture. It consist of four phase, such as Pseudonym Credential, 
Pseudonym Certificate, Pseudonym Communication and Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation. 
This work take the example of Telemedicine application in RA-DTN.
A user in RA-DTN wants to send medical record to a Doctor in rural area or in another subre­
gion of the same village. It wants to hide its real identity from the Doctor and the entities involved 
in communication including adversary. Fig.4.3 shows system model of pseudonym framework.
The following terminologies are important to be defined explicitly prior to using them.
Privacy by Design (PbD):- It has been proposed by data protection policy makers (Inform­
ation Commissioners Office Canada) [19]. In this approach, privacy requirements are integrated 
from the start i.e. prior to the development of PETs system and the control on privacy is main­
tained throughout the system’s life cycle. It ensures that privacy controls are stronger, simpler to 
implement, harder to by-pass and totally embedded in the systems core functionality
Privacy by Architecture (PbA):- In this model, even if attackers gain access to the data, no 
personally identifiable information can be created with reasonable effort. The PbA approach offers 
users higher levels of privacy, in a more reliable marmer.
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Figure 4.3: Pseudonym Framework System Model
Privacy by Policy (PbP):- This approach is based on trust based mechanisms that protect 
sensitive and personal data from accidental disclosure or misuse. However, this model is based 
on the assumptions that companies can be trusted to handle individual’s personal information and 
that privacy policies/regulations are enforceable without any pressure and influence.
Privacy by Resolution (PbR):- This approach is fairly researched, in this model the privacy 
of the user is preserved and pseudonym-identity resolution is possible in legitimate situations by 
legitimate authorities. The real identity after resolution is known to the single authority only to 
whom user is authenticated by real identity and certificate. Also resolution of one pseudonym 
certificate do not effect other pseudonym certificates issued to same user.
Privacy by Revocation (PbRe):- This approach is one of findings of this thesis, this model 
preserve the privacy of the user at the time of revocation of pseudonym certificate from other CAs. 
The CA; the issuer of pseudonym certificate also should not be able to know the real identity of 
the user except the CA to whom the user is authenticated by real identity and certificate. In this 
model revocation of one pseudonym certificate must lead to revocation of all certificates.
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4.5.1 Pseudonym Credential Phase
This is the first step towards preserving privacy of the user in RA-DTN. This phase incorpor­
ates PbA and involves two authorities such as Privacy Distribution Authority (PDA) and VGA, 
which are part of the kiosk. VGA acts as a regional GA administering sub regional GA’s in a 
village/region. The communication link between User and PDA is assumed offline and secured. 
User and VGA can communicate via mobile terminal such as bus or user can go in person to kiosk 
and use web interface to contact VGA. PDA and VGA are connected through reliable secured link 
in which delay and disruption is negligible.
User authenticates to VGA using real identity and associated certificate. User generates a 
tokens by using cryptographic functions such as XOR, hash and blinding factor. These tokens are 
send to VGA for blind signature. PDA distributes the policy for the number of tokens one user 
can send to VGA. This policy is based on the user’s activities in the past. VGA after validation 
of user’s certificate construct a challenge. User respond to that challenge accordingly and as a 
result gain a particular number of signed tokens from VGA. These signed tokens are termed as 
Pseudonym Gredentials and can be issued to user in the range of one to twelve depending on user 
profile defined in policy.
4.5.2 Pseudonym Identity/Certificate Issuance Phase
This phase involves a number of sub regional GA’s called IGA and aims to develop a system with 
PbA concept. Every sub region is administering by at least one IGA, which also acts as subregion 
DTN gateway. To build the anonymity set user with pseudonym credential first joins the group. 
Because it is trivial that there is no anonymity when two participants communicating with each 
other directly. There are more than one group per region/village, user request IGA on the behalf 
of the group for PID and PG. User can request any IGA belonging to same region/subregion,also 
user can request from different subregion.
User authenticates to IGA through PCr granted by VGA in the first phase. It can use one 
PCr with particular one IGA to request for PID/PG as Pseudonym Request message (PReq). IGA 
validate the PCr and then generate PID, which is the combination of PCr and some other unique 
fields added by IGA , all encrypted with threshold public key as Pseudonym Response message 
(PRes). Threshold public is shared between two regional IGA’s and VGA. PID and Pseudonym 
Token (PT) are used interchangeably in this work.
IGA also issues digitally signed PG ; A X.509 certificate in which real identity is replaced 
with newly generated PID. The PG is also equipped with new pseudonymised public key, however 
pseudonymised secrete key is known to user only. The PG is saved in the public directory and as
CHAPTER 4. PSEUDONYM FRAMEWORK (PF) 57
acknowledgement it is sends to user as well. ICA can issue multiple PC’s, each PC with unique 
PID/PT for single pseudonym credential. The validity of each certificate can be stretched up to 
one year.
4.5.3 Pseudonym Communication Phase
Pseudonym Communication preserve privacy of users by allowing them to communicate with 
each other through PID and PC’s instead of real identity and certificate. The above two phases 
allow users to communicate with other users using multiple pseudonym identities and certificates. 
However, without any efficient and secure mechanism for changeover in multiple PC’s adversary 
can link several actions to single user. To achieve unlinkability a pseudonym change should be 
triggered, once the level of expected uncertainty reaches a given threshold. There are certain solu­
tions in the literature for providing unlinbility or location privacy for pseudonym certificate. This 
thesis do not focus on such mechanisms, thus assumed that there is efficient algorithm implemen­
ted which allow secure changeover between multiple certificates.
4.5.4 Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation Phase
This is the accountability phase, which involves VGA, IGA and Law enforcement agency (L) 
and implement concept of PbR and PbRe for resolution and revocation protocols respectively. 
To avoid misuse of PID and PG’s in PF accountability phase is required. This phase consists 
of two protocols such as Resolution and Revocation Protocol. PID is user identifier encrypted 
with threshold pubhc key shared among VGA and two IGA, and PG is equipped with it. If user 
is found in malicious activity by using a particular PID and PG. Then it will be reported to L 
for resolution of PID to real identity. L pass the trace of malicious activity and PID/PG to both 
IGA’s. Both IGA’s according to their policy apply their threshold secrete key, also provide the 
saved identifying information against this PID to L . Further L gathered this half decrypted PID 
and other gained information and send to VGA. VGA apply its own threshold secrete key and 
decrypt the PID, compare the information received by L to information stored in the hash table of 
VGA. The match dissolved the PID to real identity. It is not possible for IGA (the one which issue 
PID/PG), VGA and L alone to dissolve it because the PID in PG is encrypted with threshold public 
key of which the secret key is divided among two IGA’s and VGA.
Revoking PG makes it no longer valid for use and should not be trusted. In the PF user’s PG 
must be revoked if it is suspected for malicious activity or its pseudonym secrete key is comprom­
ised. The revocation of PG may be requested by any entity (VGA, IGA, user) in PF. Generally 
it is the GA who issued the certificate responsible for revocation of that certificate. However in
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the pseudonym framework it is necessary to preserve the privacy of the user even if it is revoked- 
Privacy Enhancing Revocation (PER). Therefore in the revocation protocol entity report L for a 
particular PC to the ICA who issue the PC for that user. ICA revoked all PC’s issued to the user 
for a particular pseudonym credential. However it is not possible for ICA to know about the real 
identity of the user because the PID is encrypted with the threshold public key. Also user may be 
issued with some PC’s by some other regional ICA’s which also need to be revoked. Therefore 
ICA pass on the identifying information for the revoked PC to VGA via L. VGA dissolved the 
PID to real identity and sends message to all IGA’s in the region to revoke all PG’s issued for 
this particular pseudonym credentials holder. VGA also updated the GRL based on PID and real 
identity and sends to PDA.
It is not necessary that if a user PID/PG is dissolved to real identity then it must be revoked as 
well. But if the user is revoked then it is necessary to dissolved its PID to real identity.
The following Fig.4.4 shows PKI infrastructure for pseudonym framework. VGA and PDA are 
part of the regional kiosk, while IGA’s are part of regional kiosk or act as mobile gateways within 
the region. VGA issue public key certificates to IGA’s. User requests regional kiosk for trust bit 
assignment and pseudonym credentials. Further user request for PID and PG from same subregion 
or different subregion. Subregion IGA’s cooperate with each other for dissolving PID via L. If 
a PG is revoked by IGA then VGA revoked all PG including certificate based on real identity. 
The next three chapters explain in details Pseudonym Credential Phase, Pseudonym Certificate 
Issuance Phase and Pseudonym Revocation/Resolution Phase respectively.
4.6 Summary
This chapter investigated Telemedicine application in RA-DTN with its privacy requirements and 
challenges. A novel pseudonym framework as shown in Fig.4.4 is proposed consists of four 
phases. The separation of authority in the pseudonym framework for preserving privacy makes 
it impossible for IGA and VGA alone to correlates PID to real identity. If VGA or IGA issues 
both PCr and PID/PG then user achieve privacy against other network entities but VGA/IGA can 
become big brother intentionally (reveal information to government agency in pressure) and unin­
tentionally (someone break the system) both. Therefore VGA only knows about the real identity 
of the user, but does not know the PID and PG. IGA do not know about the real identity of the user 
and only know about PID and PG. PDA only knows about the trust bit assignment or the number 
of tokens user can send for pseudonym credentials. Resolution protocol do not allow any sole cer­
tificate authority to dissolve PID/PG instead a certain threshold must be meet prior to dissolving 
of PID/PG to real identity. The PER protocol allows VGA to revoked all PG’s and certificate based
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Figure 4.4: PKI for Pseudonym Framework
on real identity of the user if one PID/PC is found in malicious activity.
Chapter 5
Pseudonym Credential Phase
Pseudonym Credential Phase aims to achieve PbA by generating a credential which can be used for 
anonymous authentication. The user in RA-DTN will either use the service of mobile terminal or 
going to kiosk in person for requesting PCr. VCA in kiosk after verification will grant pseudonym 
credential. User construct a token called Blinded Token (BT) which is XOR function of hash of 
real identity of the user and fresh random number, all blinded with blinding factor b. User request 
PDA for the policy on the number of BT’s it can send to VCA, Four messages exchange result in a 
sign Blinded Token (sBT), of which the contents is not known to VCA. User apply the unblinding 
factor b~  ^ on sBT, the result is {PCr) unblinded token signed by VCA. This credential allow user 
to authenticate to CA without revealing its real identity.
The Pseudonym Credential Phase is analyzed for different privacy attacks. Formal modeling 
and analysis is adopted for the verification and validation of this phase. CASPERFDR tool is used 
to model the the messages exchange of this phase and analyzed for correctness and security. The 
basic formal model of this phase find some attacks which have been defended through different 
mechanisms.
5.1 Pseudonym Credential Phase in a nutshell
This is the first step in the process of acquiring privacy for a particular user, also a first phase 
of the PF. This phase involves four messages exchange between any user in RA-DTN and VCA. 
These messages are (Authentication/Request, Challenge, Response to Challenge and Pseudonym 
Credential grant ). The user in RA-DTN can send/receive these messages via mobile terminal or 
using kiosk web interface.
The user is identified by a unique long term identity(real identity) and certificate. The user also 
had been issued with public/private key pair for encryption and signing purposes. It generates n
60
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number of blinding factors b and its inverse b~^. Anything blinded with b can be unblind with b~^, 
b and b~  ^ is known to user only in the beginning of this phase. The first step towards hiding real 
identity is to generate PCr, which can serve the purpose of authenticating it to another certificate 
authority such as ICA. In the proposed work PCr is user self generated token blindly signed by 
VCA. The maximum numbers of signed tokens any user can get from VCA are in the range of 1 
to 12; however it is entirely depending on VCA to decide how many tokens to be signed for a user.
5.1.1 Token Sending and Signing Policy
The user in RA-DTN must know about the number of tokens it can send for blind signature. For 
this reason PDA assigned 1-4 trust bit showing the level of trust on the user. PDA is a server 
responsible of trust bit assignment situating in regional kiosk in RA-DTN scenario. It has updated 
CRL for the certificates based on both pseudonym and real identity of the user. The trust bits are 
assigned with the cooperation of VCA and updated CRL. The trust bits are assigned according to 
the previous history of user’s revocation.
The communication between any user and PDA is done offline on already established secure 
charmel. The user request PDA for the number of tokens it can send for blind signature. Both PDA 
and user do not know about the number of tokens VCA will sign out of it. VCA will sign in the 
range of 1-12, the policy is explicitly for DTN like scenario where connectivity to servers are very 
temperamental. Therefore it is always beneficial to reduce frequent contact with CA’s and acquire 
maximum number of tokens.
The user falls into one of the four categories.
Low Risk:- This is the highest level of trust any user can acquire in the PF. A user is eligible 
to fall in this category if it has been issued pseudonym certificates in the past and none of its 
pseudonym certificate found malicious or revoked in the last nine to twelve months. PDA assigned 
trust bit 1 to it, thus it can send blinded tokens in the range of 8 to 14 to VCA for signing purposes, 
VCA sign in the range of 6-12 tokens. The difference between numbers of sending and signing is 
checked for integrity, which is 2 in number. If r is the number of tokens signed by VCA then r-f  2 
is the number of tokens send by user.
Medium Risk: - If the user shows no malicious activity in the last six to nine months and its 
pseudonym certificate is not revoked then PDA assign trust bit 2 to it. In this category user can 
sends blinded tokens in the range of 8 to 10 to VCA for blind signature, VCA would sign in the 
range of 4 to 6, allow VCA to check 4 tokens for integrity. If r is number of tokens signed by VCA 
then user is asked by PDA to send r 4- 4 tokens.
High Risk: - The trust on the user is less then the above two in this category. Further the user
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pseudonym certificate is not revoked in the last three to six months period due to involvement in 
malicious activity. Thus PDA assigned trust bit 3. In this category user can send BT’s in the range 
of 10 to 11 to VCA for blind signature among which VCA would sign 2 to 3. Here VCA checks 
8 tokens to verify integrity of the user. If r is the number of tokens signed by VCA then user need 
to send r + 8 tokens to VCA.
Newbie:- If a user request for signed blinded token for the first time means he has not been 
issued a pseudonym certificate or does not found in malicious activity in the last three months. 
Then PDA will assign trust bit 4 to it. It means there is zero level of trust on the user and therefore 
will be granted very less number of signed tokens. VCA sign only one token for user, however 
user send 17 tokens to VCA, which means 16 tokens are checked for integrity. If r is the number 
of tokens signed by VCA then r + 16 is the number of tokens user need to send to VCA.
The following Table.5.1 summarize the policy required for signing and sending tokens in 
Pseudonym Credential Phase. In the above categories PDA only knows about the real identity 
of the user requesting for pseudonym certificate when he is using pseudonym framework for the 
first time otherwise user communicate with PDA using pseudonymised identity assigned to him in 
the past.
User’s
category
Trust
bit
Tokens sent Tokens integrity 
checked
Tokens
signed
% age trust by 
VCA on user
Low Risk 1 8-14 2 6-12 75-85
Mid Risk 2 8-10 4 4-6 50-60
High Risk 3 10-11 8 2-3 20-27
Newbie 4 17 16 1 5
Table 5.1: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Policy Categories
The values in the table shows increase in numbers of tokens checked for integrity to the power 
of 2 from low risk to newbie. This is because the low risk compare to newbie users proves its 
honesty by using pseudonym certificates. The table shows that with the decrease of risk user is 
able to send less number of tokens and get greater number of signed tokens. Initially the VCA 
shows 5% trust on the user but with passage of time and user’s behavior that trust is increased to 
85%. In summary, if user is not involved in malicious activity in past using pseudonym certificate 
then it would need less number of tokens to be send and received greater number of tokens from 
VCA.
5.1.2 Requirements and Assumptions
This section described the requirements for Pseudonym Credential Phase.
•  The PCr should be cryptographically secure and bound to some arbitrary value that the
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honest user turn dishonest can not deny its ownership.
• VCA must be scalable in terms of accepting large number of requests for PCr.
•  VCA should accept and then blindly sign tokens according to the policy defined by PDA 
and VCA after formal authentication.
• VCA accept requests for signing blinded token from the users that are part of the same 
region as VCA.
The following are the set of assumptions for Pseudonym Credential Phase.
• Every participating user obtained his private/public key through some secure channel and 
robust key management.
•  The communication link between PDA and VCA is secured and experiencing minimum 
delay and disruption.
•  VCA works as regional gateway and root CA in the PKI hierarchy situated in kiosk.
• All communications taken place in Pseudonym Credential Phase are either single hop (user 
go in person to kiosk) or multi hop (through mobile terminal such as bus).
5.1.3 Messages Exchange
In Pseudonym Credential Phase user exchange a set of messages with VCA to get PCr. VCA 
is hosted by kiosk in addition to number of authorities including PDA. User request PDA server 
for trust bit assignment, after successful assignment of it user request VCA for PCr. The Fig.5.1 
shows system model of Pseudonym Credential Phase. Further messages are explained in detailed 
as follow.
Authentication/Request Message
In this message user authenticates itself and sends a particular number of tokens instructed by PDA 
for blind signature to VCA. User construct blinded tokens according to the trust bit assignment, 
the tokens are constructed by taking hash of fresh random number further XOR with real identity. 
The reason to include real identity in the token is to assure to VCA that the token is belonging to 
user. The XOR function is further blinded with blinding factor b to make the token blinded. The 
reason for using XOR function is to make it impossible for any entity except VCA to know about 
the real identity of the user despite of having the b~ .^ In other words if adversary knows about 
b~ ,^ but still it is not possible for him to know about the real identity of the user from the BT. It
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Figure 5.1: Pseudonym Credential Phase
is also necessary for user to construct every BT of the same form shown in Eq.5.1 however each 
should include different random number.
(5.1)
The above equation shows which is the real identity of the user included in every BT, is 
the fresh random number generated by user i.e. random number 2 generated by user 3. User 
generates n numbers of BTs of the same contents however each one is blinded with different b and 
XOR with fresh unique random number r^. Further user take hash of id, BTs, req and encrypt with 
its private key, and the result is digital signature, to prove its identity. Further the digital signature 
is encrypted with the public key of the VCA and sends to it with original certificate. BT\ — BTn 
corresponds to the number of BT’s depending on the trust bit assigned to user by PDA, Eq.5.2 
shows the structure of the message.
(5.2)
Challenge Message
In this message VCA construct a challenge for the received BT’s. VCA decrypts the message 
with its private key and obtained the digital signature, it decrypts the signature with the public key 
provided in the certificate and checks the validity of the certificate. If the certificate is revoked or 
the signature is not verified then VCA will discard the message and broadcast the identity of this
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user as malicious user in the network. After successful verification VCA obtained BT’s, id and 
request for PCr.
VCA randomly select some n number of tokens depending on user category and construct a 
challenge i.e. I, The challenge has two parts i.e. 7-^  and P . The challenge corresponds to full 
decryption such as r]^  and b~ ,^ where P  means partial decryption information such as random 
numbers only.
In case of newbie category user need to send 17 blinded BT’s, of which VCA randomly select 
16 for P  and one for sub challenge. VCA encrypt both part of the challenge with the public 
key of user as shown below in Eq.5.3.
{P\\lf)PK^^ (5.3)
Response to Challenge Message
This message is response to the challenge message of VCA, user obtained two challenges and 
P . In response to the sub challenge , user send r\ and b~ .^ However in response to P , user send 
only random number information. User also generates one time session key, which will be use for 
return encryption by VCA. User include response to challenges in the message and encrypts it 
with the public key of the VCA. This inclusion of challenges will assure that VCA is talking to 
same user to which it send the challenges in the previous message. The message takes the form 
shown in Eq.5.4.
(rj 6 / ' ’114, e  / |  IS'ffXjSOPr™ (5.4)
Pseudonym Credential G rant Message
VCA decrypts the message with its secret key and obtained responses to both challenges. It com­
pares the responses it received with the challenges it sent to assure that VCA is communicating 
with authenticated user. VCA first take the challenge and perform one of the following or both 
steps to verify the authenticity of the blinded token.
1. It unblind the BT’s one by one by applying corresponding b~  ^ and obtained the XOR func­
tion (r<7”' 0i7(r|j)). Further it takes the hash function of provided and take XOR of that 
calculated hash with XOR function as shown in Eq.5.5 If the identity of the user is found 
then token is verified. It repeats the process for all BT’s.
BT =  -4 ->■ ® ff(4 ) =  id"‘ (5.5)
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2. It unblind the BT’s one by one by applying corresponding b~  ^ and obtained the XOR func­
tion (id^  ^©iT(r^)). Further it takes XOR of id^  ^with XOR function and get the hash value 
H(r]^). It calculates the hash value of random number and compare with hash it obtains after 
XOR function, a match verifies the token as shown in Eq.5.6 . It repeats the process for the 
rest of all BT’s.
BT =  {{id’''® H (ri)f)b-^  -4- ® g (4 ) )  -4- {id'‘‘®H{/„))mid'" =  H {/„)=H {i^)
(5.6)
The successful verification of the above lead VCA to sign the rest of the blinded tokens belongs to 
P  challenge. Therefore VCA signs blindly the rest of token without knowing the content of it.
The following steps explain the process of blind signing by VCA.
1. VCA sign the BT’s of the P  set, so sBT is of the form in Eq.5.7.
sBT„ =  [[(W“ ®ff(4))*||W’'“ ||r„''“ | | i / “ ]p’’“ ||irf“ lpp, (5.7)
The reason of including identity of VCA in every signed blinded token is to prove to ICA 
that the token is signed by valid certificate authority. is the time stamp at which the token 
is signed, every user has unique different time stamps as they being signed on different times. 
VCA also limits user to spend this token with particular ICA by including its identity. VCA also 
includes next hop address to give explicit indication to user that this token can be spend with this 
particular ICA only.
2. VCA take hash of every random number received in P  challenge. For example if P  consists 
of two random numbers such as random number . The random numbers are interpreted as 
random number 2 generated by user 3 and random number 4 generated by user3 respectively. VCA 
take hash of each random number separately and take XOR function with identity of user. The 
reason of performing this operation is due to VCA’s assumption that user construct the remaining 
packets same as the one’s which are unblinded.
3. VCA construct Table.5.2 for all users requested for PCr. For illustration purposes we 
considered that five users requested for PCr. The table shows the hash string value which is 
calculated in step 2 for all five users. Every string will be unique as every string includes unique 
random number and identity. For illustration purposes we are considering four tokens signed by 
VCA so therefore 4 unique hash string values and four times stamp each for each signed token. The 
structure of the table is only shown for simplicity purposes; it is entirely up to the implementation 
phase that how it is constructed and maintained. The reason for recording the entries in the table
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is for resolution purposes later on.
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User’s Identities Hash string(B/) (i<i"*©i7(r )^) Random numbers [r\) Time Stamps (3%^ )^
Id"'
Sl=234f3hg678
S2=256ghuh47
S3=hyh6738jnj
S4=hd78ujkdm
r\
A
j<vca
j'vca
^vca
Tvca
■^ 4
Sll=gw679jfnu r\ Tvca
I^ n l S12=hQfi038jm A J'vca
S13=hfu6729kf A nrvca“'13
S14=h6389jfmf 4 TVca-'14
S21=hQ729jf8g A nrvca■‘21
I(jn3> S22=jQ78j89jfg A TVca-‘22
S23=267hhf80g A TVca■‘23
S24=7h89jfm0g 4
S31=jfj790jk9g A TVca■‘31
S32=jfu80j46hk A jv c a
S33=jhfk790jkf A jv c a
S34=jfui890ui4h 4 TVca■‘34
Table 5.2: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Identity Resolution Hash Table
4. VCA sent sBTn — sBTn signed tokens encrypted with one time session key provided by user. 
The message shown in Eq.5.8 is sent to user.
{sBT 1 — sBT A)shk!}. (5.8)
User received the message shown in Eq.5.8 from VCA, after applying one time session key it 
obtained the sBT’s. The reason of using one time session key is to verify that the BT is signed by 
VCA to whom user was communicating before. Further user apply the corresponding unblinding 
factor b~  ^ on all sBT’s and get the signed UnBlinded Token (sUBT). After applying the corres­
ponding unblinding factor on Eq.5.9 the token becomes PCr shown in Eq.5.10.
(5.9)
(5.10)
It is not possible for any user in the network to modify the sBT because it is signed by private 
key of VCA and any sort of modification results in losing the signature. Also user can not duplicate 
the token for double spending as every token has next hop address and address of particular ICA.
The services of Pseudonym Credential Phase finishes here and every user in the network that 
follow the rules defined by VCA has been granted pool of PCr depending on trust bit. The follow-
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ing Table.5.3 shows the summary of the messages exchange of Pseudonym Credential Phase.
l .User-^VCA {(fW"' II -B ?;, II II Qf
2.VCA User {P  II P)pKni
3.User —)■ VCA (4  II 4 ,^"^  G 7-^
4.VCA -4 User {sBT\ -  sBTs) shk ,^^j
Table 5.3: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Messages Exchange
5.2 Threat Model
There is no security solution absolute and forever, however Pseudonym Credential Phase which 
aims to generate pseudonym credential provide defends against most of the attacks and adversary 
model. The aims and objectives of the adversary are categorized as follows:
•  Dishonest user wants to cheat VCA in the process of signing the blinded token to avoid 
accountability.
•  VCA misbehaving with user by signing those tokens which it already checked for verifica­
tion purposes i.e. instead of signing tokens belonging to P ,  it signs from I .^
•  Adversary observing the communication between VCA and user, and attempting to link 
pseudonym credentials to user original identity.
• Adversary controls one or more user in the network, and attempting to send/receive on their 
behalf.
5.3 Analysis of Privacy Attacks
In this section we will analyze different privacy and security attacks on Pseudonym Credential 
Phase.
5.3.1 Repudiation Attack
Repudiation attack is the one in which user denying that he/she performed a particular transac­
tion/action. The possibility of any honest user to turn dishonest can be motivation for repudiation 
attack. In Pseudonym Credential Phase user can launch this attack however it would be deducted 
with large probability. Also if attacker is succeeded then in the Resolution Phase when user is 
found involved in malicious activity will be identified.
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In this attack we considered that a honest user turns dishonest includes bogus BT’s with valid 
one while sending for blind signature. The bogus BT’s can be characterized; the tokens which do 
not reveal identifying information of the user. However VCA would detect with large probability, 
because:
• User do not know about the number of signed tokens it will receive from VCA. Therefore 
bogus tokens in the valid token’s pool could be detected with high probability.
•  VCA drawn tokens at random in challenge message from the pool of tokens sent by user. 
VCA further unblind the tokens and compare the identity included in the token to the identity 
from which the request is made. If VCA finds any bogus token which do not include identity 
of the user then it will reject request for PC,-. Therefore user can not predict about a certain 
token that it will not be picked and checked.
The block diagram in Fig.5.2 shows the anatomy of the attack. User sent mix BT’s which 
includes both legitimate and bogus for signing to VCA in the Authentication/request message. 
VCA randomly select some of the BT’s according to the category assigned to user by PDA. VCA 
verify each BT one by one by applying the b~^  and hash function. If it finds any bogus token then 
it stop checking and reject the user’s request for pseudonym certificate otherwise user is granted 
with PCr. It is possible that VCA unintentionally sign bogus token, this way adversary succussed 
in the attack. But user will be identified in the resolution phase if it performs malicious activity.
USER
II
VCA
3b X Check 
Bogus
Attack not 
Detected
Attack
Detected
Figure 5.2: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Repudiation Attack
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5.3.2 Impersonation Attack
Impersonation attack compromise the identity of the legitimate user in the network and thus claim 
message sent to/from real user. In pseudonym framework adversary can impersonate any user in 
RA-DTN whose aim to get PC, from VCA. However adversary will not be successful in this attack 
due to challenge response mechanism between user and VCA, The attack is shown in the Fig.5.3 
at abstract level.
VGA
User
Attacker
Figure 5.3: Pseudonym Credential Phase: User Impersonation Attack
Suppose attacker impersonate user in RA-DTN and observed the communication link between 
user and VCA. Further attacker is able to send blinded tokens to VCA using user identity. There­
fore the knowledge of the attacker is shown in Bq.5.11 compared to knowledge of user shown in 
Eq.5.I2
KlniiialiA) =  { ( ( < (5.11)
KiUser) =  , I", (5.12)
Attacker sends the captured message to VCA by first signing it with its own private key and 
then encrypting it under public key of VCA. VCA construct two challenges 7 ,^ 7  ^ , it sends both 
challenges encrypted with the public key of the attacker. Therefore attacker knowledge is increase 
to shown in Eq.5.13.
Ki„,ermedia,e(A) =  { ( ( i d ’" S) H(r‘„ ) f  ,id" ‘,P 'J ”} (5.13)
The attacker aim is to get signed blinded tokens which are actually destined for user from 
VCA. For this purpose attacker needs pool of random numbers and unblinded factors to responde
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to the challenge asked by VCA. If Kimermediatei )^ r\K(user) =  or attacker knowledge
is increased to KfinaiiA) =  K{user) then attacker is succeeded. However this is not possible in 
Pseudonym Credential Phase because only user know the unblinding factor and random number 
of sent blinded tokens. Therefore attacker knowledge remains the same as Kintermediatei )^-
5.3.3 Influence Attack
This attack is proposed in this thesis; influence attack is the low intensity version of impersonation 
attack. In this attack the attacker influence or force an entity to perform a particular action. That 
action may benefit the attacker directly or indirectly (later in communication). It is not possible 
for an attacker to impersonate VCA completely, because it is well known public trusted authority 
and in our assumptions we also assume trust on it. However we suppose that VCA may influence 
by law enforcement agency to become big brother for some political interest in order to reveal 
the identities of a particular user or network. However attacker is not successful because of the 
challenge response methodology. The block diagram in Fig.5.4 shows the attack at abstract level.
o-
USER sBT BT set n rT= Ip
5b O
1o
5 a
Discard TokensVCA
Accept Tokens
I s
Blind
signing
Figure 5.4: Pseudonym Credential Phase: VCA Influence Attack
In the response to challenge message of the Pseudonym Credential Phase VCA received re­
sponses to challenges P  and /^. VCA has to sign the tokens belonging to P  set. But VCA is 
forced by law enforcement agency to sign tokens from the set of /^. The reason is obvious; law 
enforcement agency want to track the communication of a particular user and for that purposes it
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needs to know the contents of the token. Moreover law enforcement agency wants to include some 
sort of tag in the token for tracking purpose. Therefore in pseudonym credential grant message 
VCA signed tokens from the set of instead of P  and send to user.
VCA signed those tokens which it already decrypts and know its contents. User already com­
piled 'BT — set'; the set which contains all tokens user sent for signing. The second set (rT) 
corresponds to those signed blinded tokens which user received in the last message. User com­
pares both sets of tokens and accept if BT — set Ç\rT =  P  otherwise reject if BT — set Ç\rT =  .
The former condition means tokens from P  are signed and the later means tokens from P  are 
signed.
5.4 Formal Modeling of Pseudonym Credential Phase
It is not possible for any system to be absolutely secure however it may be secure under some attack 
models in a certain scenario. Following are the general properties of a secure protocol/system 
[138].
• It is hard to recover private key from available public key.
•  It is hard to recover the plain text from cipher text or it is probabilistically high to recover it.
• It is hard to compute any useful information from cipher text.
• It is hard for an adversary to obtain useful/identifying information from two indistinguish­
able cipher texts.
Addition to above properties security protocol/system can be verified for ambiguity, incorrectness, 
inconsistency and incompleteness. The Pseudonym Credential Phase is modeled in CSP protocol 
description language. CASPER and FDR simulating tools has been used for checking certain 
properties. The importance of this formal modeling has been proved by modeling and analyzing 
NSPK in CSP and CASPERFDR and briefly explained in Appendix A. The rest of the chapter 
formally model Pseudonym Credential Phase for verifying the security properties and correctness 
of the protocol.
In formal modeling, the balance and decision in modeling different bits of the system is very 
difficult and important as well. Generally a protocol is modeled and analyzed for limited number of 
participants. For example if a protocol is designed for wireless sensor network, in which hundreds 
of users request a server for public/private key pair. If system is modeled and analyzed for one user 
interacting with server and found secure then other user of the system are also same and overall 
system is secured. Therefore Pseudonym Credential Phase is modeled with one user VCA and
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two ICA’s. User sends one blinded token and VCA signed that blinded token for user. If no attack 
is found on this system then it does not matter if the number of tokens gets increased or number 
of user requesting signed tokens from VCA gets increase.
5.4.1 Properties
Following are the properties of formal model of Pseudonym Credential Phase.
• The protocol is modeled with finite (two verifying certificate authorities and one user) num­
ber of honest participants and intruder. Also more than one run by each participant of the 
protocol is also modeled.
The participants such as user, VCA, ICA of Pseudonym Credential Phase are modeled as 
CSP processes.
Adversary is also modeled using CSP process, who can interact with protocol. We modeled 
Dolev Yao model which overhear messages, intercept messages, encrypt and decrypt mes­
sages with appropriate keys and also can fake messages to other participant.
In the use cases, we modified the Dolev Yao model and make it stronger that even it can
compromise key of any authorities.
•  The model is checked against secrecy and authentication properties.
•  The model is described in nine sections, each section begin with # sign, i.e. #vaiiables,
#specifications etc.
• The model used FDR for testing of the system that satisfies the specification.
5.4.2 CASPERFDR Modeling
#Free variables, defines types of variables and functions used in the Pseudonym Credential Phase. 
In this section we have VCA, user as agents, which run the protocol. PK and SK are public key and 
secret key function respectively. H is the hash function; both the participants as well as intruder 
can perform this function if appropriate value is known to them. User construct a blinded token by 
inputting a unique fresh random variable which is represented in the modeling by r, r l represents 
the random number belonging to the sub challenge P .  The challenges are represented as and 
P ,  id is the real identity of the user and inverse keys is the public private key function.
#Processes, represents the number of agents involved in this phase and their initial knowledge. 
In this phase one user represented as initiator of the protocol, initiator knows its own real identity.
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set of random number belonging to both challenges, public key of the participants involved in the 
mn and its own secret key. Responder is the representation of VCA server, knows public key of 
all participants addition to its own secret key, also both challenges.
#ProtocoI description defines the protocol itself through sequence of messages, which ex­
changes between agents. The notations XPK(Y) represents X is encrypted with public key of Y, 
same applies for secret key encryption. In the 0th step User is initiator of the protocol and started 
communication with VCA. In the 1st step User authenticate itself to VCA by sending its real iden­
tity with set of blinded tokens. In 2nd Step VCA send two challenges. In 3rd step user responds to 
the challenges with blinded token and random numbers. The special notation of percentage sign is 
used for constructing a blinded token. User take hash of the random number and take XOR with 
the its real identity and then blind it using percentage notation to a temporary variable BT. VCA 
is unable to read the contents of 3rd message because if some function is followed by percentage 
sign in CASPERFDR then the receiver can not process it. Therefore VCA signed the contents of 
BT variable without knowing and send back to user in 4th step. The step 3a is optional and used 
for evaluating correctness of the protocol. For example if VCA is able to send random number r 
included in the blinded token back to user. It means VCA knows the contents of the blinded token, 
however in the modeling it is not possible for VCA to send this r because it is unable to decrypt 
the blinded token without proper unblinding factor.
#Specification, used to specify security properties and requirement of the protocol. The pro­
tocol is checked against these requirements and if it satisfies means adversary is not able to launch 
an attack. These properties are either secrecy or authentication. Strong secret specifies that in 
any incomplete run Alice expects the value is secret between himself and Bob. The property fails 
when intruder learns the secret without acting as Bob or receiver. In this phase user is under the 
impression that its real identity and random numbers are secret between himself and VCA. Same 
as VCA assumed that both challenges is known to user only. Weak agreement specifies that Alice 
is authenticated to Bob but each one may disagree as to which role each was taking, we check the 
weak agreement between user and VCA.
#ActuaI variables, specifies the atomic data types used in the protocol. The model of Pseud­
onym Credential Phase shows number of actual variables used in the system. These variables are 
agents, random numbers, challenges, token set and real identity.
#Functions, This gives definition of all functions used in the protocol such as Public and 
private key functions.
#System provides information about the actual system to be checked in terms of number and 
type of agents using CASPERFDR. In this phase basic model we have two agents participating in
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the run, one is the node which is the user requesting blind signature and other is Serverl which 
VCA providing services to all users. The parameters in their knowledge are same as defined in the 
processes.
#Intruder, This section specifies the initial knowledge of the intruder, which is part of the 
protocol. The model implements Dolev Yao adversary model, the operations is explained earlier. 
Intruder knows about the public keys of all participants in the network/protocol. Intruder also has 
its own private/public key pair for encryption and decryption. Same as other participant intruder 
can generates random number. Intruder knows about the identity of all participants in the protocol.
The model of Pseudonym Credential Phase using CASPERFDR is shown in the Table.5.4
#Free variables
User, VCA: Agent
PK : Agent— >  PublicKey
SK : Agent— >  SecretKey
H : HashFunction
r,rl : Random
If,Ip: Challenges
id : ReallD
ts : TokenSet
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Processes INlTlATOR(User,VCA,id,r,rl, ts) knows PK, SK(User) RESPONDER(VCA,User,If,Ip) knows PK, SK(VCA)
#ProtocoI description
0.— >User : VCA
1.User- >VCA : {{id,ts}{SK{User)}}{PK{VCA)}
2.V C A - >User : {If,Ip}{PK{User)}
3a.User- >VCA : {{{H{r)eid)%HT)%BT,rl}{PK{VCA)}
3b. VC A— >User : r
4.VCA- >Usei : {{BT%({H{r)eid)%HT)}{SK{VCA)}%sBT}{PK(User)}
#Specification
StrongSecret(User, id, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(User, r, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(User, r l, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(VCA, Ip, [User]) 
StrongSecret(VCA, If, [User]) 
WeakAgreement(User, VCA)
#Functions symbolic PK, SK
#Actual variables
Node, Serverl, Mallory : Agent 
Ts :Tokenset 
Id :RealID
Random: Rm, Rl,R,Nm 
Challenges: IF,1P
#System INITlATOR(Node,Serverl,Id,R,Rl,Ts) RESPONDERl(Serverl,Node, IF,1P)
#Intruder Information Intruder = MalloryIntruderKnowledge = {Node, Serverl, Mallory, PK, Rm, SK{(Mallory)}}
Table 5.4: Phase-1 Basic Formal Model
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5.4.3 Results
After successful compilation of above CASPER model and feeding CSP output to FDR. The 
model found no attacks on secrecy properties because the attacker does not have the appropriate 
decryption keys. For example the identity of the node, random numbers and nonces are secret to 
Serverl only. However the random number used in the blind factor is secret to node only. There 
are attacks on authentication property, which are explained below. The above model also checks 
for correctness of the protocol. For example the message 3b in the protocol description VCA is 
asked to send the random number included in the blinded token after receiving the blinded tokens 
in the message-2 from node. CASPERFDR gives error ’’Unknown field(S) in the message 3b for 
sender: r”. This means that VCA is unable to send the random variable r because it gains no 
information from the blinded token.
Role Confusion Attack (Node)
This type of attack is the one in which the node is confused about its role. In this attack the 
adversary react as man in the middle between user and VCA. In the first message user sends 
the set of blinded tokens with its real identity for authentication purposes; however the message 
is taken by the intruder who acts as VCA. Further it fakes the received message to VCA. VCA 
is under the impression that the message came from user, so it replies with message-2, same as 
message-1 attacker take message-2 and fakes it to user. Now attacker till this point actively set in 
between the user and server. Therefore user continues the rest of messages exchanges with VCA, 
assuming it as VCA server. The abstract model of the attack is shown in the Fig.5.5.
FDR checks the assertion of authentication between node and serverl. Node is translated as 
the user in the real protocol, which initiate the run in formal modeling and Serverl is VCA, which 
respond to the request from initiator. The top level trace shows the belief of node in terms of 
authentication with serverl. In the system level trace node start the run of protocol with serverl, 
but the intruder imitates serverl and therefore compelled node to start the mn with the intmder. 
In the second message intmder also imitates node and reply the message to serverl. At this point 
in the trace the intmder mn two parallel sessions; one with node i.e.a and one with serverl (3. 
The attacker exploits the a  session and hence stop node to communicate with VCA. This session 
ends with the message, which intmder takes from severl and fake it to node with different value 
encrypting it with its own secret key. The node after applying its decryption key found invalid 
signature on the token and therefore discard it. In this attack the adversary learns nothing but 
it wasted the attempt of node for getting signed token, because the communication link between 
node and serverl is captured by adversary. The trace of the attack is shown in the Fig.5.6.
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Figure 5.5: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Role Confusion Attack(User)
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Checking assertion AUTH1_M: :Aut hent1c at eRESPONDERToINITI ATORWeakAg reement (T» AUTHIM::SYSTEM_1 
Attack found:
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1. Node > I_Serverl
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2. Serverl > I_Node
2. I_Serverl -> Node
3a. Node •> I_Serverl
4. I Serverl ■> Node
Node Serverl
{{Id, Ts){SK{Node)}}{PK(Serveri)} 
{(Id, Ts}{SK{Node))}{PK(Serverl)} 
{IF, IP}{PK(Node)}
{IF, IP}{PK(Node)}
{H(R) (O Id, Rl){PK{Serverl}} 
{{Garbage}{SK(Mallory) ) HPK(NodeJ}
Figure 5.6: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Role Confusion Trace (Node)
Role Confusion Attack (VCA)
The intruder is also able to launch the role confusion attack on VCA, means VCA is authenticated 
to intruder instead of user requesting for signed blinded tokens. This attack is akin of the previous 
attack except the intruder starts the communication with VCA, attack is shown in Fig.5.7. The
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model shows that the user is completely isolated after sending message-1.
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Figure 5.7: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Role Confusion Attack (VCA)
User send message-1 which includes set of blinded tokens and identity for authentication. 
But the message takes by intruder and fakes it to VCA. VCA replay with message-2 to user, 
however this time again the intruder takes the message. To this point intruder completely hijacked 
the session between the user and VCA. Therefore VCA continue the rest of message sending to 
intruder, thinking that it is sending to user.
The trace of VCA role confusion attack is shown in the Fig.5.8. The CASPERFDR result 
of this attack shows at top level that the responder is confused about its role as responder with 
node. The attacker divided the attack into two session i.e.a and (3, where a  is the session between 
intruder and user and (3 is between intruder and serverl. In message-1 node started the protocol 
run with serverl, but attacker intimate the serverl and received the message, further attacker send 
replay to serverl by intimating node. To this point intruder get hold of |3 session and VCA continue 
sending of the rest messages to intruder thinking it is sending to node. This attack do not harm 
VCA, however node is affected because node do not receive any message after the first message 
it sent. Therefore it keep sending the set of tokens but receive nothing in respond. VCA after 
several times request may block node for requesting for blinded tokens in future. In this attack 
the intruder learns nothing because in (3 session all received messages are encrypted with node’s 
public key and the corresponding secret key is known to node only.
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Figure 5.8: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Role Confusion Trace (Serverl)
5.4.4 Analysis
The above role confusion attacks were defended by including nonces; the fresh values in the 
messages exchanged between node and serverl. Further the strong authentication properties of 
’’agreement” are checked between node and serverl. In this property both participants are authen­
ticated to each other on specific value, which in our case is nonce from user and challenges P  and 
I  ^ from VCA, In the protocol description User and VCA mutually authenticate to each other the 
amendments in the protocol description is shown in the Tab.5.5.
0. -  > User : VCA
1. User -  > VCA :
2. VCA -  > User :
3a. User -  > VCA : {((JT(r)eW)%^r)%BT,rl,7/,/p}{fÆ(VCA)}
-Sb.VCA — > User : r
4. VCA -  > User : {{^T%((7f(r) ezW)%Ff7’)}{5'Æ(yCA)}%.ygT,Ma}{f;[([/^g/')}
Table 5.5: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Modified Protocol Descriptions
The model checker CASPERFDR is again run for the two properties of weak agreement and 
two properties of agreement. The main difference between weak agreement and agreement is 
that in the former participants are authenticated to each other on certain values and in the later 
participants simply authenticate to each other.
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Multiplicity attack
This attack is due to lack of freshness in the messages exchanges, in this attack the agents disagree 
on the number of times the protocol has been run. After running CASPERFDR all checks found 
no attacks except the agreement between VCA and user on data values and P .  The attack is 
shown in the Fig.5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Multiplicity Attack
The sequence diagram of multiplicity attack is shown in Fig.5.10, user is unable to get the 
pseudonym credential.
Intruder VCAUser
I
Id, Ts,Na}SK(User)}PK(V'CA)
Mld,ls,NalSK(User)}PK(VCA)
{Garbage ! PK( User) @
Figure 5.10: Multiplicity Attack: Sequence Diagram
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In the first three messages of the protocol description of Pseudonym Credential Phase both 
participants mutually authenticated to each other and agree on some data values. However in 
message-4 VCA send the messages to user without the fresh nonce or the agreed nonce. Therefore 
the attacker is able to imitate the VCA and modified the message. The severity of this attack is that 
node will never get the signed blinded token, because each time the attacker sends some garbage 
value, which can not be used as pseudonym credential.
The first countermeasure taken for this attack is to use the concept of secure channel. In this 
phase user and VCA mutually authenticated to each other at the end of message-3 and therefore 
in message-4 VCA only send the signed blinded tokens without authenticating again to the user. 
Therefore for this reason message-4 is assumed to be transmitted on secure channel, in which the 
attacker can not fake, reply and redirect the message. The second countermeasures can be the 
adaptation of nonce ’na’ on which user is authenticated to VCA, so therefore VCA send message- 
4 with nonce ’na’ to assure that user is talking to same authenticated VCA. The Table.5.6 shows 
the final formal model of this phase in which all countermeasures to the above discussed attacks 
are addressed.
The model is again checked again for all security and authentication properties and the output 
shown in Fig.5.11 gives no attack, therefore Pseudonym Credential Phase is proved secure protocol 
under the explained attacker model.
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Figure 5.11: Pseudonym Credential Phase Attack Free
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#Free variables
User, VCA: Agent
PK : Agent— >  PublicKey
SK : Agent— >  SecretKey
H : HashFunction
na: Nonce
r,rl : Random
If,Ip: Challenges
id : ReallD
ts : TokenSet
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Processes INITIATOR(User,VCA,id,r,rl, na,ts) knows PK, SK(User) RESPONDER(VCA,User,If,Ip) knows PK, SK(VCA)
#Protocol description
0.— >User : VCA
1.User- >VCA : {{id,naAs}{SK{User)}}{PK{VCA)}
2.VCA- >User : {If,Ip,na}{PK{User)}
3a. U ser- >VCA : {{(H{r)®id)%HT)%BT,r\ ,If ,Ip}{PK{VCA)}
-3b. VCA — >  User: r
4.VCA- >Ustv:{{BT%{{H(r)®id)%HT)}{SK{VCA)}%sBT,na]{PK{User)}
#Channels 4N F NRA- NR-
#Specifieation
StrongSecret(User, id, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(User, r, [User])
StrongSecret(User, na, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(VCA, Ip, [User]) 
StrongSecret(VCA, If, [User]) 
WeakAgreement(User, VCA) 
WeakAgreement(VCA, User) 
Agreement(U ser, VC A, [na] ) 
Agreement(V CA,User, [If,Ip] )
#Functions symbolic PK, SK
#Actual variables
Node, Serverl, Mallory : Agent 
Ts :Tokenset 
Id :RealID 
Na,Nm :Nonce 
Random: Rm, Rl,R,Nm 
Challenges: IF,IP
#System INITIATOR(Node,ServerI,Id,R,Rl,Na,Ts) RESPONDER(Serverl,Node, IF,IP)
#Intruder Information Intruder = MalloryIntruderKnowledge = {Node, Serverl, Mallory, PK, Rm,Nm, SK{(Mallory)}}
Table 5.6: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Final Formal Model
5.4.5 Limitations of proposed Formal Model
The following are the limitations of our proposed formal model.
•  No algebraic equivalences were defined in the messages exchange.
• The model is only evaluated for well known attacks which are dependent on authentication 
and secrecy properties.
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• Limited set of agents are modeled with finite runs, key compromise were not modeled such 
as modification in dolev yao model.
5.5 Summary
This chapter discussed the first phase of pseudonym framework, the Pseudonym Credential Phase. 
This phase allow users to get pseudonym credential from the certificate authority VCA situated 
in kiosk. This phase involved four messages exchange such as Authentication/Request, Response 
to Challenge and Challenge, Pseudonym Credential grant. The first two are originated from the 
user while the last two sent by VCA. User sends blinded tokens to VCA, and VCA after challenge 
response method signs it. Blinded token is XOR of fresh random number and hash of real iden­
tity of the user, the signed blinded token includes some identifying information added by VCA 
with blinded token digitally signed. VCA blindly sign the tokens without looking to its contents. 
However for resolution it records some of the identifying information in the form of hash tables.
The design is further analyzed for privacy attacks such as repudiation, impersonation and influ­
ence. The attacker is not successful in its objective and therefore unable to gain useful information. 
Furthermore, the design is modeled in model checker tool CASPER/FDR based on state machine. 
The tool checks all possible states a participant can take while running a protocol. After modeling 
the pseudonym credential phase the result shows some possible attacks such as role confusion and 
multiplicity attack. Attacks were defended with appropriate countermeasures such as fresh nonces, 
challenges and secure channel. The summary of the attacks and countermeasures is shown in the 
Table.5.7.
Privacy Attacks Analysis
Repudiation Attack 1. Trust bit assignment, 2. random selection of tokens by VCA.
Impersonation Attack Full and partial decryption challenges i.e. I  ^and P
Influence Attack Response to challenge.
Formal Security Analysis
Role Confusion (User) 1. Adding fresh nonce to knowledge of the user, 2. Authenticat­
ing user to VCA on the same nonce.
Role Confusion (VCA) Authenticate VCA to user on the two sub challenges i.e. I  ^ and 
P  .
Multiplicity Attack Secure channel in the last message exchange.
Table 5.7: Pseudonym Credential Phase: Attacks Summary
Chapter 6
Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase
Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase, incorporate PbA concept and allow users to anonymously 
authenticate to ICA by spending PCr to obtain PID and PC. It is trivial that in one to one commu­
nication zero level of anonymity exists between participants. User with PCr wants to get certificate 
from the certificate authority ICA. Therefore to ensure the anonymity of user while interacting with 
ICA , unlinkabihty between resulting PID and user is required. The possible solutions can be as­
sumed an already estabhshed anonymous communication channel, OR or MIX but in the previous 
chapter we already discussed the later two techniques and their infeasibility for RA-DTN. The 
assumption of established anonymous communication channel is not realistic assumption because 
providing a solution for anonymity and privacy and considering the communication channel as 
anonymous or unlinkable. Therefore to achieve unlinkability user before requesting ICA join one 
of the created group maintained by Group Manager (GM).
This chapter discusses the steps of issuing single and multiple certificates from single and 
multiple ICAs, also the protocol is analyzed for privacy attacks. CasperFDR tool is used to model 
the the messages exchange of this phase and analyzed for correctness and security. To measure 
anonymity entropy based information theoretic analysis is used for different metrics. The results 
show that Degree of Anonymity (Do A) is dependent on many parameters such as number of nodes, 
probability distribution, attacker strength and hop count.
6.1 Groups for Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase
Groups in RA-DTN are based on common interest of users i.e. preserving privacy. These groups 
can be more than one in the region/subregion and of different sizes. A Group is maintained and 
administered by Group Manager (GM); elected by group members. Every group is identified by 
unique Group ID (GID) and persist updated Group Symmetric Key (GSK) The Fig.6.1
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shows dynamics of region, subregions and groups in RA-DTN for PR Group can be composed 
of sole region with one ICA which also acts as gateway as shown in (B) part of the figure. Also 
group can be composed of more than one region shown in (A) part of the figure.
Region
Group!
\^ u b r e g io n -T ^ ^ Subregion-3 ,
a
Group! Subregion
Figure 6.1: Region, Subregions and Groups
User and sub regional ICA join the group by anonymously authenticated to it and obtained 
updated The key is updated in the event of user entering and leaving the group. Any mes­
sage send to/from GID and encrypted with is a valid message with no linking information
to PCr- Group formation and anonymous authentication is not focus of this thesis. The reason to 
join the group is to build anonymity set size prior to actual request for PC.
Different Groups sizes are simulated in ONE Simulation considering FirstContact[156] rout­
ing algorithm. In the group only one copy of the message is traveling and every member of the 
group after encountering another member pass the message to it and this way it reaches its destin­
ation. Thus the source sometimes become relay node for its own messages. The reason of opting 
this routing algorithm is twofold; first we are not focusing on routing algorithm in this work, there­
fore any protocol as far as providing a nominal amount of delivery ratio is considerable, second 
FirstContact is based on passing the message to the encounter node no matter it is efficient node 
for delivery which increase the number of hops the message pass through. Therefore it increases 
unlinkability between message sent and received and adversary need to compromise large portion 
of the network to link sender to receiver. We run simulation for different group sizes and record 
average number of relayed hops for a message sent by random group member to ICA for PC. 
The intermediate hop which acts forwarder for a particular message is represented as IHi. A mes­
sage received by IHi has hop count field, which tells the IHi that the message is passed through
CHAPTERS. PSEUDONYM CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE PHASE 86
particular number of hops, thus hop count is different for different group sizes.
6.2 Requirements and Assumptions
The following are set of requirements for Pseudonym Certificate Phase.
•  The PT/PID should be cryptographically secure and bound to some arbitrary values that 
later in communication the honest user turn dishonest can not deny its ownership.
•  ICA must be scalable in terms of accepting large number of request for PID’s and PC’s.
• ICA’s must act as subordinates of VC A in PKI hierarchy.
•  The PC based on PT must be same as X.509 certificate standard except user’s identity is 
replaced with PT/PID.
• A user can request more than one pseudonym certificate from same ICA in the subre­
gion/group or different ICA in another subregion/group.
The following are the list of assumptions for Pseudonym Certificate Phase.
•  The user’s request for PID and PC must go through multi hops and the communication link 
may be suffered from delay and disruption.
•  Threshold Public Key (TPK) is shared among two ICA’s and VCA and known to every 
entity in the PF, denoted as TPKf^^vca.
•  Threshold Secrete Key (TSK) is known to corresponding ICA/VCA only. For example TSK 
of VCA is denoted with TSK^ ^^ .
•  Any message M encrypted with TPKf^^vca will be decrypted if TSK of all CA’s such as 
ICAl, ICA2 and VCA are applied.
• User can request PID and PC from ICA which belongs to same or different subregion but 
the region must be same as VCA.
6.3 Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Messages Exchange
This phase consists of two messages exchange such as pseudonym certificate request and pseud­
onym certificate response messages. The later is optional and the former is mandatory. The 
optional message depends on the type of application in DTN and level of privacy required by the
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user. The system model of this phase is shown in the Fig.6.2. The part(I) of figure shows intra 
regional while the part (II) shows inter regional PC request/response. These both regions may 
belong to same group or different group. In the later case for inter regional communication user 
must subscribe to the group in which ICA2 is part of it.
I.PCRes
Users
Users
2.PCReq
ICAl ICA2
Subregion-1
Subregion-2
Figure 6.2: Pseudonym Certificate Issuance System Model
6.3.1 Pseudonym Certificate Request (PCReq)
The outcome of Pseudonym Credential Phase is PCr shown in Eq.5.10, user authenticates by 
spending it in Pseudonym Certificate Phase. User generate another cryptographic key pair, pseud- 
onymised public/secret key pair {pPK^  ^ and pSK’^ )^. User construct a message which includes, 
pseudonymised public key, PCr and request for PID and PC. The first layer of encryption is group 
symmetric key while the second layer of encryption is ICA public key . The second layer is to as­
sure that no one except ICA can decrypt the message while the first layer assures to ICA that user 
is legitimate and is granted an update key by the GM. The message is forward by the user to next 
hop and the process carry on until the message reached destination. This method of group com­
munication make very hard for ICA and adversary to know the sender of this message, message 
take the form of Eq.6.1.
(6d)
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6.3.2 ICA Operations
ICA removes both layers of encryption by applying SK^ ^^  and respectively, obtained re­
quest for PID/PT and PC, PCr and pseudonymised public key to bind pseudonymised identity to 
it through pseudonym certificate. If ICA is unable to remove both layers of encryption then it will 
simply discard the request. After successful decryption it apply the well known secret key of VCA 
on PCr and obtained an unknown string 9Î =  and
If ICA is unable to decrypt PCr then it will discard the request for PID/PC. In RA-DTN due 
to intermittent/disruptive connectivity it is impractical to validate each PC,- from VCA, therefore 
modification in blind signature allows ICA to verify without contacting VCA. The block diagram 
of this phase is shown in the Fig.6.3.
PCReq
ICACj K S -  C rou p  K ey  S y stem
P K S  ( A )  - P u b lic  K e y  S y ste m  fo r  IC A
P K S (B )  - P ub lic  K ey  S y ste m  for V C A
ID  c h e c k  - c h e c k in g  v ca  and ica ID  in  th e
P C R eq
NO
G K S
R E J E C T YES
K S ( B |
YES
NO I D
YES
A C C E P T
Figure 6.3: Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase Block Diagram
Pseudonym Token (PT)/Pseudonym Identity (PID)
It is not possible for ICA to know about the real identity of the user from 9Î embedded in PCr. 
Because 91 is XOR function of hash of random number and real identity, both known to user only.
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ICA removed all fields from PCr except the time stamp and 91, it constructs PT/PID as shown 
in the Eq.6.2.
(6.2)
This is the pseudonym token or pseudonym identity generated for user as alternative for real 
identity. ICA included fresh random number to make this PT unique because according to the 
policy it may generate more than one PT for same PCr. It encrypts the message with threshold 
public key, this key is shared between another ICA and VCA belonging to same region. Thus the 
PT/PID will require the secret keys of all three CA’s to decrypt it.
Pseudonym Certificate (PC)
ICA generates a pseudonym certificate same as X.509 standards and bind PT/PID as identity and 
public key pPK^ ^^  ^ of the user and digitally sign it. The corresponding pseudonym secret key 
pSj u^ser known to user only. The PC is shown in the Table.6.1 and it is saved in the public 
directory for other users who want to do secure communication with this user.
Version 
Serial Number 
Signature Algorithm 
Issuer/ICA 
Validity
Subject Unique Identifier/ PID 
Public Key/pPK
Table 6.1: Pseudonym Certificate
ICA Database
ICA take hash of 9Î and saved as HS\^^ , It records entry in the secure database in the following 
format for PT for user :
-  HSf^ -
Hash value and time stamp both are unique for each PCr. If a user is found involved in 
malicious activity then this mapping leverages the resolution process.
6.3.3 Pseudonym Certificate Response (PCRes)
This message is optional and depends on DTN application and security/privacy level of the user.
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Low Level : User will download the new PC from public directory in one of the two cases. 
First, If user is ordinary user (requires low level of security) and fully trust ICA for fair generation 
of PID. Second, if the communication link between user and ICA is intermittent and effected by 
delays.
High Level: User may ask acknowledgement of new PC from ICA in one of the two cases. 
First, if user requires high level of security/privacy and do not fully trust ICA for fair generation 
of PID. Second, if the communication link between user and ICA is persistent.
Therefore in high level case ICA send the ingredients of the PT to user as follow shown in the 
Eq.6.3.
PC,PT‘„ {{Tr\ \ria\\TPK'Syca)pPK‘‘‘")K°‘ (6.3)
User after receiving the message in Eq.6.3 decrypt it with the corresponding pseudonymised 
private key and obtained the time stamp , random number and threshold public key used for PT. 
It construct the PT accordingly and compare with PT received in the message. The match shows 
honesty of ICA and mismatch leads user to discard the message and report this particular ICA to 
VCA.
Table.6.2 shows the summary of Pseudonym Certificate Issuance phase, messages exchanges 
between user and ICA. The notation User (Gi) shows that the message is originated from the user 
belonging to group i while notation Gi(User) shows that the message is destined for the group i 
rather for a particular user. Therefore it is challenging for both adversary and ICA to know about 
the real identity of the user requesting PID and PC.
l.User{Gi) ^  ICA:{(PCr\\pPK" \^\req)K^ )^PK^^^
2.ICA -> Gi(User):PC,PT, {{T ‘^^‘‘\\rl„\\TPKSvca)pPK“^ ")K°<
Table 6.2: Pseudonym Certificate Phase Messages Exchange
6.4 Multiple Pseudonym Certificates
User can request multiple PC from same or different ICA, according to the policy defined for PF 
the range 1 to 30 PC can be issued based on one PCp. The maximum PCr a user can be granted 
are 12, maximum PC user can be issued are (12x30= 360). Thus one PC can be used per day and 
the pool last for a year. The number of PCr granting and PC issuing is entirely depends on the 
nature of application in RA-DTN such as in VANETs there is consensus on using three pseudonym
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certificates per day. The validity of each PC is calculated according to included in the PCr. 
For example if 2%^  ^=  01 — 01 — 2012 and user request on 01-01-2012 for PC, then the PC will be 
issued for a year. However if a user requests on 01-12-2012 then the validity of PC will be one 
month only.
In Pseudonym Certificate Phase user is able to obtain multiple PID/PC from ICA based on 
PCr. Each PID is different from one another as ICA included unique random number This 
section considers different use cases of multiple pseudonym certificates issuance.
Case-I: - A user can generate more than one PID and PC by spending one PCr with same 
subregion/region ICA. For example user request regional ICA for PID and PC with PC}, where 
ICA generate PIDhtoPID^i and PC\toPCn for it. Therefore every PC is embedded with unique 
PID and will be signed by same ICA.
Case-II: - A user can generate more thn one PID and PC by spending more than one PCr with 
different ICA’s belonging to same or different subregion. For example if a user is granted four PCr 
by VCA then it can spend these with four different ICA’s.
Multiple PID/PC allow user to enjoy high level of privacy, PF assumed that there exists an ef­
ficient algorithm for changeover among different PID/PC. The term efficient means that adversary 
is unable to link a two transaction to a single user
6.5 Analysis of Privacy Attacks
In this section we analyzed the possible privacy and security attacks.
6.5.1 Double Spending Attack
The double spending attack in RA-DTN can be described as user attempts to spend single PCr 
with more than one ICA’s. However the attacker will not be succussed to do so because each 
PCr is embedded with identity of particular ICA to whom it can be spend. Therefore if ICA 
after decrypting the PCr do not obtain its identity then it will simply discard the request otherwise 
accept the message. If the attack is successful then itself it do not harm the PF, because every 
PC issued by ICA for PCr is signed and in case of malicious activity resolving/revocking one PC 
will revoke/resolve all. But adversary can flood the PF by sending PID/PC requests to all ICA’s 
in the region. This can effect the legitimate user’s requet/response time for getting PC. The block 
diagram of the attack is demonstrated at abstract level in Fig.6.4.
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USER
ICA
Accepted 
for PC YES
TPK/ID
NO
Rejected
Figure 6.4; Double Spending Attack
6.6 Formal Modeling
This section formally model Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase in CasperFDR tool.
6.6.1 Properties
1. The protocol is modeled with finite participants such as three certificate authorities, single 
user and intruder.
2. All participants of the protocol are modeled using CSP processes i.e. VCA, ICAl and ICA2.
3. Adversary is also modeled using CSP process, who can interact with protocol. Here we 
are considering the famous Dolev Yao model which overhear messages, intercept messages, 
encrypt and decrypt messages with appropriate keys and also can fake messages to other 
participant.
6.6.2 Goal
6.6.3 CasperFDR Modeling
The goal of this modeling is to prove that user can request pseudonym identity and certificate from 
ICA using pseudonym credentials. Also it is not possible for ICA to know the real identity of the
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user from 91. The formal model of Pseudonym Certificate Phase is built on the top of Pseudonym 
Credential Phase model. Therefore this section describe complete formal model of both phases 
and shown in the Table.6.3. The following are the different sections of the model with explanation.
#Free variables
User, VCA,ICA1, ICA2: Agent 
PK : Agent — >  PublicKey 
SK : Agent — > SecretKey 
ts : Tokenset 
If,Ip: Challenges 
na :Nonce 
ru : Random 
id : ReallD 
sid : SignedBID 
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Processes
INITIAT0R(User,VCA,ICAl,ICA2,id, sid,na,ts) knows PK, SK(User) 
RESP0NDERl(VCA,User,ICAl,ICA2,If,Ip) knows PK, SK(VCA) 
RESP0NDER2(ICAl,User, VCA, ICA2,ru) knows PK, SK(ICAl) 
RESPONDER3(ICA2,User, VCA, ICAl) knows PK, SK(ICA2)
#Channels 4N F NRA- NR-
#Protocol description
0. — > User : VCA
1. User -  > VCA :
2. VCA -  > User: {If,Ip,na}{PK(User)}
3. User -  >  VCA : {(sid)%BT,If,Ip}{PK{VCA)}
4. VCA -  > User: {{BT%(sid)}{SK{VCA)}%sBT}{PK{User)}
5. User -  >  ICAl: {sBT%{BT%{sid)}{SKlvCA)},sid}{PK(ICAl)}
6a. ICAl -  >  User: {{sid@ru}{PK(ICA2)}%TKl}{PK(yCA)}%TK2  
6b. ICAl -  >  User: {{sid®ru}{PK{VCA)}%TK?>}{PK{ICA2)]%TKA 
7a. User -  >  VCA: TK2%{{sid®ru]{PK(ICA2))%TK\}{PK{VCA)}  
7b. User -  >  ICA2 : TKA%{{sid®ru}{PK{VCA)}%TK3}{PK(ICA2)}
#Functions symbolic PK, SK
#Specification
StrongSecret(User, id, [VCA]) 
StrongSecret(User, sid, [ICAl]) 
WeakAgreement(User, ICAl) 
Agreement(U ser,IC A 1, [sid] )
#Actual variables
Node,Serverl,Server2,Server3, Mallory : Agent
Na:Nonce
sid : SignedBID
Id : ReaHD
Ts : Tokenset
IP,IF: Challenges
Rm, Ru,Nm : Random
#System
INITIATOR(Node,Serverl,Server2,Server3,Id,sId,Na,Ts) 
RESPONDERl (Server 1 ,Node,Server2,Server3,IF,IP) 
RESPONDER2(Server2,Node, Server 1 ,S erver3, Ru) 
RESPONDER3(Server3,Node,Serverl ,Server2)
#Intnider Information Intruder = MalloryIntruderKnowledge = Node, Server 1, Server2,Server3, Mallory, 
PK,Rm,Nm,SK(Mallory)
Table 6.3: Phase-2 Formal Model
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#Free variables, defines types of variables and functions used in the Pseudonym Certificate 
Phase. In this section we have VCA, ICAl, ICA2 and user as agents, which run the protocol. 
VCA is the certificate authority which grant signed blinded token, ICAl is the certificate authority 
which issues a pseudonymised identity and certificate, ICA2 is the certificate authority of which 
threshold public key is used for pseudonymised identity generation. PK and SK are public/private 
key function respectively, H is the hash function; all the participants as well as intruder can perform 
this function if appropriate value is known to them. The set of tokens sent to VCA for signing is 
represented by ts. Ip and I f  are the challenges sent to user against the sent tokens. The nonce 
na belongs to VCA, ru is the random number generated by ICAl. The new term ’sid’ represents 
the new identity of the user, this is the blinded signed token generated in Pseudonym Credential 
Phase.
#Processes, represents the number of agents involved in this phase and their initial knowledge. 
In this phase we have one user represented as initiator of the protocol which requests for signed 
blinded token or pseudonym credential. The extra knowledge initiator gains after Pseudonym 
Credential Phase is the new pseudonymised identity ’sid’. Responder is the representation of 
VCA server who knows public keys of all participants, both challenges and its own secret key 
. Responder2 is ICA which accepts blinded signed tokens as pseudonym credential from the 
user and issue pseudonymised identity and certificate to it. ResponderS is the ICA which knows 
nothing about the pseudonymised identity or real identity of the user; however it is only responsible 
for decrypting a token encrypted with its threshold public key if and only if presented by law 
enforcement agency with the consent of ICA 1.
#Protocol description defines the protocol itself through sequence of messages, which ex­
changes between agents. The step 0 to 4 are already explained in Chapter 5 section 5.4.2. At the 
end of step4 user get signed blinded identity, which it sent to ICAl in step5. ICAl verify signature 
on the ’sid’ and compare it with ’sid’ sent in the plain. User is basically authenticating to ICAl 
through new pseudonymised identity rather then real identity. If ICAl find all checks successful 
then in step6 ICAl construct a pseudonym token which will be used as pseudonymised identity in 
the pseudonym certificate. In actual protocol pseudonym token is encrypted with threshold pub­
lic key which is share between another ICA i.e. ICA2 and VCA, however there is no support of 
threshold cryptography in the formal modeling in general and in CasperFDR particularly. There­
fore we implement threshold cryptography in the public/private key functions. The pseudonym 
token generated by ICAl in step 6 is not possible for any single certificate authority to decrypt or 
resolve it to real identity. The pseudonym token contains the fresh random number ru for unique­
ness because user can request more then one pseudonymised identity from the ICAl therefore each
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identity need to be unique which can be used as identification for pseudonym certificate. In step 7 
the new generated pseudonym token is checked with VCA and ICA2 for correctness purposes. If 
they are unable to decrypt it alone means that the pseudonym is token is generated securely.
#Channel, is common terminology in security protocols to assume some channels as secure. 
In this phase when user and VCA is authenticated to each other then after that the charmel is 
considered secure against authentication attacks. This concept is used in the model for step4 
where VCA send the signed blinded token to user.
#Specification, used to specify security properties and requirements of the protocol. The first 
property checks that weather the real identity is only known to user and VCA. The second is to 
check that the pseudonymised identity which user share with ICAl is known to ICAl only. The 
last two properties check for authentication with and without data values. The last property is to 
check that user is authenticated to ICAl using the new pseudonymised identity.
#ActuaI variables, specifies the atomic data types used in the protocol. These variables are 
agents, random numbers, challenges, token set, real identity, pseudonymised identity. As the 
model implement Dolev Yao adversary model, therefore Rm and Nm is the random number and 
nonce respectively an adversary can generate.
#Functions, This gives definition of all functions used in the protocol such as public and 
private key functions
#System provides information about the actual system to be checked. It can be in terms 
of number and type of agents using CasperFDR. In this phase we have one initiator and three 
certificate authorities participating in the run.
#Intruder, This section specifies the initial knowledge of the intruder, which is part of the 
protocol such as Dolev Yao adversary model. Intruder knows the public keys of all participants in 
the network/protocol. Intruder also has its own private/public key pair for encryption and decryp­
tion. Same as other participant intruder can generates random number. Intruder knows about the 
identity of all participants in the protocol.
Results
The formal model of Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase is run in CasperFDR tool chain and 
the model checker finds no attack as shown in the Fig.6.5. The results shows that the adversary 
finds no attack on the secrecy property between user and VCA on the data value real identity. In 
the second property adversary is unable to learn the pseudonymised identity ’sid’. This means that 
VCA only knows about the real identity of the user and ICAl only knows about the pseudonym 
credential. Third and forth property of authentication also find no attack, and user is authenticate
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to ICAl on pseudonymised identity. Therefore we have shown that both phases of the pseudonym 
framework are secure under their specific goals and threat model. Attacker learns no correlation 
information which can help it to resolve pseudonymised identity to real identity.
I n i t i a l i s in g  Casper  Done,
I n i t i a l i s in g  FCA.. , .  Done.
Casper vers io n  2 .6
P a r s in g ,. .
Type c h e c k in g . . .
C onsistency c h e c k in g .. .
C onpiIing. . .
W riting o u tp u t. . .
Output w r itten  to  /hoae /ee /p g r/n a 0 6 0 9 2 /P h a se .2 ,csi>
DC'i'i-e
S ta r tin g  FOR
ChecK 1 ng /hotie/ee/pgr/n a6S092/P hase - 2 . csp
Checking a s s e r t io n  SeCRET_H::SECRET_SPEC (T« SECF^T_M;;SySTEM_S 
No a tta ck  found k
Checking a s s e r t io n  S€CR£T_H::Sê O_SECR£T_SPEC |T - S£CRET_M::SYSTEM_S_S€Q 
No a tta ck  found -  -  -  _ " "
Checking a s s e r t io n  AUTH1_M: :AuthtenticateIMTIAT0RToRESP0N0ER2rt'eakAgree«ent [ I -  AL(TH1_M: :SYSTEM_1 
No a tta ck  found
Checking a s s e r t io n  AUlU2_M : : Aut hent 1 cat e l NT TI ATOAToRESPOWERZAg ree#ent _s 1 d |T= Al/TH? M:;SYSTEM_2 
No a ttack  found
Figure 6.5: Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase: Attack no found
The model of pseudonym identity/certificate phase is built on the top of the pseudonym cre­
dential phase formal model. Therefore, once the formal model of first phase is found secure 
against attacks then the second phase also resist to attacks such as role confusion and many other 
authentication attacks.
6.7 Information Theoretic Analysis
This section analyze degree of anonymity using information theoretic analysis to measure privacy 
in terms of entropy. In the literature anonymity systems are rather analyzed for two parameters i.e. 
number of users (anonymity set size) or through probability distribution. However in this thesis we 
will not only analysed the pseudonym framework considering both parameters but also strength of 
the attacker in order to give accurate measurement of anonymity. The work will measure the pri­
vacy of particular lol as well as overall anonymity measurement of the system. This measurement 
and analysis will consider the following attack model.
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6.7.1 Network Model
In order to achieve anonymity in terms of unlinkability between user’s request and PCr, it joins 
group. The message in the group is not send directly to each other instead it is forwarded to next 
available hop. Therefore, in group there are two types of members, one those participating in 
forwarding of messages called IH and second are non forwarding nodes nIH. The IH nodes has 
information of Hop count (H )^; indicates the number of hops a particular message is pass through, 
while nIH has no such information. In DTN source node can act as relay node for its own message, 
therefore it is possible that the contains source of a message as well.
6.7.2 Attacker Model
Eavesdropper;- can observe the communication passively both acting as insider and outsider. The 
adversary can analyze whole traffic but can not intercept or control any group member. Therefore 
considering a group of 10 members the attacker observe all equally probable as being the originator 
of particular message. So ^  is the probability of finding the actual sender of a particular message. 
Therefore probability of user being the originator of the message in a group of n members is It 
is trivial that with increase of n the probability decrease and thus DoA will increase.
Hostile Group Member can initiate and terminate/destroy connection between two group 
members. This is active insider attacker, its goal is to reduce the anonymity set size by comprom­
ising group member.
Single/Multiple Attacker can compromise one group member or many at any time. The 
compromised group member can be non forwarding or forwarding group member for a particular 
message.
Passive Internal Adversary
Adversary passively observing the communication of a particular group, it has no information 
of the number of nodes N and distribution of IH/nlH. Therefore to know the dynamics of the 
group, it randomly compromise one node, the probability of compromising a IH/nlH node is 
equal, therefore DoA in this case is always high as 1. If a node is able to compromise nIH then 
it gains no information except reducing Anonymity Set Size by number of compromised 
nodes (Q). However, if adversary is able to compromise IH node, then it gains information of 
and N. Therefore, the maximum entropy H(M) is calculated as Eq.6.4:
H(M) =  log2(N-Q) (6.4)
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Adversary passively observed a particular lol to quantitatively know the source of it, therefore, 
it divides the in two list such as hop count of compromised IH as shown in Eq.6.5and 
calculated A^  ^as shown in Eq.6.6.
0 ^  =  72''' (6.5)
=  [At -  -  (cj^ * X ) -  (Ci -  Cf^) -  ( 0 ^  -  C\^)] (6.6)
The term indicates next hop of compromised IH, c p  is the number of compromised IH,
X is the number of possible senders in range of particular IH and it is calculated as 1 <  X < ^ .
The Eq.6.6 shows direct relationship between X and c p ,  thus if adversary is able to compromised 
more then one IH, it will reduce at factor of X.
In this attack, user passively observed the activity at IH, therefore it assign random probabilit­
ies to both list in the range of 0-1, however, users belonging to same list are seen by the attacker 
as having the same probabilities. Thus probability distribution is shown in Eq.6.7;
=  (6.7)
Therefore, the entropy shown after the attack has taken place shown in Eq.6.8, and the degree 
of anonymity is shown in the Eq.6.9:
Active Internal Adversary
In this attack we consider an active internal attacker, it is able to compromise IH and obtained 
more information about a particular lol. The objective of the attacker is to reduce A^  ^ from two 
lists to one list. In the first case, attacker deduce from both lists that source does not act as relay 
for a particular lol and thus belongs to Therefore, 0^^ =  0, entropy of the system is reduce 
and expressed as Eq.6.10
H{X) =  log{'¥^) (6.10)
In the second case, attacker exclude <1>^ from the by gaining some routing information
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after capturing IH. The entropy after this attack is expressed as Eq.6.11
99
H(X) = (6 . 11)
In both cases, attacker see the users in the list equally being the source of the message, however 
in the future we can calculate the exact probabilities of the individual user in each list, also H(M) 
remains the same for both cases.
6.7.3 Degree of Anonymity Measurement Results
The results are shown for both active/passive and single/multiple adversary, for different number 
of group size i.e. 10-1000 and assigning probabilities in the range from 0 to 1. We calculated 
the for different group sizes using ONE simulator ranging from 1 to 83. The probabilistic 
simulation is performed initially for passive adversary compromising single user to multiple user 
and then for same for active adversary.
6.7.4 Passive Internal Attack
First, we consider passive internal adversary, initially it has no knowledge about number of nodes 
in the group, however, it is able to compromise a single IH in the group and capture single lol for 
source identity.
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Figure 6.6: Spectrum for Degree of Anonymity (DoA)
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The Fig.6.6 shows DoA with respect to N, S and Cj= I, Generally, DoA increases with N . The 
reason for N is obvious, it is more difficult to find a source of a message in larger set of N compare 
to smaller N while the other parameter P is an interesting factor for increase or decrease in DoA. 
when attacker assigns high probability to the list of passively observed at IH, then it means the 
anonymity set size is decreases to and thus DoA is low for smaller N and high for larger N. 
It is because a message pass through many IH before arriving at destination in larger N and thus 
increase, which further increase anonymity set size. The DoA shows increase with increasing 
N and decreasing P, because the anonymity set size is increasing to which is obviously larger 
then 0^^. The DoA never achieves the highest level i.e. DoA=l in our solution because our focus 
is on pseudonymity; in which the source can be traced in case of malicious activities. The optimal 
level of DoA is achieved for any N given 0.4 <  P  < 0.6.
The minimum and maximum DoA for a particular system may depends on the privacy re­
quirements for the system. Therefore, it is hard to suggest any particular value prior to testing 
the model intensively. The following Fig.6.7 shows the minimum and maximum level of DoA 
provided by a particular group under percentage compromising of IH, i.e. Q  =  lO%toSO% of the 
c p .  This analysis considered multiple adversaries observing passively IH in the group without 
collaborating with each other.
We considered compromised IH and not nIH nodes because the later effect anonymity neg­
ligibly. The minimum DoA shown in the results for a group size 50 or less is very poor and 
approaches to 0(attacker is certain about the source of lol), because for group size N <  50, the 
is very low as under 5, therefore the percentage compromising do not show any change. How­
ever, for A >  100 minimum DoA is increasing gradually and reaches its peak value of 0.50 for 
N =  300. The interesting situation occurs for percentile variation of Q  and 300 < N  <  400, DoA 
is decreasing with increase in N. This is because the do not increase with N and thus 0^^ at 
N=300 is same as N=400 but H(X) at N=300 is higher then N=400 and so as DoA is high.
The results show that maximum DoA of any lol increase with N and decrease with percentage 
increase in Q. However, for 10 <  < 50 , DOA remain same for different values of Q. This
is because for the said range is less then 5, therefore most of percentage value is round off to
1. However, results show fluctuation in DoA for 60 < N  <  100 for different Q. This is because 
when percentage C/ for the said range is increasing then the value matches to the lower value of 
N. For example for N=80 and 90 and C/=0.80 give same value because of very less difference in 
therefore, DoA for N=90 will be less then for N=80.
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Figure 6.7: DoA for percentage compromised nodes
6.7.5 Active Internal Attacks
The analysis further considered active attacks, in the first attack, adversary assign p=l to after 
compromising a particular IH. In this attack the adversary is assured that the source of a particular 
lol belongs to therefore it assigns equal probability to all nodes in it. The Fig.6.8 shows 
results of active attack on 0*^, DoA for A < =  30 is 0, because the 0^^ is equal to 1, thus no 
uncertainty exits at attacker’s end.
However, for N >  40, DoA increase and thus saturate at 0.60 for N >  500. Therefore DoA 
increase with N, except for two values of N i.e. 300 and 400, where DoA is high for former and 
low for later N. The reason is the small difference between two 0^ “^, thus so
attacker uncertainty is less at N=400 compare to N=300.
In the second active attack, adversary is able to compromise IH, and deduce that source of 
particular lol is in thus assign equal probability to all nodes in it. The results in Fig.6.9 show 
that DoA is increasing linear with increase with N and and for N <  500 DoA is saturated at
0.90.
The Fig.6.10 show the comparison results of already discussed two active attacks, it shows a
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Figure 6.9: Active Attack: Calculated Set Size
vital difference between two attacks. Therefore, DoA is not only depends on N,P but also depends 
on attacker strength and the information it obtains from it. In the first attack the anonymity set size 
is small, therefore its DoA never go above 0.60. However, for the second attack nodes can enjoy
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DoA >  0.90 for N >  100. The bend in the lower curve at 300 < N  < 500 is because of very small 
change in of N=300 and 400, explained in this section before.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison between two Active Attacks 
Group Degree of Anonymity Results
This is trivial that groups with larger members are hard to manage particularly in DTN, also to 
distribute updated group secret key is troublesome. Therefore, user before joining a group wants 
to know about the level of privacy on average it provides. Therefore we proposed a new metric 
Group Degree of Anonymity (GDoA) which measure anonymity of the whole group instead of 
particular lol. This new metric complement the DoA proposed by Diaz and is the average of the 
individual DoA for a particular probability distribution p . For example when a group Gl has 
N —10 user with different value of p the DoA is fluctuating for variations of Q, so the average of 
all DoA at each point is represented as GDoA and expressed in Eq.6.12.
GDoA
N (6 . 12)
The results in Fig.6.11 shows that the the group anonymity is increased with increase of users 
in the group. For N > 100, DoA is always above 0.80 for any Q, therefore, the proposed PF 
solution provide respectable anonymity despite of active attacks.
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Figure 6.11: Group Degree of Anonymity
6.8 Summary
This chapter proposed a mechanism for pseudonym certificate issuance in anonymous way by 
hiding the source of the request from both insider and outsider adversary. User joined one of 
the group to increase the anonymity set size and communicate with ICA on behalf of that group, 
which benefit user to achieve sender anonymity. Multiple pseudonym certificates can be issued 
from single or multiple ICA’s, its number is based on PCr. The protocol show resilience to double 
spending attack, and it is not possible for a user to spends PCr with more then one ICA. The 
protocol is modeled in CASPER/FDR for correctness and checking of security properties, the 
model do not find any attack.
This chapter analyzed different group sizes for DoA and newly developed metric GDoA which 
complement DoA under different adversary’s model. The results show that DoA is not only de­
pend on N but also fluctuate with probability, attacker’s strength and hop count of particular lol. 
However, for A > 100 , 0.6 < p <  0.40 and C/ =  1, DoA reaches to its peak value under passive 
adversary. The results further show that with increase in attacker’s strength DoA is decreasing 
despite of increasing in size of group and for Q  =  80% of IH then minimum DoA <  0.60 and
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maximum DoA <  0.80. The active attack on ^hc leave DoA <  0.60 , saturated at A > 700 and 
for A <  200 DoA is recorded very worst as 0.40. The DoA is increasing with N for second active 
attack and saturate at 0.70 and above for A > 200. The new metric GDoA which supplements 
DoA measured anonymity of the whole group, GDoA is decreasing with percentage increase in Q 
and saturate at 0.80 and above for A >  200.
Chapter 7
Pseudonym Revocation and Resolution 
Phase
Pseudonym Identity and Certificate Resolution and Revocation is part of the accountability phase 
in order to prevent misuse and abuse of a PF, However it is necessary that the information required 
for resolution and revocation must be protected and available to Law enforcement agency in spe­
cific situations. This chapter proposed two novel protocols for resolution and revocation which are 
compliant to DTN architecture.
Collaborative Pseudonym Identity Resolution Protocol (CPIDRP) is Privacy by Resolution 
(PbR) protocol in which the identity of the PID/PC is known to the VCA only. The engineered 
resolution mechanism require the collaboration of multiple entities and sharing of information 
maintained by each authorities via L. The protocol is analyzed for single, multiple PC issued 
by same ICA and multiple PC issued for different ICA. The protocol with its important part of 
threshold cryptography are modeled in CasperFDR.
There are many reasons that can leave a PC to be revoked prematurely, such as loss or com­
promise of a private key, change of affiliation or job function, algorithm compromise or change in 
security policy. To do secure communication it is necessary to check the status of the PC for revoc­
ation. This thesis proposed Privacy by Revocation (PbRe) Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate 
Revocation Protocol (CPCRP), it sustains user’s privacy despite of revocation and real identity is 
known to VCA only.
7.1 Collaborative Pseudonym Identity Resolution Protocol (CPIDRP)
The CPIDRP protocol resolve PID to real identity and correlate both with sufficient proof. This 
protocol restrict any single CA from resolving PID to real identity including the one which issue
106
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PC. The resolution process involves collaboration of two ICA’s and VCA through neutral authority
i.e. Law enforcement agency L. The resolution authorities are not permanently designated except 
the VCA, therefore, ICA might be different for each PID.
CPIDRP is combination of different messages exchange among ICA, VCA and L as shown in 
Fig.7.1. For illustration, an entity (user or ICA) in the subregion of RA-DTN requests resolution 
of particular of PID due to certain reasons. ICAl issued this particular PID/PC, however the 
threshold public key used for encryption is shared between ICAl, ICA2 and VCA. In CPIDRP 
ICA’s request is analyzed by L and it forwards to other CA’s if it meets the policy requirements 
of resolution. The messages exchanges in this protocol are mostly among gateways and in DTN 
there is always stable communication link among them.
REGION
SUBREGIONCA ICAl*
1CA2
F Entity
Figure 7.1: CPIDRP System Model
7.1.1 CPIDRP Messages Exchange
We now describe the CPIDRP protocol in more details by first considering single PID/PC resol­
ution involved in malicious activity, Table.7.1 shows complete steps of the resolution protocol. 
To explain the resolution process we consider that a user in a subregion of RA-DTN repeatedly 
involved in malicious activity while accessing some web services. Thus the subregion gate­
way/mobile terminal reports law enforcement agency L to resolve the PID to real identity. For 
illustration purposes, a user with PID/PC request some restricted drugs from mobile pharmacy in
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M1.P -> L
M 2.L ^IC A l i{trace\\PC\ |
M3./CA1 11 11 (PTI) TSK^ ^^  ^1 \HSf^ 11 T^ ‘^^ )PK  ^ |
M 4.L^ICA2 {trace\\{PTi)TSr^^^)p^ |
M 5.ICA2^L {{{PTi)TSK^^^^)TSK^^ '^ \^\trace\\HSf^) |
M6.L -4- VCA VGA Operations
C.77(9t) = m s f ^  1 
E.id^\indat abase) (calculated) |
M7.VCA-4L id^  ^ (optional) |
M 8 .L ^ P id^  ^ (optional) |
Table 7.1: Pseudonym Resolution Protocol
RA-DTN. According to the policy of mobile pharmacy it is necessary for the user to show its real 
identity and certificate signed by authorized CA.
In this example we consider that ICAl issued PID/PC, PID is signed with threshold public key 
shared between ICAl, ICA2 and VCA. It is not possible for any CA to know the exact number of 
secret parts and its threshold for full decryption. Also according to policy ICA/VCA is not able to 
do the resolution by its own instead it is managed through L. Therefore the mobile terminal request 
L with the trace of the activity, PTI, PC and sufficient proof. All these fields are digital sign to 
proof its identity to ICAl. ICAl agrees to cooperate with L after fulfilling the privacy policy. It is 
not able to decrypt PTI because it is encrypted with the threshold public key of which the secret 
parts are shared between VCA and ICA2. However it only knows the included time stamp 
and identity of VCA who issued PCr. It apply its secrete part of threshold secret key i.e. 
and sends the result to L.
Further L passes the part decrypted PTI and trace of activity to ICA2. ICA2 after authen­
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ticating L apply its threshold secrete part i.e. TSK^ ^^  ^ . L authenticates itself to VCA similar as 
ICA and forward the part decrypted PCr. Thus VCA apply its threshold secret key TSK?^  ^ and 
fully deciypt the PID. VCA obtained an unknown value 91, time stamps and unique random 
number added by ICAl. Further VCA takes the following actions to resolve the identity of the 
user.
1. It compares time stamp obtained from decrypted PCr, time stamp send by ICAl via L and 
time stamp in the resolution hash table of VCA.
2. It takes Hash function of 91 obtained from threshold decryption, compares with the hash 
string sent by ICA.
3. It looks up in the hash table the corresponding random variable against the time stamp and 
calculated hash value. Further it takes XOR of that random number and 91 obtained after 
threshold decryption.
4. It compares the id obtained from the previous step to the corresponding id in the hash table 
against time stamp, random number and hash sting.
If all the steps return true values then VCA successfully resolved PID to real identity. The last 
two messages exchange are optional, VCA can assure to L that the particular PID is valid user and 
its certificate is not revoked. Also if it is national issue then VCA shares the user identity with L.
7.1.2 Analysis
It is possible that the D step of M6 {id^  ^ result in garbage value instead of real
identity. This shows that user inject bogus BT’s in the Pseudonym Credential Phase. This is the 
user repudiation attack which is discussed in Chapter 5. In this case VCA uses the evidence of 
time stamp matching, and its mapping to real identity in hash table to proof the resolution.
There could be a scenario in which user spend multiple PID/PC for communication, all issued 
and signed by same ICA. It is not possible for any entity in the RA-DTN to correlate two com­
munication session to single user. The user is found in malicious activity using multiple PCs. All 
messages exchange shown in Table.?. 1 remained the same except in M4 L contact with multiple 
ICA’s for each PID. This means that the proposed Privacy by Design PF allow users to have mul­
tiple certificates but at the same time they can be traced to single identity. It is not necessary that 
if a user PID/PC is resolved then it should be revoked as well.
L can receive request from multiple entities in the RA-DTN for different PID/PC resolution, 
where each one signed by different ICA’s. The steps remain the same except L contact several
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ICA’s but same single VCA, therefore, all PC’s can easily be hnked to one identity. However it 
is not possible for any ICA and L to correlate two PC signed by different ICA’s, thus the design 
achieved perfect forward privacy.
7.2 Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Protocol (CP- 
CRP)
The issuance of multiple PC’s signed by same or different ICA allow users to enjoy ample privacy. 
But at the same time user can take advantage of this privilege by misbehaving without any fear 
and accountability. Therefore Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Protocol (CPCRP) 
revoke mahcious users and distribute updated CRL in RA-DTN. The novelty of this protocol is 
it keeps the privacy of the user despite of revocation and thus terms as Privacy by Revocation 
(PbRe). In PF real identity of the user is known to VCA only therefore after revocation it is VCA 
who deanonymized the user.
The Fig.7.2 shows the system model of revocation protocol, VCA in the RA-DTN region 
administering the subregion ICA’s, it has CRL CRVf and CRLr  ^for both certificates based on real 
identity and pseudonym identity of the user respectively. However each ICA has CRL of only self 
signed PC’s or signed by some other subregion ICA such as . If any ICA revoke a PC then 
it is necessary to revoke all PC’s issued to the user by same or different ICA. However a particular 
ICA can only revoke self signed PC’s, Therefore, the hierarchical PKI infrastructure allow us to 
revoke all PC’s issued to the user. ICA after revocation of self signed PC’s send updated CRL to 
other ICA’s in the region, it also shares the revoked PC’s and its related information with VCA. 
VCA by collaborating with ICA’s first resolved the identity of the user and then inform all ICA’s 
to revoke all PC’s issued to particular PCr. In CPCRP only VCA is able to know real identity of 
the user and therefore the privacy of the user is preserved.
7.2.1 CPCRP Message Exchange
A particular user is reported to ICA as malicious, thus ICA takes decision of revocation based on 
revocation policy. As ICA maintained a database for the issued PID/PC as described in Chapterb, 
Section 6.3.2. It look up in the database and revoked all PC’s/PID issued for a particular PCr. It 
also compile a Revoked Hash String Table (RHST) for revoked PCr and update it after revocation 
of PC’s. This table consist the hash values calculated by taking hash function of H{PCr).
ICA update CRLsr and sends it to all subregion ICA, because it is not possible for ICA to revoke 
all PC’s issued to user signed by other ICA’s. Also ICA has no such identifying information to
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Figure 7.2: CPCRP System Model
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RM-2./CA1 ->L ((rmcgj |PC| 1
RM-3.L ^  VCA |PC| 1
RM-4.VCA ^  ICA2
RM-5./CA2 ^  VCA
VCA Call VCA operation subroutine of Resolution Protocol
RM-6.VCA ^  ICA2
RM-7.VCA 7CA3
Table 7.2: Pseudonym Revocation Protocol
convince other ICA’s for revocation of PC’s. Therefore it apply the threshold secret key on the 
malicious reported PID and send to VCA via L. The reason to involve L in the revocation protocol 
is to make the mechanism fair and discourage ICA/VCA by revoking users for personal interest.
It is not possible for VCA to revoke user’s certificate based on real identity prior to decryption 
of PID. Therefore it requests the corresponding ICA to apply part of its threshold secret key. VCA
CHAPTER 7. PSEUDONYM REVOCATION AND RESOLUTION PHASE 112
calls the resolution function described in section 7.1.1 and deduce real identity, update CRV^ 
and CKLr .^ VCA maintained Identity Resolution Hash Table (IRHT) described in Chapter 5 in 
Table.5.2. VCA fetched the range of time stamps included in all sBT’s issued to this
particular user. It sends the range of time stamps to every subregion ICA and asked them to revoke 
all PC’s issued to those PCr which contains this range. Therefore every ICA only revoked self 
signed PC’s and sends updated CRLsr to all other subregion ICAs, thus every ICA’s CRL r^ is 
updated to CRL^ .^ It also sends the updated CRL^  ^to every users in their subregion. The Table.7.2 
shows different messages exchange among user, ICA, L and VCA.
7.2.2 Analysis
This section discussed three possible use cases when Alice prior to communicate securely with 
Bob verify PC of Bob and vice versa.
Inter subregion
A patient Alice in subregion-1 want to sends its medical record to a doctor Bob in subregion-
2. Subregion-1 is administered by ICAl and subregion-2 by ICA2, also both act as subregion 
gateways too. Alice and Bob both have PID/PC, Alice encrypt its medical record by Bob’s public 
key but prior to sending it wants to validate Bob’s PC. Therefore it download updated CRL^  ^from 
its subregion ICA i.e. ICAl and look up for Bob’s PC. If Bob’s PC is found in then it stop 
sending message to him otherwise continue sending. It also updates its own copy of CRLf^ if it 
do not match with with recently received CRL?  ^from ICAl. When Bob receive the message same 
as Alice it download the updated CRL?  ^from its own subregion ICA i.e. ICA2, the mechanism is 
shown in Fig.7.3.
Infra subregion
Both patient Alice and doctor Bob belongs to same subregion-1. In this case Alice before sending 
message to Bob ,download the CRLsr from two neighbors. It check Bob’s PC in all three CRLfr, 
if it found in any then it stop communication otherwise continue sending messages. RA-DTN 
subregion consist of relatively static and less number of users therefore every user has almost 
similar updated CRL r^- But to assure the correctness of CRLsr, Alice request from two neighbor’s 
node. The selection of these neighbors can be on the basis of activeness in the communication. 
The numbers depend on the level of security required by Alice, the higher the security level the 
high numbers of neighbors selection. The doctor Bob also do same as Alice for checking PC in 
CRL^f, the protocol is shown in Fig.7.4
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Inter region
A patient Alice belongs subregion-1 in region-1 and doctor Bob belongs to subregion-2 in region-
2. Subregion-1 is administrated by ICAl and region-1 by VCAl while subregion-2 by ICA2 
and VCA2. Both ICA’s have CRLf-  ^ restricted to their regions. Therefore VCAl will request the 
updated CRLf-  ^from VCA2 and further pass it to ICAl. Alice then can download region-2 CRLj  ^
from ICAl and look up for Bob’s PC. Regional VCA can act as proxy for downloading CRLf^ for 
other regional VCA. However It depends on the security level of the user to download CRLy  ^from 
regional VCAl (low) or wait for VCAl to get updated CRLf  ^ from VCA2 (high), the protocol is
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shown in Fig.7.5.
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7.3 Formal Modeling
This section modeled the resolution protocol and its main part such as threshold cryptography 
using CasperFDR tool.
7.3.1 Pseudonym Resolution Protocol
The protocol is modeled with VCA, L and two ICA’s. The protocol description of the resolution 
protocol is given in the Table.7.3. In stepl L sends PID, PC and trace of the malicious activity 
performed by user to ICAl, the one who signed the PC. ICAl after authenticating L share the 
knowledge of certificate authorities involved in the resolution and resolution information, it is not 
possible for ICAl to decrypt the token alone. L passes on the token with information provided 
by ICAl to ICA2 and VCA in step 3,4. Again it is not possible for any certificate authority to 
decrypt the token alone, therefore ICA2 apply its part threshold private key and pass on the token 
to VCA in step5. VCA after decryption of the pseudonymised token found time stamps, hash 
string as explain the resolution protocol in earlier section in this chapter. VCA is able to retrieve 
real identity of the user from ’sid’ and match with identity saved in hash table against time stamp 
and hash string. After all these verification VCA may pass the real identity of the user to L, which 
further pass it to the requested entity.
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#Protocol Description
1. L -  >  ICAl : {t,pt,cert}{SK(L)}
2. ICAl -  >  L : {ru,VCAJCA2}{SK{ICAl)}
3. L -  > VCA : TK2%{{sid@ru}{PK{ICA2)}%TKl}{PK{VCA)},ru
4. L -  >  ICA2 : TK4%{{sidem}{PK{VCA)}%TK3}{PK{ICA2)},ru
5. ICA2 -  >  VCA : TK3%{sideru}{PK{VCA)}
6. VCA -  >  L : {{iW}{5/s:(yCA)}}{P^(L)}
Table 7.3: Resolution Protocol Formal Model
#Protocol Description
1. User -  >  VCA : {{sid,ru}{PK{ICA2)}%s\,{sid,ru}{PK(ICA\)}%s2}{PK{VCA)]
2. User -  >  ICAl : {{sid,ru}{PK{ICA2)}%slXsid,ru]{PK(VCA)}%s2}{PK{ICA\)}
3. User -  >  ICA2 : {{W,m}{P^(/CAl)}%;yl,{W,m}{P^(yCA)}%^2}{fA:(/CA2)} 
4a. VCA -  >  ICAl : s2%{sid,ru}{PK(ICA\)}
4b. VCA -  >  ICA2 : s\%{sid,ru}{PK{ICA2)]
5a. ICAl -  >  VCA : s2%{sid,ru}{PK{VCA)}
5b. ICAl -  >  ICA2 : s\%{sid,ru\{PK{ICA2)]
6a. ICA2 -  >  ICAl : s\%{sid,ru}{PK(ICA\)]
6b. ICA2 -  >  VCA : s2%{sid,ru}{PK{VCA)}
Table 7.4: Threshold Cryptography Formal Model
7.3.2 Threshold  C ryp tography  m odeling
This section model threshold cryptography concept in CasperFDR tool chain. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first time that it is formally modeled. Threshold Cryptography is an import­
ant part of PF, Therefore, we model it separately where for a public key the secret key is shared 
between three entities and threshold of two entities will contribute to secret key decryption, no 
matters which two entities. The protocol description of this model is shown in the Table.7.4. The 
protocol description depict that if pseudonymised token is generated by ICAl or ICA2 then at 
least one ICA should participate with VCA in order to resolve the pseudonym token to real iden­
tity, however the number of ICA’s can be increase to two. User is issued with a pseudonym token 
by ICAl and thus to check the security of the token user sends it to those certificate authorities 
which are part of PF. In first three steps of the protocol user send the pseudonym token to certificate 
authorities such as VCA, who granted a signed bhnded token, ICAl who issued a pseudonymised 
identity and ICA2. In step-4 VCA after applying its own threshold cryptography send the pseud­
onym token to ICAl and ICA2. The same steps are repeated by ICAl and ICA2. The terms ’sid’ 
is the signed token granted by VCA, ru is the fresh random number added by ICAl, s \ /s2  are 
temporary variable for storing the values.
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7.3.3 Results
The resolution protocol is run in CasperFDR for the two secrecy properties such as StrongSecret 
(User, id, \VCA,L\ and StrongSecret(t/5'^r,5iW, [ICAl]). The former secrecy property reflects user 
assumption that real identity is shared with VCA and L only, however the later property depicts 
user’s belief on signed token that is shared between him and ICAl only. CasperFDR generate 
assertions for FDR and the result shows that the attacker is unable to learn the committed data 
values i.e. ’sid’ and id. The protocol proves that after running the resolution protocol only VCA 
knows about the real identity of the user and therefore the privacy of user preserves against ICAl 
and ICA2 despite the fact that they participated in the PF and later in resolution protocol.
The results of Threshold cryptography model shows that step 1-3 reveals no information about 
the contents of the pseudonym token to any certificate authority. However after applying part 
threshold decryption by VCA and then forwarding it to any ICA for applying another part threshold 
decryption disclosed its contents. This proves that collaboration of particular threshold of parti­
cipants leads to decryption.
7.4 Comparison of Pseudonym Framework with other solutions
We compare the proposed overall PF with two well known solutions such as Anonymity in DTN 
(ADTN) by Kate et al [7] and V token for VANETs [23]. The later provide conditional privacy 
solution for VANETs and is based on PKI. The former provide solution for privacy using onion 
routing and pseudonyms based on Identity Based Cryptography (IBC); a special branch of cryp­
tography in which public key can be user’s email/IP address,identity etc, Pubhc Key Generator 
(PKG) is responsible entity for generation and signing of keys. The following Table.7.5 shows the 
comparison for some common properties followed by a detail discussion on each property.
Properties ADTN V Token Proposed PF
Credential Cryptographically strong, 
practical infeasible
Cryptographically weak, 
practically feasible
Cryptographically strong, 
practical feasible
Trust and 
single point 
of failure
Full trust on gateways, No 
resistance
Partial trust on certificate 
authorities, partial resist­
ance
Not trusting certificate au­
thorities, full resistance
Anonymous
Channel
Pu and Kuy assuming Anonym- 
ous/OR/MIX
secure group communica­
tion
Perfect for­
ward privacy
No Partial Full
Table 7.5: Comparison among Anonymity in DTN , V token and PF
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7.4.1 Credential
User is identified by a pseudonym identity in ADTN solution which is generated by choosing a 
random number ru e  Z*, then a pseudonym Pu =  ruQu, where Qu =H(IDu). User exchange Pu 
with other participant and it enables no body except participants U, V and PKG to to construct a 
session key such as Kuv =  ^{Pu,Qv) =  ^(Pv,Qu)- The pseudonym and session key generation 
is strong in nature but for communication with each participant, a user need to go through this 
process for each participant and session. There is no such mechanism which can check the validity 
of the certificate of each other, it is possible that one of them is malicious user. There is no explicit 
mechanism defined for certificate, because to use a pseudonym then it should be accompany with 
a vahd certificate.
V Token generates token as V =  {idv\\id^^\\rŸ, the algorithm for V is public to the network. 
It is hard to dissolve V but in the resolution phase when b~^  is apphed then V can be dissolved by 
guessing probabilistically id .^ In the proposed PF bhnd token is generated as it
is hard for the adversary before and after applying b~^  to dissolve the BT. Because it is inherent 
property of hash function that it is not possible that two hash value are same of different variables. 
The credential generation in ADTN is cryptographically strong but there is no mechanism to avoid 
adversary to generate fake credential. In V token it is not possible for adversary to generate fake 
credentials but it generates it in a way which leaks information in the resolution phase. The pro­
posed PF generates pseudonym credential very strong and legitimate user with valid certificate can 
generates it, also it leaks no information during resolution and revocation phase to other authorities 
except VCA.
7.4.2 Trust and single point of failure
ADTN approach relies on a single trustable DTN gateway, it strip data’s source before relay­
ing/forwarding to next hop. Therefore, it suffers from single point failure and the gateway be­
comes big brother. Specifically, if a DTN gateway is compromised, attackers can deanonymize 
all traffic. Moreover, the DTN gateway will also become the bottleneck of performance. In V 
token the certificate authority granting credential to vehicle can not becomes big brother while the 
certificate authority which issue certificates can becomes big brother. Because vehicle’s request 
for pseudonym certificate is signed with secret key (pseudonym or real) and there is no account­
ability after receiving new pseudonym identity. Thus the certificate authority can link pseudonym 
certificate to user’s real identity or can inject bogus identity for tracking purpose. In proposed PF 
it is not possible for VCA to becomes big brother because of challenge response mechanism in 
blind signature, also ICA issue certificates without knowing real identity of the user.
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7.4.3 Anonymous Channel
The solution of ADTN does not assumed anonymous channel while communicating with other 
participants and through pseudonym and session key mutual anonymous authentication is achieved. 
V token does not assume anonymous channel in token authentication and generation stage but in 
pseudonym certificate acquisition it assumes anonymous channel in one of the three ways such as 
onion routing, mix or vehicle has issued pseudonym certificate. This is not practical that a system 
aiming privacy but assumes anonymous channel in the pseudonym certificate issuance. In V token 
vehicle generates new key pair and use secret for signature while proving ownership of pseud­
onym request. If the certificate is pseudonym certificate issued in the past then vehicle requesting 
pseudonym certificate for first time has no anonymity. If the certificate is based on real identity 
of the user and vehicle is requesting for the first time pseudonym certificate then there is still no 
anonymity as the CA knows the real identity of the user form the certificate.
The proposed PF does not assumes anonymous channel instead it provides unlinkability between 
user and its PReq though group communication. User forwards its request to next available hop 
and before reaching ICA it passes through multiple hops. User generate new pseudonym pub­
lic/secret key pair and encrypt pubhc key and request for pseudonym by PK^^  ^ and then 
therefore it is hard for the outsider adversary to know the source of the message, group mem- 
bers/ICA are also unable to know the source as the source is GID . Thus PF support anonymity for 
both type of users such as requesting pseudonym certificate for the first time and returning users 
(already has been issued PC).
7.4.4 Perfect forward privacy
Forward privacy is defines as the privacy remains after resolution/revocation of particular PID/PC. 
There is no exphcit solution provided in the ADTN approach for both resolution and revocation 
while only resolution is provided in the V token approach. The V token solution do not achieved 
perfect forward privacy because in the resolution mechanism the identifying information is dis­
closed to L, from which it can deduce the real identity of the user, however, resolution of one PC 
do not effect other PC. The proposed PF provide both resolution and revocation protocol based 
on the collaboration of three certificate authorities. In our solution we achieved perfect forward 
privacy in resolution/revocation phase given that only the identifying information is disclosed to 
VCA only, to whom user authenticates by real identity in Pseudonym Credential Phase. The pro­
posed solution is robust enough that revocation of one PC results in revocation of all PCs issued 
to particular user.
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7.5 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed two accountability protocols through PhD concepts such as PbR 
and PbRe. Both protocols are based on dynamic and distributed mechanism, where collaboration 
of different multiple authorities resolve/revoke the PID/PC. Despite of accountability of user the 
real identity of the user is known to VCA only, to whom user authenticated by real identity and 
certificate for acquisition of credentials. The analysis of each protocol discussed different use 
cases and scenarios for resolution and revocation. The chapter has been closed with comparative 
analysis among two popular protocols and proposed PF, the comparison shows that PF provide 
more anonymous, secure and reliable solution.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
Many traditional networks i.e. Internet, satellite networks, WSNs etc are based on the assump­
tion of continuous end to end path between a source and a destination for the delivery of packets. 
However this assumptions is not always true for challenged networks such as sparse satellite net­
works,WSNs, deep space networks and rural area. This led to the conception and design of DTN 
to relax some of the assumptions such as high error rate, intermittent connectivity and provide 
interoperability in these challenged networks. DTN research has many promising practical apphc- 
ations in these challenged networks such as RA-DTN, which was the focus of this thesis.
Privacy refers to the abihty of the individual to control distribution of information about 
him/her self while anonymity and pseudonymity are the famous techniques to achieve it. While 
significant research has been achieved on improving routing and security issues for DTN, pri­
vacy has received relatively little attention. However, privacy in DTN is very important and chal­
lenging, especially in the rural area where DTN architecture is of great value. News reporting. 
Telemedicine are example applications in RA-DTN which requires hiding of end user identities 
while exchanging messages.
The proposed privacy solutions in literature for DTN rely on special nodes such as trusted 
gateway, pivot node or pawn group for stripping user’s identity prior to forwarding to next hop or 
destination. Therefore form single point of failure and big brother through these special nodes. 
A range of developed anonymity based privacy methods exist for conventional networks do not 
immediately applicable to DTN because of unpredictable patterns of connectivity, long commu­
nication delay, source routing and mixing. Pseudonym identity and certificate based solutions 
lacks the separation of duties among CAs and trusting them fully for not misbehaving. To provide 
solutions to aforementioned shortcomings we proposed two PbA based protocols and one each
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PbR and PbRe.
In Chapter 4 the proposed pseudonym framework is briefly described with all four phases. 
The system model is shown in Fig.4.3 and the overall design of the Pseudonym Framework is 
shown in Fig.4.4. The telemedicine application of RA-DTN is shown in Fig.4.2 and the proposed 
Pseudonym Framework is applied on it for the generation of Pseudonym Credential, Pseudonym 
Identity and Pseudonym Certificate. The detail conclusions of this work are presented in the 
following subsection.
8.1.1 Pseudonym Credential Phase
The first phase. Pseudonym Credential Phase represented in Chapter 5 is composed of two off­
line messages exchange between user and PDA, four online messages exchange between user 
and VCA. However considering DTN intermittent nature these messages exchange happened not 
very often and allow users to send certain number of blinded tokens to get multiple PCr. User 
is assigned a trust bit by PDA prior to credential request, later it authenticates to VCA and send 
blinded tokens according to policy/trust bit for blind signature, blinded token is the XOR function 
of hash of fresh random number and identity of the user, while PCr is VCA’s signed bhnded token 
contains some extra fields added by VCA for re-identification later in resolution/revocation pro­
cess. However it is not possible for VCA and PDA to link this particular PCr back to real identity 
unless other CA’s collaborate to do so. The challenge response method allow user to give lim­
ited personal information to VCA, also ehminate trust on it for signing always the right numbers 
and format of Bhnded Tokens , instead user can check the honesty of VCA. This phase has been 
modeled in Chapter 5 using CASPERFDR for functional correctness and security properties, the 
results show some attacks such as role confusion and multiphcity attack which were addressed us­
ing fresh nonce. It also shows defences against privacy attacks such as impersonation, repudiation 
and newly discovered influence attack. The threat model for attacks considered both misbehaving 
VCA and users.
Table.7.5 in Chapter 7 compares the Pcr with two well known solutions such as ADTN and V 
token and shows that PCr dominates both, also in proposed Pseudonym Framework, VCA can not 
become big brother or single point of failure.
8.1.2 Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase
The second phase in Chapter 6, Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase is presented in Chapter 6 
is composed of one mandatory and on optional message between user and any ICA for PID/PC 
issuance. The optional message is subject to security level required by user because this phase
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also eliminates trust assumption on ICA, thus in the second message user may verify the PID/PC 
generated by ICA. In this phase, user can contact multiple ICA’s for multiple certificate, thus 
suitable for DTN architecture and allow users to request PID/PC on less disconnected communic­
ation link. User first joined a group for increasing anonymity set size and achieving unhnkability 
between PCreq and PCr. ICA authenticates user on a particular PCr, verify p of VCA based on 
its certificate. After decryption of PCr, ICA obtained and 91, it construct a PID/PT
=(9Î1 1 1 1  ) TP Æ g VC6Z and PC based on it. It is not possible for ICA to learn the identity of
the user due to XOR function in BT and group communication allow users to enjoy unhnkability 
and anonymity against adversary and ICA. This phase shows that user achieved anonymity using 
group communication and it is hard for group member/ICA and adversary to link PReq to par­
ticular user/PCr. Threat analysis of this phase considered misbehaving ICA, aiming to construct 
self generated PID, however this attack is detected and defended. Double spending of same PCr 
with different ICAs is not possible, the detection and defending mechanism suits DTN as ICA self 
decide instead of contacting third party for verification. Information theoretic analysis measure 
privacy in terms of DoA and GDoA of individual user and group respectively,for different sizes 
of groups, probabihty distribution and adversary models. The results show that for N  >  100 and 
0.40 < p <  0.60, DoA archives 0.80 and saturate at V > 500 under passive adversary show in 
Chapter 6, Fig.6.6. The DoA never go above 0.60 for active attack in which adversary reduce 
the anonymity set size to 0^^, however DoA >  0.80 for N >  200 when adversary reduce the an­
onymity set size to show in Chapter 6, Fig.6.8 and Fig.6.9 respectively. The GDoA results 
show that DoA >  .80 is achieved for V > 100 for Q  < 0.70  while for iV <  100 it worst and never 
reached 0.70 as shown in Chapter 6, Fig.6.11. Roughly, we suggest that a system with good pri­
vacy is marked by DoA >  0.80, an average privacy is marked as DoA >  0.50 and worst privacy is 
DoA <  0.50. Therefore, under passive adversary for N  >  400 and at any probability distribution 
we achieve good privacy, <  100 clause achieved worst privacy and lOOA < N  <399  achieved 
average privacy. The proposed PF do not reach to good privacy for any N under the active attack 
on <i>^  ^ and achieved average privacy at A > 400 and worst privacy for N <  400. However, for 
active attack on T 5  good privacy is achieved at A > 200, average privacy for 77 > 100 and worst 
privacy âtN <  100.
8.1.3 Pseudonym Revocation and Resolution Phase
First half of this phase in Chapter 7, is the Collaborative Pseudonym Identity Resolution Pro­
tocol (CPIRP) composed of several messages exchange between authorities such ICA, VCA and 
L. However these authorities also acting as gateways, DTN assumed stable and persistent con-
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nections between gateways. The protocol achieved PbR as after resolution of Pseudonym ID the 
real identifying information is known to VCA only. It is not possible for any single authority to 
resolve Pseudonym ID without the consent of L and trace of activity on which user can be jur­
istic. The protocol distribute the ability of identity resolution among randomly selected authorities 
through threshold cryptography scheme. Any entity in the RA-DTN can request L for resolu­
tion of any Pseudonym ID with sufficient proof, L further pass the request to ICA who signed 
PC for user. Both ICA’s apply their and finally the PID is decrypted with TSK^ ^ ,^ fur­
ther VCA calculate/check some information and resolve Pseudonym ID to The protocol is 
analyzed for single to multiple Pseudonym ID resolution, where each PID/PC is signed by same 
or different ICA. CPIRP and threshold cryptography are vahdated for correctness and security in 
CASPER/FDR.
Second half of this phase in Chapter 7, Collaborative Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Pro­
tocol (CPCRP) composed of several messages between authorities which also acting as gateways 
such as ICA, VCA and L. The protocol achieved PbRe, thus ICA can revoke only self signed 
PC without knowing it real identity, however VCA is able to revoke all certificates based on real 
identity and PID issued to this particular user. The analysis section discussed three use cases of 
revocation such as intra subregion, inter subregion and inter region for PC vahdation and revoca­
tion.
8.2 Applicability of proposed PF to other networks
The proposed solution can be applied for Internet without any modification. However for VANETs 
and Intelligent Transport System (ITS) ; It is a composition of technologies and services whose 
aims include improving road safety and the efficiency of transport systems. The proposed PF may 
go through following possible changes:
• Certificate authority that grant credential for vehicle can be several in a region, for example 
for every three ICA, there should be one VCA. The communication link can be a persistent 
wireless link for messages exchange for PCr.
•  Certificate authority that issue certificate for vehicle can be Road Side Unit (RSU), which 
also acts as gateway. For the messages exchange 802.l ip  Dedicated Short Range Commu­
nications (DSRC) can be used.
• Credential must be grant independent of the ICA, thus user can spend a particular PCr with 
any ICA, double spending problem can be solved through distributed servers/RSU.
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In case of Resolution/Revocation, CRL distribution must be efficient and global, for example if 
certificate is revoked then this information should be updated on each RSU prior to vehicle use 
another certificate. In ITS it is not possible for vehicle to keep CRL, therefore before secure 
communication it will download the updated CRL from RSU.
8.3 Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed PhD pseudonym based framework for DTN, the solution preserve 
privacy of end user though pseudonym identity and certificate. The work presented in this thesis 
can be continued and we list some directions for future work:
• In the proposed PF solution we have one CA i.e. VCA responsible for granting pseud­
onym credential to all types of users , In the future we will extend the architecture for 
multiple VCA which grant role based pseudonym credentials to users, for example VCA 
for financial pseudonym credential, social networking etc. Therefore, revocation/resolution 
of pseudonym certificates based on financial pseudonym credential will not revoke/resolve 
pseudonym certificates based on social networking pseudonym credentials. However, a 
careful thought is needed to apply it in DTN because it may involve many interactions with 
certificate authorities and gateways.
• The overall framework can be analyzed for new privacy attacks such as sybil, cloning , 
packet counting and intersection attack. Groups is DTN are relatively new idea and required 
research on formation and maintenance in case of large delays, disruption and misbehaving 
members. For privacy it is beneficial to form group without the presence of group manager 
to avoid unwanted tracing and accountability. Resolution and Revocation can be revisited 
for quantification of anonymity and unhnkability, also its modehng can be improved and 
analyzed for modified dolev yao model.
•  There is a requirement of definition of a privacy pohcy that addresses issues related to con­
sent and disclosure, correction of and access to records, data retention, and conditions on 
data sharing. Also provide guidance for the actual policy realization throughout the fife 
cycle of PF.
• In PF during the Pseudonym Credential Phase, user authenticates to VCA by real identity, 
therefore anonymous authentication is required so that VCA is assured that user is a legitim­
ate user but unable to know its real identity. This method can be extended for group joining 
in the Pseudonym Certificate Issuance Phase.
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• During the communication phase users with multiple PID/PC can securely exchange mes­
sage with each other, however, they can be traced and adversary can link different actions 
to one PID. Therefore untraceability is important requirement and can be achieved through 
efficient pseudonym changeover algorithm or introducing a silent zone in which users can 
change their PID’s without being observed.
• Work in this area can be extended in many ways; More research is needed to find an efficient 
way of computing the probability distributions that lead to the anonymity provided by PF as 
a whole. Quantification of the anonymity systems, are typically based on a specific attack 
that apphes to the system being examined, therefor general metrics are required which are 
independent of system under consideration. A further consideration for the development of a 
quantifications is their abihty to be apphed in real world systems. The current quantification 
is appropriate for simulations in which the entire state of a given system is known to the 
user. The revocation and resolution phase of PF can be measured for privacy under different 
attack models.
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Appendix A
Security Protocol Verification using 
CasperFDR
A.l Needham Schroeder Puhlic Key Protocol (NSPK)
The Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NSPK) is one of the famous case studies in formal 
methods in general and CASPER, FDR and CSP tool chain in particular. The popularity comes 
from the attack which was being discovered after 16 years by Gavin. He modeled the protocol in 
CSP process algebra and uses FDR model checker to explore state space.
The NSPK involves three messages exchanges between Alice and Bob for authentication pur­
poses, however both know each other public key. The protocol beings with A selecting a nonce 
ria, and sending along with it real identity to B encrypted with pubhc key of B. When B receive 
this message it decrypt it and obtain the nonce ria. Further B encrypt the nonce Ua and its own 
generated nonce nt with pubhc key of A and send along with its identity and A’s identity. When 
A receives the message and obtained Ua and rib, fiom ria A’s assured that he is talking to B because 
only B can decrypt the message sent by A earher. A return the nonce rib encrypted with pubhc key 
of B along with its real identity and B’s real identity. When B decrypt the message and obtain rib, 
so this make assure that he is talking to A because only A can decrypt the message in which rib 
had been sent. Thus after the complete run of the protocol both A and B authenticate each other. 
The protocol is shown below in standard cryptographic notations. Where A denotes Alice and B 
denotes B, PKa and PKb are the pubhc keys of Ahce and Bob respectively. The actual steps of the 
protocol are shown in Tab.A.l.
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A ^ B A, B, {ria,A}PKb
B -^ A B, A, {na,fib}pKA
A ^ B A, B, {rib}P K b
Table A.l: Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol
A.2 Modeling NSPK
This section modeled the NSPK in CASPER/FDR tool chain. The notations used in the modeling 
of this protocol are according to CSP, which is mathematical like language for describing proto­
cols. The protocol modeled is divided into several sections, where each section is started with # 
sign as shown in Tab.A.2. We will discuss each section step by step.
#Free variables
A, B: Agent 
na, nb : Nonce 
PK: Agent — > PublicKey 
SK: Agent — > SecretKey 
InverseKeys = (PK, SK)
#Specification 
Secret (A, na, [B])
Secret (B, nb, [A])
Agreement (A,B,[na,nb])
Agreement (B,A,[na,nb])
#Functions 
symbohc PK, SK 
#Intruder Information 
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice, Bob, Mallory, 
Nm, PK, SK{(Mallory)}}
#Processes
INITIATOR (A,na) knows PK, SK(A) 
RESPONDER (B,nb) knows PK, SK(B) 
#Protocol description
0. -  >  A : B
1. A -> B :{ n a} { P X (R )}
2 . B - >  A:  {na,nb}{PK(A)}
3. A -  >  B: {nb}{PK(B)}
#Actual variables
Alice, Bob, Malloiy: Agent 
Na, Nb, Nm: Nonce 
#System
INITIATOR (Alice, Na)
RESPONDER (Bob, Nb)
Table A.2: Formal Model of NSPK
The free variables, defines type of variable and functions that are used in the protocol. The 
term free variables is names because they will be instantiated to their actual values in the actual 
system. In NSPK A, B are type agent variables which are honest participant involved in the run 
of the protocol. The terms ria and rib should be taken to be type of nonce generated by A and B 
respectively, which are random in nature. Every agent has pubhc/private key, PK and SK returns 
agent’s public and private key respectively. Inverse key function indicates that PK and SK are 
inverse of each other, anything encrypted with any key will be decrypted with the other key. The 
Process, All agents participating in the protocol run will be represented as CSP process. In NSPK 
Alice is initiator and Bob is responder. The parameters shows the knowledge an agent have before 
run of the protocol, the lines shows in NSPK that each agent should know its identity and nonce. 
The keyword ’’knows” define the network knowledge of an entity i.e. each agent should know the
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public keys of all nodes involved in the protocol run and its own secrete key. In NSPK initiator 
Alice knows public key of the responder Bob and the responder Bob knows the pubhc key of Ahce 
addition to its own private key. Generally the above knowledge allows any agent to send message 
that could be expected to create and receive messages that it’s able to decrypt or verify.
Protocol Description, defines the sequence of the messages exchanges. In NSPK Alice ini­
tiates the protocol run in stepO by starting a session with Bob. However the absence of sender 
in the stepO indicates that this message is sent by the environment. In stepl Alice want to au­
thenticate itself to Bob and thus send nonce encrypted with well known pubhc key of Bob. Bob 
after decrypting the message get the nonce ria and construct another message by including its own 
generated nonce with the received one both encrypted with pubhc key of Ahce in step2. Ahce de­
crypt the message by applying it’s private key and obtained both nonces, it compares the received 
nonce Ua with the one it generated by itself, the match successfully authenticate Bob to Ahce. In 
step3 Ahce send the received nonce rib to Bob encrypted with Bob’s pubhc key. Bob decrypt the 
message sent by Ahce with its private key and compare the obtained rib with the one it generate by 
itself, a match successfully authenticate Alice to Bob . The notations {m} {k} represents message 
m encrypted with key k.
Specification, defines all the properties for which a particular protocol is intended to check. 
In NSPK specification part checks the protocol for security properties such as secrecy and authen­
tication. ’’Secrete” keyword is used for secrecy property, i.e. an agent thinks that something is 
secrete between him and the other agent. In NSPK the specification check Alice thinks that ria 
is secrete between himself and Bob, however if Bob is intruder or captured by intruder then the 
secrete is no more secret between Alice and Bob. The secrecy also hold for Bob in the same fash­
ion.” Agreement” is authentication specifications, i.e. an agent is correctly authenticated to another 
agent on the data values. This is the highest degree of authentication, however weakagreement is 
the lowest. In NSPK the agreement specification checks weather Alice is correctly authenticated 
to Bob using data value ria and rib, and also Bob is correctly authenticated to Alice on ria and rib 
data values. Generally if A complete run of protocol with B on specific data values then it means 
the B already running the protocol with A on the same data values. In weakagreement if A acting 
as initiator complete run of protocol with B then apparently B has previously been running the 
protocol with A, however B is not necessarily acting as responder of the message. For example 
intruder imitates B and it start run of protocol with A, then A thinks that it is running protocol with 
B however B thinks that he is running protocol with intruder.
Actual variables, defines the variable in the similar fashion as free variables, but these vari­
ables are used in the actual system. It is normal practice to start write full name of agent involved
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in the protocol run with the name of intruder and also the other data items. In NSPK Alice and 
Bob are two participating agents and Mallory is the intruder, nonces ria, rib and nm are generated 
by Alice, Bob and Mallory respectively. Function defines different functions used in the protocol
i.e. public/private key, shared key, secrete key etc. The keyword ’’symbolic” tells Casper to pro­
duce its won values for the result of function application. NSPK includes a sole public/private key 
function.
System described the agents to be checked with their instantiated parameters list. NSPK 
involves single initiator and responder with same parameters list defined in the process part of the 
protocol model. Intruder, specify the intruder’s knowledge and abihty. NSPK is analyzed in the 
presence of Dolev Yao intruder model, in which the adversary has its own identity, public/private 
key pair, nonce. Further it knows the identities of all participating nodes in the protocol run and 
their public keys.
A.3 Results of NSPK
This section first discuss abstract of attacks on NSPK before CasperFDR results of NSPK model. 
As illustrated in Fig.A.l, A initiate the protocol and B is responder, MR is the attacker Mallory 
observing communication between them. Both participating agents share an insecure communica­
tion channel i.e. A.B or B.A. These communication channels are susceptible to attack by MR who 
may intercept or spoof message sent between two agents over take and fake channel. A send the 
message to B, which is intercepted by MR through take channel, the message is reroute through 
fake message to B. The same action also happens to the message sent by B to A. Attacker starts 
a communication channel with A and B by impersonating their identities. Both agents are aware 
of communication over the insecure channel but unable to discern that the message sent/receive 
honestly along the conununication channel or dishonestly along the take/fake channels.
All found attacks on NSPK are from Lowe analysis. CasperFDR is started by executing the 
shell script, after pressing the ’’compile” button, it checks the model for errors. After pressing 
’’check” button the compiler creates refinement assertions based on the specification content of 
the model, these assertions are further checked using FDR. The first assertion corresponds to the 
secrecy specification that weather the claim of Alice and Bob is valid that na and nb is secrete 
between them only.
The attack found in Fig.A.2 shows that intruder is able to get hold of nonce generated by 
Alice. The top level trace described believes of agents i.e. A believes that nonce ria is secret share 
with intruder. The notion I a / B  represents that intruder taking Agent’s identity, for either faking, 
replaying or intercepting messages. In stepl intruder intercept the message and start session with
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Figure A.l: NSPK: Composition of Honest and Dishonest Nodes
Alice, while Alice is thinking that it starts session with Bob, further intruder take the identity of 
Alice and fake the message received earlier. In Step2 Bob send message assuming session with 
Alice but intruder receive message instead of Alice. This way intruder launch man in the middle 
attack and can take, fake and reply messages exchanges between Alice and Bob. By end of the 
protocol intruder taking Alice and Bob identities came to know about nonce na, which Alice think 
it is secrete between himself and Bob.
In the same assertions we are also checking weather rib is a secrete between Bob and Alice 
only. However this claim is again not valid as intruder is able to obtain the secrete nonce nb as 
shown in Fig.A.3. Intruder intercept the message in stepl and able to starts session with Alice. 
Further Intruder takes the identity of Alice and replays the message by sending to Bob. Bob reply 
in step2 by assuming that it is running session with Alice and sends ria and to intruder, however 
message is encrypted with Public key of Alice, so intruder can not decrypt it. Intruder replay the 
received message and send to Alice, where he decrypt it and send nt, back to Intruder in stepS. 
This way intruder obtain the secrete rib which Bob thinks he share with Alice only.
The Fig.A.4 shows the attack where Bob believes that it authenticates itself to Alice using 
nonces ria and rib as data items. Intruder behaving man in the middle take the first message sends 
by Alice to Bob where it is able to get ria. In step3 Alice sent the message contains ria to intruder 
using. This way Bob authenticate itself to intruder Mallory instead of Alice.
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Attack found:
Top l e v e l  trace:
The in tr u d e r  knows Nb
System le v e l :
Casper> •> A : I
1. A . >11:  (Na, A)(PK(I))
L I A .> B : (Na, A|(PX(B))
2. B .> I A : (Na, Nb)(PK(A))
2. I I .> Â : (Na, Nb)(M((A))
3. Â > 1 1 :  (N b )(P k (I)}
3 . U  '> B : (N
The in tr u d e r  knows
compte ! fhoçk; çqmpiif&çh«k
Figure A.3: Secrecy Attack (nonce of B)
The Fig. A.5 shows the attack which is launch on Alice, In the actual protocol run Alice want 
to authenticate itself to Bob using data items ria, nb. But due to intruder interception Alice au­
thenticates to intruder using data items ria and nm- In the first message intruder take the identity
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FJe
ccFjsiBj c-nect & check:
Checking a s se rtio n  ftl(TH2,H::ftuttientiC3teINITUTORToR£SFO»^3kAgreenent [T^ AUlH2jM::SrSTEKJ 
A ttack found:
Top level tra c e :
B believes {s)he has cofipleted a run of the pro toco l, tak ing  ro le  PESPONCER, with A, using data l te ? s  Na, Nb
System level:
Câsper> 0 . •> A : I
1. A . > 1 1 :  {Na, A}{PK(I)}
1.  I A .> B : (Na, A}{PK(B))
2. B - > I A : (Na, Nb}{PK(A)}
2. I I •> Â : (Na, Nbj{PK(A)}
3. Â . > 1 1 : (Nb}{PK(in
3. I A .> B : (%HPK(B))
Figure A.4: Authentication Attack (Bob)
of Bob and take the message sent by Alice to Bob, later on it replay the message to Bob. In step2 
Bob send the message encrypted with intruder public key contains ria and rib- Intruder decrypts the 
message and then later on modifies the message by including nm instead of rib and send to Alice. 
Alice decrypts the message and obtained rim, which she further sends to intruder in step3. This 
way Alice authenticate to intruder instead of Bob.
IIHnHI b M M t i
Fie
— J
-----H
M k ir g  assertion AUTH2_M; ;A u t h M l T 1 [T= ÂüI h2_M:;Sï STE.U
itack fame:
cp level i f x e :
Alice believes she has completed a run of the protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with BoP, using data i t e : s  Na, No 
jysieo level:
> Alice : Bob 
. Alice •> IM : (Na)|PK(Bob}|
. I_Fall£)fy •> b  : (Na)iPi((Bob)i
I Bob ■> I Fallory : (Na, %)|PK(Hallory)|
I I_eoD •> "Alice : (Na, NiHPKiAlice}}
]. Alice > I Boo : (Nf!HPk(Bci))l
Figure A.5: Authentication Attack (Alice)
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A.4 Remodeling NSPK
Lowe remodeled the protocol in order to avoid the aforementioned attacks by the intruder. The 
modified protocol is again analyzed in CasperFDR under Dolev Yao adversary model, but this time 
no attack was launched by the intruder. The following steps in Tab.A.3 described the remodeling 
of NSPK.
A ^ B A, B, {ria,A}pKs
B ^ A B, A, {ria,ni),B}pK^
A ^ B A, B, {rib}PKb
Table A.3; Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol
The modified protocol only includes the identity of B in the second message encrypted under 
the public key of Alice. Therefore intruder can not replay the message sent by Bob to Alice as 
Alice is expecting Bob identity in the message and the message is encrypted with Alice public 
key of which the corresponding private key is known to Alice only. We further checked the model 
using CasperFDR and found no attack as seen below in the Fig.A.6.
I n l i la U s ln g  C asp er.. . .  Done.
I n i t ia l i s in g  FDR., . ,  Done.
Ready.
Casper version  2 ,0
P a r s in g .. ,
Type c h e ck in g .. .
C onsistency c h e c k in g ...
C om piling., ,
W riting ou tp u t. . .
Output w ritten  to  / user/eepgr/na0G092/Download/NS3.csp  
Done
S ta r tin g  FOR
Check Irig /u se  r/eepg r/ na00092/ Dcwnl oad/NSS. c sp
Checking assort Ian SECRETM; : SECRET SPEC (T  ^ SEC%T_M; : SYSTEMES 
Mo attack  found
Checking a sse r t io n  SECRET_M: :SEO>ECRET_,£PEC [T- SECRET_M: :SYSTEM_S_SEQ 
No attack  found
Checking a sse r t io n  AUTH1_M: :AuthenticalelNITIAT0RToPESP0NDEP.4greement_na_nb AUTH1_M;:5YSTEM_1
No attack  found
Checking a sse r t io n  AUlH2_M: ; Authenticat6Î5cSP0î^RToINlTlATÔPAgreeinent_na_nb iT* AUTH2_M; iSYSTE«_2 
No at lock found
[>ooe
Figure A.6; Authentication Attack (Bob)
The modified model of the protocol is safe and secure when two agents involved each one 
having one nonce, but further this protocol can be analyzed if agents increase in numbers or their 
nonces increases. Generally if a protocol is secure for smaller system then it can be generalized 
through some methods that it would be also secure for larger system. NSPK is not the focus of
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this thesis, rather in this appendix we have shown that CasperFDR is being used for the popular 
NSP protocol which serves in the research community for seventeen years as a secure protocol but 
after modeling it in CasperFDR; we have found attack on it which is initially found by Lowe.
A.5 Analysis of NSPK
The remodeling of NSPK and checking it with secrecy and authentication properties find no attack. 
However it is always good to consider some different systems as shown in Tab.A.4 of the same 
protocol. Therefore this section will analyze NSPK after remodeling with some different system 
to uncover any attacks.
First System Second System
#System #System
INITIATOR (Alice, Na) INITIATOR (Bob, Na)
RESPONDER (Alice, Na) RESPONDER (Bob, Nb)
Third System
#System
INITIATOR (Alice, Na) 
INITIATOR (Alice, Na) 
RESPONDER (Bob, Nb) 
RESPONDER (Bob, Nb)
Table A.4: Systems
A.5.1 First System
This system shown in Tab.A.4 considered the case in which the initiator A can run the protocol 
once as initiator and once as responder possibly concurrently. The possible scenario of this system 
can be file transfer between two computers own by same person.
CasperFDR found attack on this system, the attack is known as self authentication attack, its 
system level trace is shown in Tab.A.5.
System level:
Casper— >  0. — > Alice : Mallory
1. Alice — >  I-Mallory : {Na,Alice}{PK{Mallory)}
1 .1-Alice — >  Alice : {Nm,Alice}{PK{Alice)}
2. Alice — > I-Alice : {Nm,Na,Alice}{PK{Alice)}
3. IM ice -  >  Alice : {Na}{PK(Alice)}
Table A.5: Self Authentication Attack(First System)
In this attack the intruder is able to reply the message-1, which Alice is send nonce to the 
its another account, however the message is caught by intruder and reply to Alice back. Alice is
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thinking that it got the response message from other account therefore start communication with 
intruder. This way Alice is authenticated to intruder as well as nonce is leak to intruder.
A.5.2 Second System
In this system we consider responder B who can ran the protocol once as initiator and once as 
responder, this system is reciprocal of the previous system.
This system shows same self authentication attack, however the difference is only the identity 
is changed from Ahce to Bob. Bob authenticates to intruder thinking it as Alice and therefore 
nonce nb is leak to the intruder. The system level trace is shown in the Tab.A.6
System level:
Casper— >  0. — > Bob : Mallory
1. Bob — > IJVIallory : {Na,Bob]{PK{Mallory)}
1. IM ice  -  >  Bob : {Na,Alice]{PK(Bob)}
2. Bob -  >  IM ice  : {Na,Na,Bob}{PK{Alice)}
3. IM ice  -  >  Bob : {Na){PK{Bob)}
Table A.6: Self Authentication Attack(Second System)
A.5.3 Third System
In this system both initiator and responder ran the protocol twice, the objective can be to authen­
ticate twice to each other, however CasperFDR finds multiplicity attack , in this attack the two 
agents are disagree about the number of times the protocol has been ran. This attack can be severe 
if it involves in onhne banking, where customer may authenticate on same data values to bank 
and debit the account twice. In other way customer may give his account information to intruder 
instead to bank.
The analysis shows that there is careful measures are needed to make the system or protocol 
attack free under some specific threat model. Theses attacks were launched because lack of fresh 
nonce while authenticating each time. Therefore these attacks can be defended if each time agents 
uses unique and fresh nonce to authenticate to another agent. For example Alice should use dif­
ferent nonce i.e. Naa in third system same as Bob N^ b-
Appendix B
Opportunistic Network Simulator 
(ONE)
Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator is an evaluation system specifically de­
signed for DTN behavior and routing protocols. The main functions of ONE simulator are the 
modehng of node movement, routing, message handling and inter-node contacts. This simulator 
is particularly suitable for performing simulations for terrestrial DTNs. The ONE simulator has 
in-built capabilities for mobility modeling, integrated support for DTN routing and incorporates a 
number of tools to support visualization and report generation.
Node movement is implemented by different movement models which are either synthetic 
models or based on existing movement traces. The routing functions are implemented by provid­
ing support of different routing algorithms. It aheady provides support for six different DTN 
routing algorithms and still flexible enough that new routing modules can be easily added to the 
simulator. The simulator is an event based simulator and events are generated via different gener­
ators. The messages are always unicast from a single source to a single destination. At the end, the 
simulation results are collected through different report generators. Simulator provides a flexible 
way to add new reports generators.
The core of the ONE is an agent-based discrete event simulator which uses time slicing ap­
proach to efficiently support simultaneous movement and routing simulation. The simulation time 
advances in fixed steps and the simulator supports any number of different types of wireless nodes 
which can be grouped in node groups which share common parameters such as buffer size radio 
range and mobility model. The simulator has GUI support to allow the interaction between the 
movement modeling and routing simulation to be visualized. The simulator supports report mod­
ules which capture data during the simulation for further analysis. ONE can be run on Linux, 
Windows or any other platform which supports Java.
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Simulations in the ONE can be run in the GUI or Batch modes as shown in the Fig.B.l. The 
GUI mode is best suited for testing, debugging and for demonstration purposes. The GUI mode 
allows the simulation to be visualized in real-time. The GUI mode also allows for node inspection 
and the retrieval of routing specific information. On the other hand, the Batch mode is best for 
running large amount of simulation involving different sets of parameters. The Batch mode is 
well-suited when real-time visualization is not a need and all processing power is channeled for 
the simulation. Both modes support the generation of reports for further analysis.
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Figure B.l: ONE Simulator GUI
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